Interlocking directorates in Spanish banking in the twentieth century

Spanish banking historiography asserts that the largest banks performed in the twentieth century as though they constituted a monopoly. One of their main coordination schemes would have been a network of interlocking bank directors that would include most of the financial firms. Evidence available for the 1920s and 1960s seems to confirm the veracity of this hypothesis. In this paper, more systematic evidence is presented to cover the whole twentieth century with the aim of checking whether these networks persisted over the entire period or they were by-products of temporary situations. Our results show that no general network remained for more than a decade. Therefore, it should be ruled out that interlocking directorates worked as a coordination device of an alleged banking cartel.

State and industry in the 1940s: The Spanish automobile industry

The decade of the 1940s was one of the darkest periods in the country's history, with years of famine, repression, general misery, and impoverishment of all aspects of national life ranging from culture to the economy. During those years plans were made to establish a Spanish motor industry once the Civil War had come to an end in 1939. It seemed a propitious moment for private enterprise and various foreign motor companies presented proposals for manufacturing their entire vehicle range, from cars to trucks. However, the government plans were for a State monopoly, a policy which meant that any private projects which did not contemplate the regime taking management decisions were rejected out of hand. From 1941 onwards, any new initiative was required to meet the plans set by INI. The main argument running through this paper is that one can only understand the development of the modern Spanish motor industry if one grasps the haggling between motor companies and government regarding market entry and the impact of the regime's autarchic policies in the 1940s.

What do the papers sell?

We model the market for news as a two-sided market where newspapers sell news to readers who value accuracy and sell space to advertisers who value advert-receptive readers. We show that monopolistic newspapers under-report or bias news that sufficiently reduces advertiser profits. Newspaper competition generally reduces the impact of advertising. In fact, as the size of advertising grows, newspapers may paradoxically reduce advertiser bias, due to increasing competition for readers. However, advertisers can counter this effect of competition by committing to news-sensitive cut-off strategies, potentially inducing as much under-reporting as in the monopoly case.

Conflicts of interest, information provision and competition in banking

In some markets, such as the market for drugs or for financial services, sellers have better information than buyersregarding the matching between the buyer's needs and the good's actual characteristics. Depending on the market structure,this may lead to conflicts of interest and/or the underprovision of information by the seller. This paper studies this issuein the market for financial services. The analysis presents a new model of competition between banks, as banks' pricecompetition influences the ensuing incentives for truthful information revelation. We compare two different firm structures,specialized banking, where financial institutions provide a unique financial product, and one-stop banking, where a financialinstitution is able to provide several financial products which are horizontally differentiated. We show first that, althoughconflicts of interest may prevent information disclosure under monopoly, competition forces full information provision forsufficiently high reputation costs. Second, in the presence of market power, one-stop banks will use information strategicallyto increase product differentiation and therefore will always provide reliable information and charge higher rices thanspecialized banks, thus providing a new justification for the creation of one-stop banks. Finally, we show that, ifindependent financial advisers are able to provide reliable information, this increases product differentiation and thereforemarket power, so that it is in the interest of financial intermediaries to promote external independent financial advice.

A non-quasi-competitive Cournot oligopoly with stability

This paper presents a classical Cournot oligopoly model with some peculiar features: it is non--quasi--competitive as price under N-poly is greater than monopoly price; Cournot equilibrium exists and is unique with each new entry; the successive equilibria after new entries are stable under the adjustment mechanism that assumes that actual output of each seller is adjusted proportionally to the difference between actual output and profit maximizing output. Moreover, the model tends to perfect competition as N goes to infinity, reaching the monopoly price again.

Normalisation informatique et marchés de services : le cas du XML

Extensible Markup Language (XML) is a generic computing language that provides an outstanding case study of commodification of service standards. The development of this language in the late 1990s marked a shift in computer science as its extensibility let store and share any kind of data. Many office suites software rely on it. The chapter highlights how the largest multinational firms pay special attention to gain a recognised international standard for such a major technological innovation. It argues that standardisation processes affects market structures and can lead to market capture. By examining how a strategic use of standardisation arenas can generate profits, it shows that Microsoft succeeded in making its own technical solution a recognised ISO standard in 2008, while the same arena already adopted two years earlier the open source standard set by IBM and Sun Microsystems. Yet XML standardisation also helped to establish a distinct model of information technology services at the expense of Microsoft monopoly on proprietary software

