Criar o próprio jogo didático ou apenas jogar? Efeitos de diferentes estratégias de ensino na motivação e aprendizado de ciências

The use of games as educational tools is common, however the effectiveness of games with educational purposes is still poorly known. In this study we evaluated three different low-cost teaching strategies make and play your own board game, just play an educational science game and make a poster to be exposed in the school regarding: (1) science learning; (2) use of deep learning strategies (DLS); and (3) intrinsic motivation. We tested the hypothesis that, in these three parameters evaluated, scores would be higher in the group that made and play their own game, followed respectively by the group that just played a game and the group that made a poster. The research involved 214 fifth-grade students from six elementary schools in Natal/RN. A group of students made and played their own science board game (N = 68), a second group played a science game (N = 75), and a third group made a poster to be exposed at school (N = 71). Our hypothesis was partly empirically supported, since there was no significant difference in science learning and in the use of DLS between the group that made their own game and the group that just played the game; however, both groups had significantly higher scores in science learning and in use of DLS than the group that made the poster. There was no significant difference in the scores of intrinsic motivation among the three experimental groups. Our results indicate that activities related to non-digital games can provide a favorable context for learning in the school environment. We conclude that the use of games for educational purposes (both making a game and just playing a game) is an efficient and viable alternative to teach science in Brazilian public school

Regional integration and the issue of choosing an appropriate exchange-rate regime in Latin America

Includes bibliography

Caracterização da interação de inositol hexafosfato e cloreto com hemoglobina humana: aspectos energéticos e estruturais

Pós-graduação em Biofísica Molecular - IBILCE

Redução do medo durante o tratamento odontológico utilizando pontas ultrassônicas

Over the last few years, new technologies have been developed to making cavity preparations, among which the diamond burs CVDentus® (CVDentus, São José dos Campos, Brazil) are outstanding. These points are produced by chemical deposition from the vapor phase, forming a single diamond stone, with greater durability than the conventional diamond burs. Coupled to the ultrasound appliance, they have several clinical applications in Dentistry with advantages over conventional rotary instruments, such as lower pressure, noise, vibration and heat, as well as reducing the need to use local anesthesia, contributing to minimize patient’s fear and anxiety. The aim of this study was to present the complete restorative dental treatment performed with this system in a child patient with a prior history of non-cooperative behavior. The use of this new technology offered the patient greater comfort, making it possible recondition the patient’s attitude to dental treatment, in addition to favoring conservative cavity preparations to be made.

Lo spazio senso-motorio come rappresentazione dei comportamenti intersoggettivi. Una nuova ipotesi sperimentale dalla filosofia alle neuroscienze

La ricerca ha preso le mosse da tre ipotesi fondamentali: 1) Esiste un legame tra processi cognitivi di basso ed alto livello; 2) Lo spazio senso-motorio è una percezione soggettiva; 3) Lo spazio senso-motorio varia in funzione delle diverse modalità di interazione sociale. La tesi sostiene che lo spazio senso-motorio si lascia modulare dalla semplice co-presenza di un altro agente umano e da interazioni cooperative e non cooperative. I capitoli I, II, III, hanno lo scopo di scomporre e spiegare il significato della prima, seconda e terza ipotesi; giungendo a formulare la tesi centrale che sarà poi dimostrata sperimentalmente nel capitolo IV. Il capitolo V introduce future linee di ricerca nell’ambito dell’etica proponendo una nuova ipotesi sul legame che potrebbe sussistere tra la percezione dello spazio durante l’interazione sociale e i giudizi morali. Il lavoro svolto chiama ad operare insieme diverse discipline che concorrono a formare le scienze cognitive: la storia della filosofia, la filosofia della mente contemporanea, la neuropsicologia sperimentale ed alcuni temi della psicologia sociale.

