Essays in macro finance and monetary economics

Les questions abordées dans les deux premiers articles de ma thèse cherchent à comprendre les facteurs économiques qui affectent la structure à terme des taux d'intérêt et la prime de risque. Je construis des modèles non linéaires d'équilibre général en y intégrant des obligations de différentes échéances. Spécifiquement, le premier article a pour objectif de comprendre la relation entre les facteurs macroéconomiques et le niveau de prime de risque dans un cadre Néo-keynésien d'équilibre général avec incertitude. L'incertitude dans le modèle provient de trois sources : les chocs de productivité, les chocs monétaires et les chocs de préférences. Le modèle comporte deux types de rigidités réelles à savoir la formation des habitudes dans les préférences et les coûts d'ajustement du stock de capital. Le modèle est résolu par la méthode des perturbations à l'ordre deux et calibré à l'économie américaine. Puisque la prime de risque est par nature une compensation pour le risque, l'approximation d'ordre deux implique que la prime de risque est une combinaison linéaire des volatilités des trois chocs. Les résultats montrent qu'avec les paramètres calibrés, les chocs réels (productivité et préférences) jouent un rôle plus important dans la détermination du niveau de la prime de risque relativement aux chocs monétaires. Je montre que contrairement aux travaux précédents (dans lesquels le capital de production est fixe), l'effet du paramètre de la formation des habitudes sur la prime de risque dépend du degré des coûts d'ajustement du capital. Lorsque les coûts d'ajustement du capital sont élevés au point que le stock de capital est fixe à l'équilibre, une augmentation du paramètre de formation des habitudes entraine une augmentation de la prime de risque. Par contre, lorsque les agents peuvent librement ajuster le stock de capital sans coûts, l'effet du paramètre de la formation des habitudes sur la prime de risque est négligeable. Ce résultat s'explique par le fait que lorsque le stock de capital peut être ajusté sans coûts, cela ouvre un canal additionnel de lissage de consommation pour les agents. Par conséquent, l'effet de la formation des habitudes sur la prime de risque est amoindri. En outre, les résultats montrent que la façon dont la banque centrale conduit sa politique monétaire a un effet sur la prime de risque. Plus la banque centrale est agressive vis-à-vis de l'inflation, plus la prime de risque diminue et vice versa. Cela est due au fait que lorsque la banque centrale combat l'inflation cela entraine une baisse de la variance de l'inflation. Par suite, la prime de risque due au risque d'inflation diminue. Dans le deuxième article, je fais une extension du premier article en utilisant des préférences récursives de type Epstein -- Zin et en permettant aux volatilités conditionnelles des chocs de varier avec le temps. L'emploi de ce cadre est motivé par deux raisons. D'abord des études récentes (Doh, 2010, Rudebusch and Swanson, 2012) ont montré que ces préférences sont appropriées pour l'analyse du prix des actifs dans les modèles d'équilibre général. Ensuite, l'hétéroscedasticité est une caractéristique courante des données économiques et financières. Cela implique que contrairement au premier article, l'incertitude varie dans le temps. Le cadre dans cet article est donc plus général et plus réaliste que celui du premier article. L'objectif principal de cet article est d'examiner l'impact des chocs de volatilités conditionnelles sur le niveau et la dynamique des taux d'intérêt et de la prime de risque. Puisque la prime de risque est constante a l'approximation d'ordre deux, le modèle est résolu par la méthode des perturbations avec une approximation d'ordre trois. Ainsi on obtient une prime de risque qui varie dans le temps. L'avantage d'introduire des chocs de volatilités conditionnelles est que cela induit des variables d'état supplémentaires qui apportent une contribution additionnelle à la dynamique de la prime de risque. Je montre que l'approximation d'ordre trois implique que les primes de risque ont une représentation de type ARCH-M (Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticty in Mean) comme celui introduit par Engle, Lilien et Robins (1987). La différence est que dans ce modèle les paramètres sont structurels et les volatilités sont des volatilités conditionnelles de chocs économiques et non celles des variables elles-mêmes. J'estime les paramètres du modèle par la méthode des moments simulés (SMM) en utilisant des données de l'économie américaine. Les résultats de l'estimation montrent qu'il y a une évidence de volatilité stochastique dans les trois chocs. De plus, la contribution des volatilités conditionnelles des chocs au niveau et à la dynamique de la prime de risque est significative. En particulier, les effets des volatilités conditionnelles des chocs de productivité et de préférences sont significatifs. La volatilité conditionnelle du choc de productivité contribue positivement aux moyennes et aux écart-types des primes de risque. Ces contributions varient avec la maturité des bonds. La volatilité conditionnelle du choc de préférences quant à elle contribue négativement aux moyennes et positivement aux variances des primes de risque. Quant au choc de volatilité de la politique monétaire, son impact sur les primes de risque est négligeable. Le troisième article (coécrit avec Eric Schaling, Alain Kabundi, révisé et resoumis au journal of Economic Modelling) traite de l'hétérogénéité dans la formation des attentes d'inflation de divers groupes économiques et de leur impact sur la politique monétaire en Afrique du sud. La question principale est d'examiner si différents groupes d'agents économiques forment leurs attentes d'inflation de la même façon et s'ils perçoivent de la même façon la politique monétaire de la banque centrale (South African Reserve Bank). Ainsi on spécifie un modèle de prédiction d'inflation qui nous permet de tester l'arrimage des attentes d'inflation à la bande d'inflation cible (3% - 6%) de la banque centrale. Les données utilisées sont des données d'enquête réalisée par la banque centrale auprès de trois groupes d'agents : les analystes financiers, les firmes et les syndicats. On exploite donc la structure de panel des données pour tester l'hétérogénéité dans les attentes d'inflation et déduire leur perception de la politique monétaire. Les résultats montrent qu'il y a évidence d'hétérogénéité dans la manière dont les différents groupes forment leurs attentes. Les attentes des analystes financiers sont arrimées à la bande d'inflation cible alors que celles des firmes et des syndicats ne sont pas arrimées. En effet, les firmes et les syndicats accordent un poids significatif à l'inflation retardée d'une période et leurs prédictions varient avec l'inflation réalisée (retardée). Ce qui dénote un manque de crédibilité parfaite de la banque centrale au vu de ces agents.