Anàlisi legal del projecte Google books des de la perspectiva dels drets de propietat intel·lectual

Objectiu. Descriure el projecte Google books i analitzar-lo des de la perspectiva legal, tenint en compte els tres agents principals implicats: Google, els titulars de drets de propietat intel·lectual i les biblioteques. Metodologia. Anàlisi legal comparada (legislacions dels Estats Units, de França i d'Espanya) de les implicacions del projecte Google books sobre els drets de propietat intel·lectual i el dret de la competència. Estudi de les demandes plantejades contra Google als Estats Units i a Europa, aixícom les possibles conseqüències de l'acord de conciliació adoptat per Google i les associacionsd'autors i editors als Estats Units. Resultats. Google books ha suposat una infracció massiva de drets de propietat intel·lectual. Per determinar si els llibres d'una biblioteca han entrat en el domini públic o no, cal determinar prèviament quina llei nacional resulta aplicable a cada llibre. La posada a disposició a Google books d'obres descatalogades i tan sols fragments de llibres que es troben a la venda no pot dursea terme sense l'autorització dels titulars. En el cas de les obres òrfenes, l'explotació exigeixl'adopció de certes mesures prèvies per garantir els drets dels titulars, en cas que aquests arribina conèixer-se. L'acord de conciliació adoptat als Estats Units entre Google i les associacionsd'autors i editors pot implicar una posició de monopoli per part de Google en relació amb la venda dels llibres descatalogats i les obres òrfenes.

Del "know how" al poder: la metodologia d'avaluació d'intangibles empresarials en competència i la seva aplicació en un entorn oligopolístic

Sometimes, behind the entrepreneurial profit the degree of monopoly is concealed. What it occurs with the models of investments evaluation when the skill of the employer consists on having capacity to capture the regulator?

Pieces of Iowa’s Past, February 1, 2012

Pieces of Iowa’s Past, published by the Iowa State Capitol Tour Guides weekly during the legislative session, features historical facts about Iowa, the Capitol, and the early workings of state government. All historical publications are reproduced here with the actual spelling, punctuation, and grammar retained. February 1, 2012 THIS WEEK: A Different Oath for Senator Vale BACKGROUND: Senator Jacob G. Vale was born July 7, 1821, in York County, Pennsylvania. In 1847, he married Anne Rex, and they moved to Iowa in 1850. Vale farmed in Lee County, and in 1853, he ran on an independent ticket for the legislature but was defeated. He moved to Van Buren County in 1856. In 1861, he was solicited by both parties to become a candidate for the state Senate. He was elected and served as the only independent senator in the 13th General Assembly. Vale also served in the 14th General Assembly in 1872. In 1873, Vale was the Anti-Monopoly candidate for governor of Iowa. Vale died February 17, 1875. His son, B.R. Vale, served in the Iowa Senate from 1888-1896

Basc i tecnologia lingüística

En aquest article reflexionem sobre el monopoli de les llengües "majoritàries" en l'àmbit de les tecnologies lingüístiques. Analitzem, així mateix, com les llengües minoritàries poden afrontar aquest desafiament i examinem el cas de l'èuscar. Un cop estudiat el desenvolupament de l'èuscar en el camp de les tecnologies lingüístiques, analitzem fins a quin punt aquestes tecnologies poden ajudar el procés de normalització de la llengua.