Caratteristiche ed efficienza economica del Distretto agroalimentare del Pecorino Romano DOP

Una delle realtà economiche più importanti della Sardegna è la produzione di Pecorino Romano DOP. Il contesto nel quale è nato e si è sviluppato ingloba molte delle precondizioni che favoriscono la nascita di un distretto. Il principale obiettivo di questo studio è verificare se il comparto lattiero caseario della Sardegna, focalizzato nella produzione di Pecorino Romano DOP, può creare un effetto distretto. Ciò potrebbe suggerire l'esistenza dello stesso distretto anche se atipico. Per verificare questa ipotesi, in primo luogo è stata esaminata l'efficienza produttiva delle imprese trasformatrici di Pecorino Romano utilizzando il metodo della Frontiera stocastica di produzione. Successivamente sono state cercate le cause delle differenze. Lo studio mostra che i livelli di efficienza osservati sono quasi interamente attribuibili agli input di produzione utilizzati, in particolare al latte. Risulta chiaro che il sistema delle cooperative funziona e che tali aziende ottengono sistematicamente margini di efficienza migliori rispetto alle non cooperative. Le variabili analizzate non permettono di concludere che esiste un "effetto distretto".

Bargaining for power and information : an experimental and theoretical analysis of the interaction between institutions, externalities and adverse selection

Bargaining is the building block of many economic interactions, ranging from bilateral to multilateral encounters and from situations in which the actors are individuals to negotiations between firms or countries. In all these settings, economists have been intrigued for a long time by the fact that some projects, trades or agreements are not realized even though they are mutually beneficial. On the one hand, this has been explained by incomplete information. A firm may not be willing to offer a wage that is acceptable to a qualified worker, because it knows that there are also unqualified workers and cannot distinguish between the two types. This phenomenon is known as adverse selection. On the other hand, it has been argued that even with complete information, the presence of externalities may impede efficient outcomes. To see this, consider the example of climate change. If a subset of countries agrees to curb emissions, non-participant regions benefit from the signatories’ efforts without incurring costs. These free riding opportunities give rise to incentives to strategically improve ones bargaining power that work against the formation of a global agreement. This thesis is concerned with extending our understanding of both factors, adverse selection and externalities. The findings are based on empirical evidence from original laboratory experiments as well as game theoretic modeling. On a very general note, it is demonstrated that the institutions through which agents interact matter to a large extent. Insights are provided about which institutions we should expect to perform better than others, at least in terms of aggregate welfare. Chapters 1 and 2 focus on the problem of adverse selection. Effective operation of markets and other institutions often depends on good information transmission properties. In terms of the example introduced above, a firm is only willing to offer high wages if it receives enough positive signals about the worker’s quality during the application and wage bargaining process. In Chapter 1, it will be shown that repeated interaction coupled with time costs facilitates information transmission. By making the wage bargaining process costly for the worker, the firm is able to obtain more accurate information about the worker’s type. The cost could be pure time cost from delaying agreement or cost of effort arising from a multi-step interviewing process. In Chapter 2, I abstract from time cost and show that communication can play a similar role. The simple fact that a worker states to be of high quality may be informative. In Chapter 3, the focus is on a different source of inefficiency. Agents strive for bargaining power and thus may be motivated by incentives that