Chance-lowering causes

Philosophers have long been fascinated by the connection between cause and effect: are 'causes' things we can experience, or are they concepts provided by our minds? The study of causation goes back to Aristotle, but resurged with David Hume and Immanuel Kant, and is now one of the most important topics in metaphysics. Most of the recent work done in this area has attempted to place causation in a deterministic, scientific, worldview. But what about the unpredictable and chancey world we actually live in: can one theory of causation cover all instances of cause and effect?Cause and Chance: Causation in an Indeterministic Worldis a collection of specially written papers by world-class metaphysicians. Its focus is the problem facing the 'reductionist' approach to causation: the attempt to cover all types of causation, deterministic and indeterministic, with one basic theory.

Goodman and Putnam on the making of worlds

Hilary Putnam and Nelson Goodman are two of the twentieth century's most persuasive critics of metaphysical realism, however they disagree about the consequences of rejecting metaphysical realism. Goodman defended a view he called irrealism in which minds literally make worlds, and Putnam has sought to find a middle path between metaphysical realism and irrealism. I argue that Putnam's middle path turns out to be very elusive and defend a dichotomy between metaphysical realism and irrealism.

O corpo como imagem e as imagens do corpo na contemporaneidade

Tese de doutoramento, Belas-Artes (Teoria da Imagem), Universidade de Lisboa, Faculdade de Belas-Artes, 2013

Space-time within general relativity : a structural realist understanding

ABSTRACT This dissertation investigates the, nature of space-time as described by the theory of general relativity. It mainly argues that space-time can be naturally interpreted as a physical structure in the precise sense of a network of concrete space-time relations among concrete space-time points that do not possess any intrinsic properties and any intrinsic identity. Such an interpretation is fundamentally based on two related key features of general relativity, namely substantive general covariance and background independence, where substantive general covariance is understood as a gauge-theoretic invariance under active diffeomorphisms and background independence is understood in the sense that the metric (or gravitational) field is dynamical and that, strictly speaking, it cannot be uniquely split into a purely gravitational part and a fixed purely inertial part or background. More broadly, a precise notion of (physical) structure is developed within the framework of a moderate version of structural realism understood as a metaphysical claim about what there is in the world. So, the developement of this moderate structural realism pursues two main aims. The first is purely metaphysical, the aim being to develop a coherent metaphysics of structures and of objects (particular attention is paid to the questions of identity and individuality of these latter within this structural realist framework). The second is to argue that moderate structural realism provides a convincing interpretation of the world as described by fundamental physics and in particular of space-time as described by general relativity. This structuralist interpretation of space-time is discussed within the traditional substantivalist-relationalist debate, which is best understood within the broader framework of the question about the relationship between space-time on the one hand and matter on the other. In particular, it is claimed that space-time structuralism does not constitute a 'tertium quid' in the traditional debate. Some new light on the question of the nature of space-time may be shed from the fundamental foundational issue of space-time singularities. Their possible 'non-local' (or global) feature is discussed in some detail and it is argued that a broad structuralist conception of space-time may provide a physically meaningful understanding of space-time singularities, which is not plagued by the conceptual difficulties of the usual atomsitic framework. Indeed, part of these difficulties may come from the standard differential geometric description of space-time, which encodes to some extent this atomistic framework; it raises the question of the importance of the mathematical formalism for the interpretation of space-time.

Unorthodox Humeanism

The thesis is situated in the domain of contemporary metaphysics of science. The question is which ontology fits best with our knowledge of the world. The method chosen is the one of evaluating the consequences of different ontological frameworks against the background of our scientific knowledge of the world. The thesis analyses the two main frameworks in today's metaphysics of science, Humeanism and dispositionalism. It advocates that only an unorthodox version of Humeanism and only an unorthodox version of dispositionalism can be defended, the unorthodox character of these versions consisting in taking the fundamental properties to be relations rather than intrinsic properties. The thesis then sets out in detail what such an unorthodox version of Humeanism amounts to. Chapters 1 and 2 introduce the standard versions of Humeanism and dispositionalism, focussing on the accounts of laws of nature and causation. Chapter 3 compares both these positions and concludes that as far as the orthodox versions are concerned, dispositionalism fares better than Humeanism, since it can avoid Humeanism's commitments to quidditism and humility. However, as is argued in chapter 4, instead of replying to the objections from quidditism and humility by switching to dispositionalism, there is an unorthodox version of Humeanism available that does not run into these problematic consequences and that is supported by science: if one takes the fundamental physical properties to be relations instead of intrinsic properties, the objection from quidditism is avoided, since there is no hidden intrinsic essence of relations. As regards the objection from humility, one can maintain that science is in principle able to provide knowledge of the fundamental relations that there are in the world so that there is no principled ignorance. Consequently, the thesis concludes that Humeanism and dispositionalism are on a par as regards the remaining charge of humility. Unorthodox Humeanism provides a competitive and adequate ontology in the light of contemporary science.

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The paper spells out five different accounts of the relationship between objects and relations three of which are versions of ontic structural realism (OSR). We argue that the distinction between objects and properties, including relations, is merely a conceptual one by contrast to an ontological one: properties, including relations, are modes, that is the concrete, particular ways in which objects exist. We then set out moderate OSR as the view according to which irreducible relations are central ways in which the fundamental physical objects exist. Physical structures thus consist in objects for whom it is essential that they are related in certain ways. There hence are objects, but they do not possess an intrinsic identity. This view can also admit intrinsic properties as ways in which objects exist provided that these do not amount to identity conditions for the objects. Finally, we indicate how this view can take objective modality into account.

The modal nature of structures in ontic structural realism

Ontic structural realism is the view that structures are what is real in the first place in the domain of fundamental physics. The structures are usually conceived as including a primitive modality. However, it has not been spelled out as yet what exactly that modality amounts to. This paper proposes to fill this lacuna by arguing that the fundamental physical structures possess a causal essence, being powers. Applying the debate about causal vs. categorical properties in analytic metaphysics to ontic structural realism, I show that the standard argument against categorical and for causal properties holds for structures as well. Structural realism, as a position in the metaphysics of science that is a form of scientific realism, is committed to causal structures. The metaphysics of causal structures is supported by physics, and it can provide for a complete and coherent view of the world that includes all domains of empirical science.

Voyages astraux et hors du corps. Héautoscopie, extase et hallucinations expérientielles d'origine épileptique [Astral and out-of-body voyages. Heautoscopy, ecstasis and experimental hallucinations of epileptic origin]

We report a 38 year-old patient who had temporoparietal epilepsy and unusual ictal "out of body" experiences that remained undiagnosed for more than ten years, until her admission for a motor seizure of the left hemibody. Out of body episodes were experienced as intense and ecstatic astral journeys. EEG showed a bilateral extension of epileptiform abnormalities to the parietal regions, predominantly on the right side. We discuss the various forms of heautoscopy and their putative mechanisms. We suggest that a disturbance in representing space in independent extrapersonal and personal coordinates might be as crucial as the elusive hypothesis of a body schema disorder. Combined involvement of the parietal neocortex and temporolimbic structures might allow those experiences to gain a subjective vividness which appears to be indissociable from normal conscious experiences.