Behavioural queueing : cellular automata and a laboratory experiment

Dans cette thèse, nous étudions les aspects comportementaux d'agents qui interagissent dans des systèmes de files d'attente à l'aide de modèles de simulation et de méthodologies expérimentales. Chaque période les clients doivent choisir un prestataire de servivce. L'objectif est d'analyser l'impact des décisions des clients et des prestataires sur la formation des files d'attente. Dans un premier cas nous considérons des clients ayant un certain degré d'aversion au risque. Sur la base de leur perception de l'attente moyenne et de la variabilité de cette attente, ils forment une estimation de la limite supérieure de l'attente chez chacun des prestataires. Chaque période, ils choisissent le prestataire pour lequel cette estimation est la plus basse. Nos résultats indiquent qu'il n'y a pas de relation monotone entre le degré d'aversion au risque et la performance globale. En effet, une population de clients ayant un degré d'aversion au risque intermédiaire encoure généralement une attente moyenne plus élevée qu'une population d'agents indifférents au risque ou très averses au risque. Ensuite, nous incorporons les décisions des prestataires en leur permettant d'ajuster leur capacité de service sur la base de leur perception de la fréquence moyenne d'arrivées. Les résultats montrent que le comportement des clients et les décisions des prestataires présentent une forte "dépendance au sentier". En outre, nous montrons que les décisions des prestataires font converger l'attente moyenne pondérée vers l'attente de référence du marché. Finalement, une expérience de laboratoire dans laquelle des sujets jouent le rôle de prestataire de service nous a permis de conclure que les délais d'installation et de démantèlement de capacité affectent de manière significative la performance et les décisions des sujets. En particulier, les décisions du prestataire, sont influencées par ses commandes en carnet, sa capacité de service actuellement disponible et les décisions d'ajustement de capacité qu'il a prises, mais pas encore implémentées. - Queuing is a fact of life that we witness daily. We all have had the experience of waiting in line for some reason and we also know that it is an annoying situation. As the adage says "time is money"; this is perhaps the best way of stating what queuing problems mean for customers. Human beings are not very tolerant, but they are even less so when having to wait in line for service. Banks, roads, post offices and restaurants are just some examples where people must wait for service. Studies of queuing phenomena have typically addressed the optimisation of performance measures (e.g. average waiting time, queue length and server utilisation rates) and the analysis of equilibrium solutions. The individual behaviour of the agents involved in queueing systems and their decision making process have received little attention. Although this work has been useful to improve the efficiency of many queueing systems, or to design new processes in social and physical systems, it has only provided us with a limited ability to explain the behaviour observed in many real queues. In this dissertation we differ from this traditional research by analysing how the agents involved in the system make decisions instead of focusing on optimising performance measures or analysing an equilibrium solution. This dissertation builds on and extends the framework proposed by van Ackere and Larsen (2004) and van Ackere et al. (2010). We focus on studying behavioural aspects in queueing systems and incorporate this still underdeveloped framework into the operations management field. In the first chapter of this thesis we provide a general introduction to the area, as well as an overview of the results. In Chapters 2 and 3, we use Cellular Automata (CA) to model service systems where captive interacting customers must decide each period which facility to join for service. They base this decision on their expectations of sojourn times. Each period, customers use new information (their most recent experience and that of their best performing neighbour) to form expectations of sojourn time at the different facilities. Customers update their expectations using an adaptive expectations process to combine their memory and their new information. We label "conservative" those customers who give more weight to their memory than to the xiv Summary new information. In contrast, when they give more weight to new information, we call them "reactive". In Chapter 2, we consider customers with different degree of risk-aversion who take into account uncertainty. They choose which facility to join based on an estimated upper-bound of the sojourn time which they compute using their perceptions of the average sojourn time and the level of uncertainty. We assume the same exogenous service capacity for all facilities, which