are at odds with the socially efficient outcome. I have already mentioned the example of climate change. Other examples are coalitions within committees that are formed to secure voting power to block outcomes or groups that commit to different technological standards although a single standard would be optimal (e.g. the format war between HD and BlueRay). It will be shown that such inefficiencies are directly linked to the presence of externalities and a certain degree of irreversibility in actions. I now discuss the three articles in more detail. In Chapter 1, Olivier Bochet and I study a simple bilateral bargaining institution that eliminates trade failures arising from incomplete information. In this setting, a buyer makes offers to a seller in order to acquire a good. Whenever an offer is rejected by the seller, the buyer may submit a further offer. Bargaining is costly, because both parties suffer a (small) time cost after any rejection. The difficulties arise, because the good can be of low or high quality and the quality of the good is only known to the seller. Indeed, without the possibility to make repeated offers, it is too risky for the buyer to offer prices that allow for trade of high quality goods. When allowing for repeated offers, however, at equilibrium both types of goods trade with probability one. We provide an experimental test of these predictions. Buyers gather information about sellers using specific price offers and rates of trade are high, much as the model’s qualitative predictions. We also observe a persistent over-delay before trade occurs, and this mitigates efficiency substantially. Possible channels for over-delay are identified in the form of two behavioral assumptions missing from the standard model, loss aversion (buyers) and haggling (sellers), which reconcile the data with the theoretical predictions. Chapter 2 also studies adverse selection, but interaction between buyers and sellers now takes place within a market rather than isolated pairs. Remarkably, in a market it suffices to let agents communicate in a very simple manner to mitigate trade failures. The key insight is that better informed agents (sellers) are willing to truthfully reveal their private information, because by doing so they are able to reduce search frictions and attract more buyers. Behavior observed in the experimental sessions closely follows the theoretical predictions. As a consequence, costless and non-binding communication (cheap talk) significantly raises rates of trade and welfare. Previous experiments have documented that cheap talk alleviates inefficiencies due to asymmetric information. These findings are explained by pro-social preferences and lie aversion. I use appropriate control treatments to show that such consideration play only a minor role in our market. Instead, the experiment highlights the ability to organize markets as a new channel through which communication can facilitate trade in the presence of private information. In Chapter 3, I theoretically explore coalition formation via multilateral bargaining under complete information. The environment studied is extremely rich in the sense that the model allows for all kinds of externalities. This is achieved by using so-called partition functions, which pin down a coalitional worth for each possible coalition in each possible coalition structure. It is found that although binding agreements can be written, efficiency is not guaranteed, because the negotiation process is inherently non-cooperative. The prospects of cooperation are shown to crucially depend on i) the degree to which players can renegotiate and gradually build up agreements and ii) the absence of a certain type of externalities that can loosely be described as incentives to free ride. Moreover, the willingness to concede bargaining power is identified as a novel reason for gradualism. Another key contribution of the study is that it identifies a strong connection between the Core, one of the most important concepts in cooperative game theory, and the set of environments for which efficiency is attained even without renegotiation.

