163 resultados para Lobbying
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This paper sets out to conduct an empirical analysis of the post-Lisbon role of the European Parliament (EP) in the EU’s Common Commercial Policy through an examination of the ‘deep and comprehensive’ bilateral Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) currently negotiated as part of the EU’s Global Europe strategy. The EU-Korea and EU-India FTAs are used as case studies in order to determine the implications of the EP’s enhanced trade powers on the processes, actors and outcomes of EU bilateral trade policy. The EP is now endowed with the ‘hard power’ of consent in the ratification phase of FTAs, acting as a threat to strengthen its ‘soft power’ to influence negotiations. The EP is developing strategies to influence the mandate and now plays an important role in the implementation of FTAs. The entry of this new player on the Brussels trade policy field has brought about a shift in the institutional balance of power and opened up the EP as a new point of access for trade policy lobbyists. Finally, increased EP involvement in EU trade policy has brought about a politicisation of EU trade policy and greater normative outcomes of FTAs.
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In expanding on earlier analyses of the evolution of multinational business that have drawn from concepts of competition and innovation, this study examines the strategies used by British multinationals, between 1870 and 1929, to protect the global reputation of their brands, which were crucial to their survival and success. Even after the passage of new trademark legislation in 1876, enforcement of trademarks remained expensive, and often firms preferred to negotiate, rather than to prosecute violations. Many trademark imitators were based in the newly industrializing countries of the time—the United States, Germany, and Japan—and were part of the British export supply chains as licensees, franchisees, or wholesalers. British firms responded to infringements by lobbying governments, appointing local agents to provide intelligence, and collaborating with other firms.
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The political economy literature on agriculture emphasizes influence over political outcomes via lobbying conduits in general, political action committee contributions in particular and the pervasive view that political preferences with respect to agricultural issues are inherently geographic. In this context, ‘interdependence’ in Congressional vote behaviour manifests itself in two dimensions. One dimension is the intensity by which neighboring vote propensities influence one another and the second is the geographic extent of voter influence. We estimate these facets of dependence using data on a Congressional vote on the 2001 Farm Bill using routine Markov chain Monte Carlo procedures and Bayesian model averaging, in particular. In so doing, we develop a novel procedure to examine both the reliability and the consequences of different model representations for measuring both the ‘scale’ and the ‘scope’ of spatial (geographic) co-relations in voting behaviour.
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The rise in international markets of new, productive Japanese car manufacturers provoked intense world competition, which created serious doubts about the economic sustainability of an industry mostly dominated until the 1970s by European and North-American multinational companies. Ultimately, this crisis provoked a deep transformation of the industry, with consequences that had a permanent impact on European companies in the sector. American and later European manufacturers were successful in lobbying governments to provide protection. Using a rich source of data from the UK, I show that the ‘new trade policy’, voluntary export restraint (VER), placed on Japanese exports of new cars from 1977 to December 1999, was binding. This case study illustrates the strategies used by Japanese manufacturers to gain access to the European market through the UK market via strategic alliances and later through transplant production, against which continental European nation states were unable to fully insulate themselves. It is also shown that the policy had a profound effect on the nature of Japanese products, as Japanese firms responded to the quantity restraints by radically altering the product characteristics of their automobiles and shifting towards larger autos and new goods, to maximise their profits subject to the binding constraint.
