Conjecture, proof, and sense in Wittgenstein's philosophy of mathematics

One of the key tenets in Wittgenstein’s philosophy of mathematics is that a mathematical proposition gets its meaning from its proof. This seems to have the paradoxical consequence that a mathematical conjecture has no meaning, or at least not the same meaning that it will have once a proof has been found. Hence, it would appear that a conjecture can never be proven true: for what is proven true must ipso facto be a different proposition from what was only conjectured. Moreover, it would appear impossible that the same mathematical proposition be proven in different ways. — I will consider some of Wittgenstein’s remarks on these issues, and attempt to reconstruct his position in a way that makes it appear less paradoxical.

Post-normal science and the art of nature conservation

Nature conservation may be considered a post-normal science in that the loss of biodiversity and increasing environmental degradation require urgent action but are characterised by uncertainty at every level. An ‘extended peer community’ with varying skills, perceptions and values are involved in decision-making and implementation of conservation, and the uncertainty involved limits the effectiveness of practice. In this paper we briefly review the key ecological, philosophical and methodological uncertainties associated with conservation, and then highlight the uncertainties and gaps present within the structure and interactions of the conservation community, and which exist mainly between researchers and practitioners, in the context of nature conservation in the UK. We end by concluding that an openly post-normal science framework for conservation, which acknowledges this uncertainty but strives to minimise it, would be a useful progression for nature conservation, and recommend ways in which knowledge transfer between researchers and practitioners can be improved to support robust decision making and conservation enactment.

Applied philosophy of language

This chapter explores the extent to which philosophy of language can be considered an applied discipline. I consider, first, ways in which sub-sections of philosophy of language may be considered as applied in terms of their subject matter and/or the kinds of questions being addressed (e.g. philosophy of language which deals with derogatory or inflammatory uses of language, or the role of philosophy of language within feminist philosophy). Then, in the second part of the chapter, I turn to consider a more general (and perhaps more controversial) conception of philosophy of language as applied, which arises from the methodology adopted and the relationship of the discipline to empirical data.