Minimizing the Price of Tranquility: How to Discourage Scotland's Secession from the United Kingdom

What some view as overly-generous funding of the Scottish parliament results from Scotland.s credible threat to secede from the United Kingdom. Scotland is shown to benefit from a second mover advantage in a non-cooperative sequential game over the allocation of public funds. Various reform proposals are criticized for not recognizing that reform of Scottish government finances must be consistent with Scotland.s credible threat. Fiscal autonomy -- in which the Scottish parliament finances a much greater proportion of its spending from Scottish-sourced taxes, is demonstrated to be a viable reform within the existing political context and, in some circumstances, could remove Scotland.s second mover advantage. We also use a cooperative bargaining game model to demonstrate that an Australian style grants commission would not be a viable reform in the British context.

Diseño de algoritmos de guerra electrónica y radar para su implementación en sistemas de tiempo real

Esta tesis se centra en el estudio y desarrollo de algoritmos de guerra electrónica {electronic warfare, EW) y radar para su implementación en sistemas de tiempo real. La llegada de los sistemas de radio, radar y navegación al terreno militar llevó al desarrollo de tecnologías para combatirlos. Así, el objetivo de los sistemas de guerra electrónica es el control del espectro electomagnético. Una de la funciones de la guerra electrónica es la inteligencia de señales {signals intelligence, SIGINT), cuya labor es detectar, almacenar, analizar, clasificar y localizar la procedencia de todo tipo de señales presentes en el espectro. El subsistema de inteligencia de señales dedicado a las señales radar es la inteligencia electrónica {electronic intelligence, ELINT). Un sistema de tiempo real es aquel cuyo factor de mérito depende tanto del resultado proporcionado como del tiempo en que se da dicho resultado. Los sistemas radar y de guerra electrónica tienen que proporcionar información lo más rápido posible y de forma continua, por lo que pueden encuadrarse dentro de los sistemas de tiempo real. La introducción de restricciones de tiempo real implica un proceso de realimentación entre el diseño del algoritmo y su implementación en plataformas “hardware”. Las restricciones de tiempo real son dos: latencia y área de la implementación. En esta tesis, todos los algoritmos presentados se han implementado en plataformas del tipo field programmable gate array (FPGA), ya que presentan un buen compromiso entre velocidad, coste total, consumo y reconfigurabilidad. La primera parte de la tesis está centrada en el estudio de diferentes subsistemas de un equipo ELINT: detección de señales mediante un detector canalizado, extracción de los parámetros de pulsos radar, clasificación de modulaciones y localization pasiva. La transformada discreta de Fourier {discrete Fourier transform, DFT) es un detector y estimador de frecuencia quasi-óptimo para señales de banda estrecha en presencia de ruido blanco. El desarrollo de algoritmos eficientes para el cálculo de la DFT, conocidos como fast Fourier transform (FFT), han situado a la FFT como el algoritmo más utilizado para la detección de señales de banda estrecha con requisitos de tiempo real. Así, se ha diseñado e implementado un algoritmo de detección y análisis espectral para su implementación en tiempo real. Los parámetros más característicos de un pulso radar son su tiempo de llegada y anchura de pulso. Se ha diseñado e implementado un algoritmo capaz de extraer dichos parámetros. Este algoritmo se puede utilizar con varios propósitos: realizar un reconocimiento genérico del radar que transmite dicha señal, localizar la posición de dicho radar o bien puede utilizarse como la parte de preprocesado de un clasificador automático de modulaciones. La clasificación automática de modulaciones es extremadamente complicada en entornos no cooperativos. Un clasificador automático de modulaciones se divide en dos partes: preprocesado y el algoritmo de clasificación. Los algoritmos de clasificación basados en parámetros representativos calculan diferentes estadísticos de la señal de entrada y la clasifican procesando dichos estadísticos. Los algoritmos de localization pueden dividirse en dos tipos: triangulación y sistemas cuadráticos. En los algoritmos basados en triangulación, la posición se estima mediante la intersección de las rectas proporcionadas por la dirección de llegada de la señal. En cambio, en los sistemas cuadráticos, la posición se estima mediante la intersección de superficies con igual diferencia en el tiempo de llegada (time difference of arrival, TDOA) o diferencia en la frecuencia de llegada (frequency difference of arrival, FDOA). Aunque sólo se ha implementado la estimación del TDOA y FDOA mediante la diferencia de tiempos de llegada y diferencia de frecuencias, se presentan estudios exhaustivos sobre los diferentes algoritmos para la estimación del TDOA, FDOA y localización pasiva mediante TDOA-FDOA. La segunda parte de la tesis está dedicada al diseño e implementación filtros discretos de respuesta finita (finite impulse response, FIR) para dos aplicaciones radar: phased array de banda ancha mediante filtros retardadores (true-time delay, TTD) y la mejora del alcance de un radar sin modificar el “hardware” existente para que la solución