Market Prices and Food Aid Local and Regional Procurement and Distribution: A Multi-Country Analysis

To date, no research has rigorously addressed the concern that local and regional procurement (LRP) of food aid could affect food prices and food price volatility in food aid source and recipient countries. We assemble spatially and temporally disaggregated data and estimate the relationship between food prices and their volatility and local food aid procurement and distribution across seven countries for several commodities. In most cases, LRP activities have no statistically significant relationship with either local price levels or food price volatility. The few exceptions underscore the importance of market monitoring. (C) 2013 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

A smart multi-hop hierarchical routing protocol for efficient video communication over wireless multimedia sensor networks

For smart applications, nodes in wireless multimedia sensor networks (MWSNs) have to take decisions based on sensed scalar physical measurements. A routing protocol must provide the multimedia delivery with quality level support and be energy-efficient for large-scale networks. With this goal in mind, this paper proposes a smart Multi-hop hierarchical routing protocol for Efficient VIdeo communication (MEVI). MEVI combines an opportunistic scheme to create clusters, a cross-layer solution to select routes based on network conditions, and a smart solution to trigger multimedia transmission according to sensed data. Simulations were conducted to show the benefits of MEVI compared with the well-known Low-Energy Adaptive Clustering Hierarchy (LEACH) protocol. This paper includes an analysis of the signaling overhead, energy-efficiency, and video quality.

Multi-antenna non-line-of-sight identification techniques for target localization in mobile ad-hoc networks

Target localization has a wide range of military and civilian applications in wireless mobile networks. Examples include battle-field surveillance, emergency 911 (E911), traffc alert, habitat monitoring, resource allocation, routing, and disaster mitigation. Basic localization techniques include time-of-arrival (TOA), direction-of-arrival (DOA) and received-signal strength (RSS) estimation. Techniques that are proposed based on TOA and DOA are very sensitive to the availability of Line-of-sight (LOS) which is the direct path between the transmitter and the receiver. If LOS is not available, TOA and DOA estimation errors create a large localization error. In order to reduce NLOS localization error, NLOS identifcation, mitigation, and localization techniques have been proposed. This research investigates NLOS identifcation for multiple antennas radio systems. The techniques proposed in the literature mainly use one antenna element to enable NLOS identifcation. When a single antenna is utilized, limited features of the wireless channel can be exploited to identify NLOS situations. However, in DOA-based wireless localization systems, multiple antenna elements are available. In addition, multiple antenna technology has been adopted in many widely used wireless systems such as wireless LAN 802.11n and WiMAX 802.16e which are good candidates for localization based services. In this work, the potential of spatial channel information for high performance NLOS identifcation is investigated. Considering narrowband multiple antenna wireless systems, two xvNLOS identifcation techniques are proposed. Here, the implementation of spatial correlation of channel coeffcients across antenna elements as a metric for NLOS identifcation is proposed. In order to obtain the spatial correlation, a new multi-input multi-output (MIMO) channel model based on rough surface theory is proposed. This model can be used to compute the spatial correlation between the antenna pair separated by any distance. In addition, a new NLOS identifcation technique that exploits the statistics of phase difference across two antenna elements is proposed. This technique assumes the phases received across two antenna elements are uncorrelated. This assumption is validated based on the well-known circular and elliptic scattering models. Next, it is proved that the channel Rician K-factor is a function of the phase difference variance. Exploiting Rician K-factor, techniques to identify NLOS scenarios are proposed. Considering wideband multiple antenna wireless systems which use MIMO-orthogonal frequency division multiplexing (OFDM) signaling, space-time-frequency channel correlation is exploited to attain NLOS identifcation in time-varying, frequency-selective and spaceselective radio channels. Novel NLOS identi?cation measures based on space, time and frequency channel correlation are proposed and their performances are evaluated. These measures represent a better NLOS identifcation performance compared to those that only use space, time or frequency.

Opportunistic Routing for Multi-flow Video Dissemination over Flying Ad-Hoc Networks

A reliable and robust routing service for Flying Ad-Hoc Networks (FANETs) must be able to adapt to topology changes. User experience on watching live video sequences must also be satisfactory even in scenarios with buffer overflow and high packet loss ratio. In this paper, we introduce a Cross-layer Link quality and Geographical-aware beaconless opportunistic routing protocol (XLinGO). It enhances the transmission of simultaneous multiple video flows over FANETs by creating and keeping reliable persistent multi-hop routes. XLinGO considers a set of cross-layer and human-related information for routing decisions, as performance metrics and Quality of Experience (QoE). Performance evaluation shows that XLinGO achieves multimedia dissemination with QoE support and robustness in a multi-hop, multi-flow, and mobile network environments.

The scholarly networks of Albrecht von Haller and the Economic Society of Bern – a multi-level network analysis

Here, by the example of the transfer of cultivated plants in the context of the correspondence networks of Albrecht von Haller and the Economic Society, a multi-level network analysis is suggested. By a multi-level procedure, the chronological dynamics, the social structure, the spatial distribution and the functional networking are analyzed one after the other. These four levels of network analysis do not compete with each other but are mutually supporting. This aims at a deeper understanding of how these networks contributed to an international transfer of knowledge in the 18th century.

