Essays on Correlated Equilibrium and Voter Turnout

This thesis consists of three essays in the areas of political economy and game theory, unified by their focus on the effects of pre-play communication on equilibrium outcomes.

Communication is fundamental to elections. Chapter 2 extends canonical voter turnout models, where citizens, divided into two competing parties, choose between costly voting and abstaining, to include any form of communication, and characterizes the resulting set of Aumann's correlated equilibria. In contrast to previous research, high-turnout equilibria exist in large electorates and uncertain environments. This difference arises because communication can coordinate behavior in such a way that citizens find it incentive compatible to follow their correlated signals to vote more. The equilibria have expected turnout of at least twice the size of the minority for a wide range of positive voting costs.

In Chapter 3 I introduce a new equilibrium concept, called subcorrelated equilibrium, which fills the gap between Nash and correlated equilibrium, extending the latter to multiple mediators. Subcommunication equilibrium similarly extends communication equilibrium for incomplete information games. I explore the properties of these solutions and establish an equivalence between a subset of subcommunication equilibria and Myerson's quasi-principals' equilibria. I characterize an upper bound on expected turnout supported by subcorrelated equilibrium in the turnout game.

Chapter 4, co-authored with Thomas Palfrey, reports a new study of the effect of communication on voter turnout using a laboratory experiment. Before voting occurs, subjects may engage in various kinds of pre-play communication through computers. We study three communication treatments: No Communication, a control; Public Communication, where voters exchange public messages with all other voters, and Party Communication, where messages are exchanged only within one's own party. Our results point to a strong interaction effect between the form of communication and the voting cost. With a low voting cost, party communication increases turnout, while public communication decreases turnout. The data are consistent with correlated equilibrium play. With a high voting cost, public communication increases turnout. With communication, we find essentially no support for the standard Nash equilibrium turnout predictions.

Environmental taxes and the Double dividend hypothesis

In this End of Degree Dissertation I built a basic economic model, where two perfectly competitive markets interact, as a tool to understand, illustrate and evaluate environmentalfiscal reforms that have already been implemented or have been announced in many developed countries. Thus, in this dissertation I try to explain as simply as possible the theorical aspects of the “double dividend” hyphotesis and provide a numerical example with illustrative purpose.

New symbiotic hypothesis on the origin of eukaryotic flagella

The origin of eukaryotic flagella has long been a mystery. Here we review the possibility that flagella sprouted evolutionarily from the eukaryotic cell proper seems very unlikely because it is hard to imagine what function and benefit in natural selection the flagella would have provided to the cells when they first emerged as simple buds. Lynn Margulis' 1970 spirochete hypothesis, though popular still, has never been confirmed. Moreover, the absence of tubulin and axonemal dynein in the spirochetes and the incapability of the bacterial and eukaryotic membranes' making a continuum now suggest that the hypothesis is outdated. Tubulin genes were recently identified in a new bacteria division, verrucomicrobia, and microtubules have also been found in one of these species, epixenosomes, the defensive ectosymbionts. On the basis of these data, we propose a new symbiotic hypothesis: that the mid-ancestor of eukaryotic cells obtained epixenosomelike verrucomicrobia as defensive ectosymbionts and the ectosymbionts later became endosymbiotic. They still, however, protruded from the surface of their host to play their role. Later, many genes were lost or incorporated into the host genome. Finally, the genome, the bacterial membrane, and the endosymbiotic vesicle membrane were totally lost, and fingerlike protrusions with microtubules formed. As the cells grew larger, the defensive function of the protrusions eventually weakened and then vanished. Some of the protrusions took on a new role in cell movement, which led them to evolve into flagella. The key step in this process was that the dynein obtained from the host evolved into axonemal dyneins, attaching onto the microtubules and forming motile axonemes. Our hypothesis is unproven, but it offers a possible explanation that is consistent with current scientific thought. We hope that our ideas will stimulate additional studies on the origin of eukaryotic flagella and on investigations of verrucomicrobia. Whether such studies confirm, refine, or replace our hypothesis, they should nevertheless further our understanding of the origin of eukaryotic cells.