Modeling the monetary policy reaction function of the colombian central bank

This paper proposes a simple Ordered Probit model to analyse the monetary policy reaction function of the Colombian Central Bank. There is evidence that the reaction function is asymmetric, in the sense that the Bank increases the Bank rate when the gap between observed inflation and the inflation target (lagged once) is positive, but it does not reduce the Bank rate when the gap is negative. This behaviour suggests that the Bank is more interested in fulfilling the announced inflation target rather than in reducing inflation excessively. The forecasting performance of the model, both within and beyond the estimation period, appears to be particularly good.

A simple model of multiple equilibria and default. CEPS Working Document No. 366, 16 July 2012

This Working Document by Daniel Gros presents a simple model that incorporates two types of sovereign default cost: first, a lump-sum cost due to the fact that the country does not service its debt fully and is recognised as being in default status, by ratings agencies, for example. Second, a cost that increases with the size of the losses (or haircut) imposed on creditors whose resistance to a haircut increases with the proportional loss inflicted upon them. One immediate implication of the model is that under some circumstances the creditors have a (collective) interest to forgive some debt in order to induce the country not to default. The model exhibits a potential for multiple equilibria, given that a higher interest rate charged by investors increases the debt service burden and thus the temptation to default. Under very high debt levels credit rationing can set in as the feedback loop between higher interest rates and the higher incentive to default can become explosive. The introduction of uncertainty makes multiple equilibria less likely and reduces their range.

The price of risk in construction projects: contingency approximation model (CAM)

Little attention has been focussed on a precise definition and evaluation mechanism for project management risk specifically related to contractors. When bidding, contractors traditionally price risks using unsystematic approaches. The high business failure rate our industry records may indicate that the current unsystematic mechanisms contractors use for building up contingencies may be inadequate. The reluctance of some contractors to include a price for risk in their tenders when bidding for work competitively may also not be a useful approach. Here, instead, we first define the meaning of contractor contingency, and then we develop a facile quantitative technique that contractors can use to estimate a price for project risk. This model will help contractors analyse their exposure to project risks; and help them express the risk in monetary terms for management action. When bidding for work, they can decide how to allocate contingencies strategically in a way that balances risk and reward.