sea de bajo coste. La operación de un phased array de banda ancha mediante desfasadores no es factible ya que el retardo temporal no puede aproximarse mediante un desfase. La solución adoptada e implementada consiste en sustituir los desfasadores por filtros digitales con retardo programable. El máximo alcance de un radar depende de la relación señal a ruido promedio en el receptor. La relación señal a ruido depende a su vez de la energía de señal transmitida, potencia multiplicado por la anchura de pulso. Cualquier cambio hardware que se realice conlleva un alto coste. La solución que se propone es utilizar una técnica de compresión de pulsos, consistente en introducir una modulación interna a la señal, desacoplando alcance y resolución. ABSTRACT This thesis is focused on the study and development of electronic warfare (EW) and radar algorithms for real-time implementation. The arrival of radar, radio and navigation systems to the military sphere led to the development of technologies to fight them. Therefore, the objective of EW systems is the control of the electromagnetic spectrum. Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) is one of the EW functions, whose mission is to detect, collect, analyze, classify and locate all kind of electromagnetic emissions. Electronic intelligence (ELINT) is the SIGINT subsystem that is devoted to radar signals. A real-time system is the one whose correctness depends not only on the provided result but also on the time in which this result is obtained. Radar and EW systems must provide information as fast as possible on a continuous basis and they can be defined as real-time systems. The introduction of real-time constraints implies a feedback process between the design of the algorithms and their hardware implementation. Moreover, a real-time constraint consists of two parameters: Latency and area of the implementation. All the algorithms in this thesis have been implemented on field programmable gate array (FPGAs) platforms, presenting a trade-off among performance, cost, power consumption and reconfigurability. The first part of the thesis is related to the study of different key subsystems of an ELINT equipment: Signal detection with channelized receivers, pulse parameter extraction, modulation classification for radar signals and passive location algorithms. The discrete Fourier transform (DFT) is a nearly optimal detector and frequency estimator for narrow-band signals buried in white noise. The introduction of fast algorithms to calculate the DFT, known as FFT, reduces the complexity and the processing time of the DFT computation. These properties have placed the FFT as one the most conventional methods for narrow-band signal detection for real-time applications. An algorithm for real-time spectral analysis for user-defined bandwidth, instantaneous dynamic range and resolution is presented. The most characteristic parameters of a pulsed signal are its time of arrival (TOA) and the pulse width (PW). The estimation of these basic parameters is a fundamental task in an ELINT equipment. A basic pulse parameter extractor (PPE) that is able to estimate all these parameters is designed and implemented. The PPE may be useful to perform a generic radar recognition process, perform an emitter location technique and can be used as the preprocessing part of an automatic modulation classifier (AMC). Modulation classification is a difficult task in a non-cooperative environment. An AMC consists of two parts: Signal preprocessing and the classification algorithm itself. Featurebased algorithms obtain different characteristics or features of the input signals. Once these features are extracted, the classification is carried out by processing these features. A feature based-AMC for pulsed radar signals with real-time requirements is studied, designed and implemented. Emitter passive location techniques can be divided into two classes: Triangulation systems, in which the emitter location is estimated with the intersection of the different lines of bearing created from the estimated directions of arrival, and quadratic position-fixing systems, in which the position is estimated through the intersection of iso-time difference of arrival (TDOA) or iso-frequency difference of arrival (FDOA) quadratic surfaces. Although TDOA and FDOA are only implemented with time of arrival and frequency differences, different algorithms for TDOA, FDOA and position estimation are studied and analyzed. The second part is dedicated to FIR filter design and implementation for two different radar applications: Wideband phased arrays with true-time delay (TTD) filters and the range improvement of an operative radar with no hardware changes to minimize costs. Wideband operation of phased arrays is unfeasible because time delays cannot be approximated by phase shifts. The presented solution is based on the substitution of the phase shifters by FIR discrete delay filters. The maximum range of a radar depends on the averaged signal to noise ratio (SNR) at the receiver. Among other factors, the SNR depends on the transmitted signal energy that is power times pulse width. Any possible hardware change implies high costs. The proposed solution lies in the use of a signal processing technique known as pulse compression, which consists of introducing an internal modulation within the pulse width, decoupling range and resolution.