remains constant throughout. We first analyse the collective behaviour generated by the customers' decisions. We show that the system achieves low weighted average sojourn times when the collective behaviour results in neighbourhoods of customers loyal to a facility and the customers are approximately equally split among all facilities. The lowest weighted average sojourn time is achieved when exactly the same number of customers patronises each facility, implying that they do not wish to switch facility. In this case, the system has achieved the Nash equilibrium. We show that there is a non-monotonic relationship between the degree of risk-aversion and system performance. Customers with an intermediate degree of riskaversion typically achieve higher sojourn times; in particular they rarely achieve the Nash equilibrium. Risk-neutral customers have the highest probability of achieving the Nash Equilibrium. Chapter 3 considers a service system similar to the previous one but with risk-neutral customers, and relaxes the assumption of exogenous service rates. In this sense, we model a queueing system with endogenous service rates by enabling managers to adjust the service capacity of the facilities. We assume that managers do so based on their perceptions of the arrival rates and use the same principle of adaptive expectations to model these perceptions. We consider service systems in which the managers' decisions take time to be implemented. Managers are characterised by a profile which is determined by the speed at which they update their perceptions, the speed at which they take decisions, and how coherent they are when accounting for their previous decisions still to be implemented when taking their next decision. We find that the managers' decisions exhibit a strong path-dependence: owing to the initial conditions of the model, the facilities of managers with identical profiles can evolve completely differently. In some cases the system becomes "locked-in" into a monopoly or duopoly situation. The competition between managers causes the weighted average sojourn time of the system to converge to the exogenous benchmark value which they use to estimate their desired capacity. Concerning the managers' profile, we found that the more conservative Summary xv a manager is regarding new information, the larger the market share his facility achieves. Additionally, the faster he takes decisions, the higher the probability that he achieves a monopoly position. In Chapter 4 we consider a one-server queueing system with non-captive customers. We carry out an experiment aimed at analysing the way human subjects, taking on the role of the manager, take decisions in a laboratory regarding the capacity of a service facility. We adapt the model proposed by van Ackere et al (2010). This model relaxes the assumption of a captive market and allows current customers to decide whether or not to use the facility. Additionally the facility also has potential customers who currently do not patronise it, but might consider doing so in the future. We identify three groups of subjects whose decisions cause similar behavioural patterns. These groups are labelled: gradual investors, lumpy investors, and random investor. Using an autocorrelation analysis of the subjects' decisions, we illustrate that these decisions are positively correlated to the decisions taken one period early. Subsequently we formulate a heuristic to model the decision rule considered by subjects in the laboratory. We found that this decision rule fits very well for those subjects who gradually adjust capacity, but it does not capture the behaviour of the subjects of the other two groups. In Chapter 5 we summarise the results and provide suggestions for further work. Our main contribution is the use of simulation and experimental methodologies to explain the collective behaviour generated by customers' and managers' decisions in queueing systems as well as the analysis of the individual behaviour of these agents. In this way, we differ from the typical literature related to queueing systems which focuses on optimising performance measures and the analysis of equilibrium solutions. Our work can be seen as a first step towards understanding the interaction between customer behaviour and the capacity adjustment process in queueing systems. This framework is still in its early stages and accordingly there is a large potential for further work that spans several research topics. Interesting extensions to this work include incorporating other characteristics of queueing systems which affect the customers' experience (e.g. balking, reneging and jockeying); providing customers and managers with additional information to take their decisions (e.g. service price, quality, customers' profile); analysing different decision rules and studying other characteristics which determine the profile of customers and managers.