Flexible rules cum constrained discretion: a new consensus in monetary policy

This paper demonstrates that recent influential contributions to monetary policy imply an emerging consensus whereby neither rigid rules nor complete discretion are found optimal. Instead, middle-ground monetary regimes based on rules (operative under 'normal' circumstances) to anchor inflation expectations over the long run, but designed with enough flexibility to mitigate the short-run effect of shocks (with communicated discretion in 'exceptional' circumstances temporarily overriding these rules), are gaining support in theoretical models and policy formulation and implementation. The opposition of 'rules versus discretion' has, thus, reappeared as the synthesis of 'rules cum discretion', in essence as inflation-forecast targeting. But such synthesis is not without major theoretical problems, as we argue in this contribution. Furthermore, the very recent real-world events have made it obvious that the inflation targeting strategy of monetary policy, which rests upon the new consensus paradigm in modern macroeconomics is at best a 'fair weather' model. In the turbulent economic climate of highly unstable inflation, deep financial crisis and world-wide, abrupt economic slowdown nowadays this approach needs serious rethinking to say the least, if not abandoning it altogether

What will be the risk-free rate and benchmark yield curve following European monetary union?

Using a linear factor model, we study the behaviour of French, Germany, Italian and British sovereign yield curves in the run up to EMU. This allows us to determine which of these yield curves might best approximate a benchmark yield curve post EMU. We find that the best approximation for the risk free yield is the UK three month T-bill yield, followed by the German three month T-bill yield. As no one sovereign yield curve dominates all others, we find that a composite yield curve, consisting of French, Italian and UK bonds at different maturity points along the yield curve should be the benchmark post EMU.

Some benefits of cyclical monetary policy

In this paper, we present a simple random-matching model of seasons, where di§erent seasons translate into di§erent propensities to consume and produce. We Önd that the cyclical creation and destruction of money is beneÖcial for welfare under a wide variety of circumstances. Our model of seasons can be interpreted as providing support for the creation of the Federal Reserve System, with its mandate of supplying an elastic currency for the nation.

The role of no-arbitrage on forecasting: lessons from a parametric term structure model

Parametric term structure models have been successfully applied to innumerous problems in fixed income markets, including pricing, hedging, managing risk, as well as studying monetary policy implications. On their turn, dynamic term structure models, equipped with stronger economic structure, have been mainly adopted to price derivatives and explain empirical stylized facts. In this paper, we combine flavors of those two classes of models to test if no-arbitrage affects forecasting. We construct cross section (allowing arbitrages) and arbitrage-free versions of a parametric polynomial model to analyze how well they predict out-of-sample interest rates. Based on U.S. Treasury yield data, we find that no-arbitrage restrictions significantly improve forecasts. Arbitrage-free versions achieve overall smaller biases and Root Mean Square Errors for most maturities and forecasting horizons. Furthermore, a decomposition of forecasts into forward-rates and holding return premia indicates that the superior performance of no-arbitrage versions is due to a better identification of bond risk premium.

Monetary arrangements for emerging economies

In this paper we look at various alternatives for monetary regimes: dollarization, monetary union and local currency. We use an extension of the debt crisis model of Cole and Kehoe ([3], [4] and [5]), although we do not necessarily follow their sunspot interpretation. Our focus is to appraise the welfare of a country which is heavily dependent on international capital due to low savings, for example, and might suffer a speculative attack on its external public debt. We study the conditions under which countries will be better off adopting each one of the regimes described above. If it belongs to a monetary union or to a local currency regime, a default may be avoided by an ination tax on debt denominated in common or local currency, respectively. Under the former regime, the decision to inate depends on each member country's political inuence over the union's central bank, while, in the latter one, the country has full autonomy to decide about its monetary policy. The possibility that the government inuences the central bank to create ination tax for political reasons adversely affects the expected welfare of both regimes. Under dollarization, ination is ruled out and the country that is subject to an external debt crisis has no other option than to default. Accordingly, one of our main results is that shared ination control strengthens currencies and a common-currency regime is superior in terms of expected welfare to the local-currency one and to dollarization if external shocks that member countries suffer are strongly correlated to each other. On the other hand, dollarization is dominant if the room for political ination under the alternative regime is high. Finally, local currency is dominant if external shocks are uncorrelated and the room for political pressure is mild. We nish by comparing Brazil's and Argentina's recent experiences which resemble the dollarization and the local currency regimes, and appraising the incentives that member countries would have to unify their currencies in the following common markets: Southern Common Market, Andean Community of Nations and Central American Common Market.