Cognitive strategies for reducing energy consumption in wireless sensor networks

El consumo energético de las Redes de Sensores Inalámbricas (WSNs por sus siglas en inglés) es un problema histórico que ha sido abordado desde diferentes niveles y visiones, ya que no solo afecta a la propia supervivencia de la red sino que el creciente uso de dispositivos inteligentes y el nuevo paradigma del Internet de las Cosas hace que las WSNs tengan cada vez una mayor influencia en la huella energética. Debido a la tendencia al alza en el uso de estas redes se añade un nuevo problema, la saturación espectral. Las WSNs operan habitualmente en bandas sin licencia como son las bandas Industrial, Científica y Médica (ISM por sus siglas en inglés). Estas bandas se comparten con otro tipo de redes como Wi-Fi o Bluetooth cuyo uso ha crecido exponencialmente en los últimos años. Para abordar este problema aparece el paradigma de la Radio Cognitiva (CR), una tecnología que permite el acceso oportunista al espectro. La introducción de capacidades cognitivas en las WSNs no solo permite optimizar su eficiencia espectral sino que también tiene un impacto positivo en parámetros como la calidad de servicio, la seguridad o el consumo energético. Sin embargo, por otra parte, este nuevo paradigma plantea algunos retos relacionados con el consumo energético. Concretamente, el sensado del espectro, la colaboración entre los nodos (que requiere comunicación adicional) y el cambio en los parámetros de transmisión aumentan el consumo respecto a las WSN clásicas. Teniendo en cuenta que la investigación en el campo del consumo energético ha sido ampliamente abordada puesto que se trata de una de sus principales limitaciones, asumimos que las nuevas estrategias deben surgir de las nuevas capacidades añadidas por las redes cognitivas. Por otro lado, a la hora de diseñar estrategias de optimización para CWSN hay que tener muy presentes las limitaciones de recursos de estas redes en cuanto a memoria, computación y consumo energético de los nodos. En esta tesis doctoral proponemos dos estrategias de reducción de consumo energético en CWSNs basadas en tres pilares fundamentales. El primero son las capacidades cognitivas añadidas a las WSNs que proporcionan la posibilidad de adaptar los parámetros de transmisión en función del espectro disponible. La segunda es la colaboración, como característica intrínseca de las CWSNs. Finalmente, el tercer pilar de este trabajo es teoría de juegos como algoritmo de soporte a la decisión, ampliamente utilizado en WSNs debido a su simplicidad. Como primer aporte de la tesis se presenta un análisis completo de las posibilidades introducidas por la radio cognitiva en materia de reducción de consumo para WSNs. Gracias a las conclusiones extraídas de este análisis, se han planteado las hipótesis de esta tesis relacionadas con la validez de usar capacidades cognitivas como herramienta para la reducción de consumo en CWSNs. Una vez presentada las hipótesis, pasamos a desarrollar las principales contribuciones de la tesis: las dos estrategias diseñadas para reducción de consumo basadas en teoría de juegos y CR. La primera de ellas hace uso de un juego no cooperativo que se juega mediante pares de jugadores. En la segunda estrategia, aunque el juego continúa siendo no cooperativo, se añade el concepto de colaboración. Para cada una de las estrategias se presenta el modelo del juego, el análisis formal de equilibrios y óptimos y la descripción de la estrategia completa donde se incluye la interacción entre nodos. Con el propósito de probar las estrategias mediante simulación e implementación en dispositivos reales hemos desarrollado un marco de pruebas compuesto por un simulador cognitivo y un banco de pruebas formado por nodos cognitivos capaces de comunicarse en tres bandas ISM desarrollados en el B105 Lab. Este marco de pruebas constituye otra de las aportaciones de la tesis que permitirá el avance en la investigación en el área de las CWSNs. Finalmente, se presentan y discuten los resultados derivados de la prueba de las estrategias desarrolladas. La primera estrategia proporciona ahorros de energía mayores al 65% comparados con una WSN sin capacidades cognitivas y alrededor del 25% si la comparamos con una estrategia cognitiva basada en el sensado periódico del espectro para el cambio de canal de acuerdo a un nivel de ruido fijado. Este algoritmo se comporta de forma similar independientemente del nivel de ruido siempre que éste sea espacialmente uniformemente. Esta estrategia, a pesar de su sencillez, nos asegura el comportamiento óptimo en cuanto a consumo energético debido a la utilización de teoría de juegos en la fase de diseño del comportamiento de los nodos. La estrategia colaborativa presenta mejoras respecto a la anterior