Bargaining for power and information : an experimental and theoretical analysis of the interaction between institutions, externalities and adverse selection

Bargaining is the building block of many economic interactions, ranging from bilateral to multilateral encounters and from situations in which the actors are individuals to negotiations between firms or countries. In all these settings, economists have been intrigued for a long time by the fact that some projects, trades or agreements are not realized even though they are mutually beneficial. On the one hand, this has been explained by incomplete information. A firm may not be willing to offer a wage that is acceptable to a qualified worker, because it knows that there are also unqualified workers and cannot distinguish between the two types. This phenomenon is known as adverse selection. On the other hand, it has been argued that even with complete information, the presence of externalities may impede efficient outcomes. To see this, consider the example of climate change. If a subset of countries agrees to curb emissions, non-participant regions benefit from the signatories’ efforts without incurring costs. These free riding opportunities give rise to incentives to strategically improve ones bargaining power that work against the formation of a global agreement. This thesis is concerned with extending our understanding of both factors, adverse selection and externalities. The findings are based on empirical evidence from original laboratory experiments as well as game theoretic modeling. On a very general note, it is demonstrated that the institutions through which agents interact matter to a large extent. Insights are provided about which institutions we should expect to perform better than others, at least in terms of aggregate welfare. Chapters 1 and 2 focus on the problem of adverse selection. Effective operation of markets and other institutions often depends on good information transmission properties. In terms of the example introduced above, a firm is only willing to offer high wages if it receives enough positive signals about the worker’s quality during the application and wage bargaining process. In Chapter 1, it will be shown that repeated interaction coupled with time costs facilitates information transmission. By making the wage bargaining process costly for the worker, the firm is able to obtain more accurate information about the worker’s type. The cost could be pure time cost from delaying agreement or cost of effort arising from a multi-step interviewing process. In Chapter 2, I abstract from time cost and show that communication can play a similar role. The simple fact that a worker states to be of high quality may be informative. In Chapter 3, the focus is on a different source of inefficiency. Agents strive for bargaining power and thus may be motivated by incentives that are at odds with the socially efficient outcome. I have already mentioned the example of climate change. Other examples are coalitions within committees that are formed to secure voting power to block outcomes or groups that commit to different technological standards although a single standard would be optimal (e.g. the format war between HD and BlueRay). It will be shown that such inefficiencies are directly linked to the presence of externalities and a certain degree of irreversibility in actions. I now discuss the three articles in more detail. In Chapter 1, Olivier Bochet and I study a simple bilateral bargaining institution that eliminates trade failures arising from incomplete information. In this setting, a buyer makes offers to a seller in order to acquire a good. Whenever an offer is rejected by the seller, the buyer may submit a further offer. Bargaining is costly, because both parties suffer a (small) time cost after any rejection. The difficulties arise, because the good can be of low or high quality and the quality of the good is only known to the seller. Indeed, without the possibility to make repeated offers, it is too risky for the buyer to offer prices that allow for trade of high quality goods. When allowing for repeated offers, however, at equilibrium both types of goods trade with probability one. We provide an experimental test of these predictions. Buyers gather information about sellers using specific price offers and rates of trade are high, much as the model’s qualitative predictions. We also observe a persistent over-delay before trade occurs, and this mitigates efficiency substantially. Possible channels for over-delay are identified in the form of two behavioral assumptions missing from the standard model, loss aversion (buyers) and haggling (sellers), which reconcile the data with the theoretical predictions. Chapter 2 also studies adverse selection, but interaction between buyers and sellers now takes place within a market rather than isolated pairs. Remarkably, in a market it suffices to let agents communicate in a very simple manner to mitigate trade failures. The key insight is that better informed agents (sellers) are willing to truthfully reveal their private information, because by doing so they are able to reduce search frictions and attract more buyers. Behavior observed in the experimental sessions closely follows the theoretical predictions. As a consequence, costless and non-binding communication (cheap talk) significantly raises rates of trade and welfare. Previous experiments have documented that cheap talk alleviates inefficiencies due to asymmetric information. These findings are explained by pro-social preferences and lie aversion. I use appropriate control treatments to show that such consideration play only a minor role in our market. Instead, the experiment highlights the ability to organize markets as a new channel through which communication can facilitate trade in the presence of private information. In Chapter 3, I theoretically explore coalition formation via multilateral bargaining under complete information. The environment studied is extremely rich in the sense that the model allows for all kinds of externalities. This is achieved by using so-called partition functions, which pin down a coalitional worth for each possible coalition in each possible coalition structure. It is found that although binding agreements can be written, efficiency is not guaranteed, because the negotiation process is inherently non-cooperative. The prospects of cooperation are shown to crucially depend on i) the degree to which players can renegotiate and gradually build up agreements and ii) the absence of a certain type of externalities that can loosely be described as incentives to free ride. Moreover, the willingness to concede bargaining power is identified as a novel reason for gradualism. Another key contribution of the study is that it identifies a strong connection between the Core, one of the most important concepts in cooperative game theory, and the set of environments for which efficiency is attained even without renegotiation.