Monetary equilibrium with decentralized trade and learning

This paper analyzes the stability of monetary regimes in an economy where fiat money is endogenously created by the government, information about its value is imperfect, and learning is decentralized. We show that monetary stability depends crucially on the speed of information transmission in the economy. Our model generates a dynamic on the acceptability of fiat money that resembles historical accounts of the rise and eventual collapse of overissued paper money. It also provides an explanation of the fact that, despite its obvious advantages, the widespread use of fiat money is only a recent development.

Monetary policy and country risk

This article develops an econometric model in order to study country risk behavior for six emerging economies (Argentina, Mexico, Russia, Thailand, Korea and Indonesia), by expanding the Country Beta Risk Model of Harvey and Zhou (1993), Erb et. al. (1996a, 1996b) and Gangemi et. al. (2000). Toward this end, we have analyzed the impact of macroeconomic variables, especially monetary policy, upon country risk, by way of a time varying parameter approach. The results indicate an inefficient and unstable effect of monetary policy upon country risk in periods of crisis. However, this effect is stable in other periods, and the Favero-Giavazzi effect is not verified for all economies, with an opposite effect being observed in many cases.

A monetary mechanism for sharing capital: Diamond and Dybvig meet Kiyotaki and Wright

A model is presented in which banks accept deposits of fiat money and intermediate capital. Alt though theories about the coexistence of money and credit are inherently difficult, the model offers a simple explanation for the dual role of financial institutions: Banks are well monitored, and can credibly allow fiat-money withdraws to whom needs its, thus qualifying to become safe brokers of idle capital. The model shares some features with those of Diamond and Dybvig (1983) and Kiyotaki and Wright (1989).

Foreign funding to an emerging market: the Monetary Premium Theory and the Brazilian Case, 1991 - 1998

We develop a framework to explain the private capital flows between the rest of the world and an emerging economy. The model, based on the monetary premium theory, relates an endogenous supply of foreign capitals to an endogenous differential of interest rates; its estimation uses the econometric techniques initiated by Heckman. Four questions regarding the capital flows phenomenon are explored, including the statistical process that governs the events of default and the impact of the probability of default on the interest rate differential. Using the methodology, we analyse the dynamics of foreign capital movements in Brazil during the 1991- 1998 period.

Stochastic growth and monetary policy: the impacts on the term structure of interest rates

This paper builds a simple, empirically-verifiable rational expectations model for term structure of nominal interest rates analysis. It solves an stochastic growth model with investment costs and sticky inflation, susceptible to the intervention of the monetary authority following a policy rule. The model predicts several patterns of the term structure which are in accordance to observed empirical facts: (i) pro-cyclical pattern of the level of nominal interest rates; (ii) countercyclical pattern of the term spread; (iii) pro-cyclical pattern of the curvature of the yield curve; (iv) lower predictability of the slope of the middle of the term structure; and (v) negative correlation of changes in real rates and expected inflation at short horizons.

DSGE model with banking sector for emerging economies : estimated using Bayesian methodology for Brazil

Economias emergentes sofrem importantes restrições de crédito quando comparadas com economias desenvolvidas, entretanto, modelos estocásticos de equilíbrio geral (DSGE) desenhados para economias emergentes ainda precisam avançar nessa discussão. Nós propomos um modelo DSGE que pretende representar uma economia emergente com setor bancário baseado em Gerali et al. (2010). Nossa contribuição é considerar uma parcela da renda esperada como colateral para empréstimos das famílias. Nós estimamos o modelo proposto para o Brasil utilizando estimação Bayesiana e encontramos que economias que sofrem restrição de colateral por parte das famílias tendem a sentir o impacto de choques monetários mais rapidamente devido a exposição do setor bancário a mudanças no salário esperado.