en términos de protección frente al ruido en escenarios de ruido más complejos donde aporta una mejora del 50% comparada con la estrategia anterior. ABSTRACT Energy consumption in Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) is a known historical problem that has been addressed from different areas and on many levels. But this problem should not only be approached from the point of view of their own efficiency for survival. A major portion of communication traffic has migrated to mobile networks and systems. The increased use of smart devices and the introduction of the Internet of Things (IoT) give WSNs a great influence on the carbon footprint. Thus, optimizing the energy consumption of wireless networks could reduce their environmental impact considerably. In recent years, another problem has been added to the equation: spectrum saturation. Wireless Sensor Networks usually operate in unlicensed spectrum bands such as Industrial, Scientific, and Medical (ISM) bands shared with other networks (mainly Wi-Fi and Bluetooth). To address the efficient spectrum utilization problem, Cognitive Radio (CR) has emerged as the key technology that enables opportunistic access to the spectrum. Therefore, the introduction of cognitive capabilities to WSNs allows optimizing their spectral occupation. Cognitive Wireless Sensor Networks (CWSNs) do not only increase the reliability of communications, but they also have a positive impact on parameters such as the Quality of Service (QoS), network security, or energy consumption. These new opportunities introduced by CWSNs unveil a wide field in the energy consumption research area. However, this also implies some challenges. Specifically, the spectrum sensing stage, collaboration among devices (which requires extra communication), and changes in the transmission parameters increase the total energy consumption of the network. When designing CWSN optimization strategies, the fact that WSN nodes are very limited in terms of memory, computational power, or energy consumption has to be considered. Thus, light strategies that require a low computing capacity must be found. Since the field of energy conservation in WSNs has been widely explored, we assume that new strategies could emerge from the new opportunities presented by cognitive networks. In this PhD Thesis, we present two strategies for energy consumption reduction in CWSNs supported by three main pillars. The first pillar is that cognitive capabilities added to the WSN provide the ability to change the transmission parameters according to the spectrum. The second pillar is that the ability to collaborate is a basic characteristic of CWSNs. Finally, the third pillar for this work is the game theory as a decision-making algorithm, which has been widely used in WSNs due to its lightness and simplicity that make it valid to operate in CWSNs. For the development of these strategies, a complete analysis of the possibilities is first carried out by incorporating the cognitive abilities into the network. Once this analysis has been performed, we expose the hypotheses of this thesis related to the use of cognitive capabilities as a useful tool to reduce energy consumption in CWSNs. Once the analyses are exposed, we present the main contribution of this thesis: the two designed strategies for energy consumption reduction based on game theory and cognitive capabilities. The first one is based on a non-cooperative game played between two players in a simple and selfish way. In the second strategy, the concept of collaboration is introduced. Despite the fact that the game used is also a non-cooperative game, the decisions are taken through collaboration. For each strategy, we present the modeled game, the formal analysis of equilibrium and optimum, and the complete strategy describing the interaction between nodes. In order to test the strategies through simulation and implementation in real devices, we have developed a CWSN framework composed by a CWSN simulator based on Castalia and a testbed based on CWSN nodes able to communicate in three different ISM bands. We present and discuss the results derived by the energy optimization strategies. The first strategy brings energy improvement rates of over 65% compared to WSN without cognitive techniques. It also brings energy improvement rates of over 25% compared with sensing strategies for changing channels based on a decision threshold. We have also seen that the algorithm behaves similarly even with significant variations in the level of noise while working in a uniform noise scenario. The collaborative strategy presents improvements respecting the previous strategy in terms of noise protection when the noise scheme is more complex where this strategy shows improvement rates of over 50%.