Distributed Energy Production in the North-West Region of Russia

The energy system of Russia is the world's fourth largest measured by installed power. The largest are that of the the United States of America, China and Japan. After 1990, the electricity consumption decreased as a result of the Russian industry crisis. The vivid economic growth during the latest few years explains the new increase in the demand for energy resources within the State. In 2005 the consumption of electricity achieved the maximum level of 1990 and continues to growth. In the 1980's, the renewal of power facilities was already very slow and practically stopped in the 1990's. At present, the energy system can be very much characterized as outdated, inefficient and uneconomic because of the old equipment, non-effective structure and large losses in the transmission lines. The aim of Russia's energy reform, which was started in 2001, is to achieve a market based energy policy by 2011. This would thus remove the significantly state-controlled monopoly in Russia's energy policy. The reform will stimulateto decrease losses, improve the energy system and employ energy-saving technologies. The Russian energy system today is still based on the use of fossil fuels, and it almost totally ignores the efficient use of renewable sources such as wind, solar, small hydro and biomass, despite of their significant resources in Russia. The main target of this project is to consider opportunities to apply renewable energy production in the North-West Federal Region of Russia to partly solve the above mentioned problems in the energy system.

Maintenance and construction outsourcing in a public-owned electricity network company

Euroopan sähkösektori on ollut viimeisen vuosikymmenen suurten mullistusten kourissa. Sähkömarkkinoiden avautumisen jälkeen monopoliliiketoimintaa harjoittavien sähköyhtiöiden on ollut pakko parantaa tuottavuuttaan. Ratkaisuksi tähän on etsitty apua huolto- ja rakennustoimintojen ulkoistamisella. Ulkoistaminen on kuitenkin uusi menetelmä tällä sektorilla. Tämän tutkielman tavoitteena on selvittää syyt, jotka tanskalaisella sähköverkkoyhtiöllä oli huolto- ja rakennustoimintojen ulkoistamiseen, sekä löytää siitä saatavat hyödyt ja siihen sisältyvät riskit. Tutkimus suoritetaan käyttäen apuna kirjallisuutta, saatavilla olevia due diligence-, sekä muita raportteja ja analyysejä, sekä tapausta koskettavien tahojen haastatteluja.Lisäksi sähköverkkoalan asiantuntijoiden kanssa käytyjä konsultointia käytetäänselvitykseen. Tutkimus osoittaa, että perimmäiset ajurit huolto- ja rakennustoimintojen ulkoistamiseen tulivat lainmuutosten ja vapautuneiden sähkömarkkinoiden asettamista paineista. Kunnallisessa organisaatiossa parantaa tehokkuutta ulkoistamalla jotain toimintoja yksityisomisteiselle palvelun tuottajalle. Muut ulkoistamisesta odotetut hyödyt olivat alentuneet kustannukset, virtaviivaisempi organisaation ja sähköverkkoyhtiön tehottomista osista eroon pääseminen ennen sen myymistä.

Three essays in incomplete contracts

General Introduction These three chapters, while fairly independent from each other, study economic situations in incomplete contract settings. They are the product of both the academic freedom my advisors granted me, and in this sense reflect my personal interests, and of their interested feedback. The content of each chapter can be summarized as follows: Chapter 1: Inefficient durable-goods monopolies In this chapter we study the efficiency of an infinite-horizon durable-goods monopoly model with a fmite number of buyers. We find that, while all pure-strategy Markov Perfect Equilibria (MPE) are efficient, there also exist previously unstudied inefficient MPE where high valuation buyers randomize their purchase decision while trying to benefit from low prices which are offered once a critical mass has purchased. Real time delay, an unusual monopoly distortion, is the result of this attrition behavior. We conclude that neither technological constraints nor concern for reputation are necessary to explain inefficiency in monopolized durable-goods markets. Chapter 2: Downstream mergers and producer's capacity choice: why bake a larger pie when getting a smaller slice? In this chapter we study the effect of downstream horizontal mergers on the upstream producer's capacity choice. Contrary to conventional wisdom, we find anon-monotonic relationship: horizontal mergers induce a higher upstream capacity if the cost of capacity is low, and a lower upstream capacity if this cost is high. We explain this result by decomposing the total effect into two competing effects: a change in hold-up and a change in bargaining erosion. Chapter 3: Contract bargaining with multiple agents In this chapter we study a bargaining game between a principal and N agents when the utility of each agent depends on all agents' trades with the principal. We show, using the Potential, that equilibria payoffs coincide with the Shapley value of the underlying coalitional game with an appropriately defined characteristic function, which under common assumptions coincides with the principal's equilibrium profit in the offer game. Since the problem accounts for differences in information and agents' conjectures, the outcome can be either efficient (e.g. public contracting) or inefficient (e.g. passive beliefs).

Säännellyn liiketoiminnan tehostamisstrategia

Regulaattorin asettama tehostamistavoite monopoliasemassatoimivalle yritykselle täydentää tuottotasosääntelyä ja laatutason valvontaa. Monopolilla on mahdollisuus ylivoittoihin kilpailun puuttuessa ja sääntelyllä sekä erityisesti tehostamistavoitteella pyritään korvaamaan kilpailun puuttuminen. Mahdollisia tehostamismenettelyitä ovat kustannussääntely, kustannuskattosääntely, vertailuun perustuva sääntely ja neuvotteluun perustuva sääntely. Tässä tutkielmassa on tarkasteltu tehokkuuden käsitettä, eri tehostamismenettelyitä ja tehokkuuden mittausmenetelmiä. Niiden lisäksi on tarkasteltu sääntelyn taustalla vaikuttavia syitä, kuten monopolin toiminta ja agentti-teorian mukainen informaatioetu ja moraalisen riskin ongelma. Tehostamistavoitteen asettamisessa onkyse neuvotteluprosessista regulaattorin kanssa. Tätä neuvotteluprosessia varten tutkielmassa laadittiin strategia energiatoimialalla Suomessa toimivalle yritykselle. Strategian perusteina käytettiin resurssiriippuvuusteorian ja resurssipohjaisen näkemyksen mukaisia lähtökohtia. Tutkielman lopputuloksena ehdotetaan konkreettisia strategia- ja taktiikkavaihtoehtoja yrityksen tehostamismenettelyn asettamisprosessia varten.