Tacit vs. overt collusion firm asymmetries and numbers:what's the evidence?

It is conventional wisdom that collusion is more likely the fewer firms there are in a market and the more symmetric they are. This is often theoretically justified in terms of a repeated non-cooperative game. Although that model fits more easily with tacit than overt collusion, the impression sometimes given is that ‘one model fits all’. Moreover, the empirical literature offers few stylized facts on the most simple of questions—how few are few and how symmetric is symmetric? This paper attempts to fill this gap while also exploring the interface of tacit and overt collusion, albeit in an indirect way. First, it identifies the empirical model of tacit collusion that the European Commission appears to have employed in coordinated effects merger cases—apparently only fairly symmetric duopolies fit the bill. Second, it shows that, intriguingly, the same story emerges from the quite different experimental literature on tacit collusion. This offers a stark contrast with the findings for a sample of prosecuted cartels; on average, these involve six members (often more) and size asymmetries among members are often considerable. The indirect nature of this ‘evidence’ cautions against definitive conclusions; nevertheless, the contrast offers little comfort for those who believe that the same model does, more or less, fit all.

Evolutionary market agents for resource allocation in decentralised systems

We introduce self-interested evolutionary market agents, which act on behalf of service providers in a large decentralised system, to adaptively price their resources over time. Our agents competitively co-evolve in the live market, driving it towards the Bertrand equilibrium, the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium, at which all sellers charge their reserve price and share the market equally. We demonstrate that this outcome results in even load-balancing between the service providers. Our contribution in this paper is twofold; the use of on-line competitive co-evolution of self-interested service providers to drive a decentralised market towards equilibrium, and a demonstration that load-balancing behaviour emerges under the assumptions we describe. Unlike previous studies on this topic, all our agents are entirely self-interested; no cooperation is assumed. This makes our problem a non-trivial and more realistic one.

Algebraic duality theorems for infinite LP problems

In this paper we consider a primal-dual infinite linear programming problem-pair, i.e. LPs on infinite dimensional spaces with infinitely many constraints. We present two duality theorems for the problem-pair: a weak and a strong duality theorem. We do not assume any topology on the vector spaces, therefore our results are algebraic duality theorems. As an application, we consider transferable utility cooperative games with arbitrarily many players.

Three essays on trade and investment

From H. G. Johnson's work (Review of Economic Studies, 1953–54) on tariff retaliation, the questions of whether a country can win a “tariff war” and how or even the broader question of what will affect a country's strategic position in setting bilateral tariff have been tackled in various situations. Although it is widely accepted that a country will have strategic advantages in winning the tariff war if its relative monopoly power is sufficiently large, it is unclear what are the forces behind such power formation. The goal of this research is to provide a unified framework and discuss various forces such as relative country size, absolute advantages and relative advantages simultaneously. In a two-country continuum-of-commodity neoclassical trade model, it is shown that sufficiently large relative country size is a sufficient condition for a country to choose a non-cooperative tariff Nash equilibrium over free trade. It is also shown that technology disparities such as absolute advantage, rate of technology disparity and the distribution of the technology disparity all contribute to a country's strategic position and interact with country size. ^ Leverage effect is usually used to explain the phenomenon of asymmetric volatility in equity returns. However, leverage itself can only account for parts of the asymmetry. In this research, it is shown that stock return volatility is related to firms’ financial status. Financially constrained firms tend to be more sensitive to the return changes. Financial constraint factor explains why some firms tend to be more volatile than others. I found that the financial constraint factor explains the stock return volatility independent of other factors such as firm size, industry affiliation and leverage. Firms’ industry affiliations are shown to be very weak in differentiating volatility. Firm size is proven to be a good factor in distinguishing the different levels of volatility and volatility-return sensitivity. Leverage hypothesis is also partly corroborated and the situation where leverage effect is not applicable is discussed. Finally, I examined the macroeconomic policy's effects on overall market volatility. ^

On the fundamentals of research and development (R&D) spillovers in competitive markets

Rivals may voluntarily share Research and Development (R&D) results even in the absence of any binding agreements or collusion. In a model where rival firms engage in non-cooperative independent R&D process, we used optimization and game theory analysis to study the equilibrium strategy of the firms. Our work showed that, while minimal spillover is always equilibrium, there may be another equilibrium where firms may reciprocally choose high, sometimes perfect, spillover rates. The incentive for sharing R&D output is based on firms' expectations of learning from their rivals' R&D progress in the future. This leads to strategic complementarities between the firms' choices of spillover rates and thus policy implication follows. ^ Public research agencies can contribute more to social welfare by providing research as public goods. In a non-cooperative public-private research relationship where parallel R&D is conducted, by making its R&D results accessible, the public research agency can stimulate private spillovers, even if there exists rivalry among the private firms who can benefit from such spillovers. ^