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Syftet med denna uppsats är att ta reda på hur lokala kommunikationskonsulter i Falun/Borlänge-regionen ser på opinionsbildning via professionella konsulter. De centrala begrepp som avhandlas är PR, opinionsbildning och lobbying.Den teoretiska ram som omger undersökningen består av de teoribyggen som skapats av Jürgen Habermas, James E. Grunig och Larsåke Larsson. Habermas ställer sig tveksam till den demokratiska nyttan av professionell opinionsbildning, Grunig är mer positiv och Larsson ser både för- och nackdelar med PR-verksamheten. Larssons undersökning av opinionskonsulter från 2005 refereras också.Undersökningen bygger på intervjuer med ett antal kommunikationskonsulter verksamma i Falun och Borlänge. Den lokala marknaden för opinionsbildande uppdrag diskuteras, men också huruvida politiska uppdrag förser byråerna med politisk färg. Huruvida medarbetarnas engagemang är viktigt och hur hög statusen på opinionsbildande uppdrag är ventileras, samt vilka arbetsmetoder som används. Intervjuerna behandlar också förekomsten av lobbying på lokal nivå. Till slut redogör de intervjuade för sin syn på hur opinionsbildning, PR och lobbying via konsulter påverkar demokratin.Under slutsatser diskuteras resultatet i relation till den teoretiska ramen. Att PR- och reklambranscherna alltmer växer samman och att opinionsbildning är ett vanligt inslag i många projekt är ett faktum som också skymtat fram i den teoretiska ramen. Men reklam- och PR-metoder integreras också i politiken, på gott och ont. Följaktligen växer den gråzon som finns mellan de olika typerna av kommunikation och mellan opinionsbildande och icke-opinionsbildande uppdrag. Det försvårar gränsdragning och tydlighet, men skapar nya kreativa möjligheter.Att den ökade användningen av kommunikationskonsulter kanske kan bidra till en orättvis fördel för resursstarka organisationer diskuteras. Ny teknik, t.ex. Internet, kan dock eventuellt vara den motvikt som gör det möjligt även för resurssvaga grupper att höras i det offentliga samtalet. Kommunikation som maktfaktor tas även upp utifrån termer som lobbying och medias dagordningsfunktion.Några aspekter av den outnyttjade potential som PR har ventileras också. PR som metod är en outnyttjad resurs på det lokala planet, något som kan bero både på okunskap hos de lokala kunderna och ett traditionellt arbetssätt hos byråerna. Utifrån intervjusvaren framkommer att både byråerna, deras kunder och media på landsorten skulle gynnas av ett större samarbete.Resultaten av intervjuerna stöder mycket i den teoretiska ramen, medan somligt förkastas. Som sammanfattning kan sägas att opinionsbildning via konsulter kan användas för både gott och ont. Vilket som blir resultatet handlar som oftast om etik, ansvar, öppenhet och professionalitet.ABSTRACTThe primary target for this report is to find out how communication consultants in the region of Falun and Borlänge views the practice of establishing public opinions by using professional public relations consultants. The concepts in focus are PR, the moulding of public opinion and lobbying.The theoretical framework surrounding this report is the writings by Jürgen Habermas, James E. Grunig and Larsåke Larsson. Habermas has doubts as to the democratic use of professional consultants working with public opinions, Grunig has a somewhat more positive approach and Larsson sees both advantages and disadvantages in a democratic sense with the PR industry. Larssons research concerning consultants working with the moulding of public opinions from 2005 is also reviewed. The research is carried out by interviewing some communication consultants working in the Falun /Borlänge- area. The local market for commissions concerning public opinions is discussed, but also if and how political commissions are forcing a political stamp upon the firms engaging in such commissions. The importance of personal commitment in the consultants and the level of prominence commissions concerning public opinion has in the business is discussed, but also which methods is used and preferred. The interviews also deal with the practice of lobbying in the local arena. Finally the participants state their views on how the moulding of public opinion, PR and lobbying effects the democracy. Conclusively, the result is put in relation to the theories earlier mentioned. The public relations market is merging with the advertising business, that is a fact, and establishing public opinion is a common element in a lot of projects. But methods used for advertising and PR are also integrated in the political sphere, for good and bad. That has made the distinction between different kinds of communication harder, thereby enhancing the difficulties of establishing boundaries and achieving clarity. Yet at the same time it facilitates new creative opportunities.The growing use of communication consultants may contribute to unfair advantages for organisations with large economic resources. New technical development though, such as the Internet for example, may prove to simplify communication for groups with lesser economic power. Communication as an aspect of power is being discussed in terms of lobbying and the agenda setting power of media.Some aspects of the unused potential that lies within PR are also in focus in this report. PR as a method is an unused resource in the local market, which can be due to the local clients lack of knowledge but also to the traditional work carried out by the communication firms. The findings of the interviews show that both communication firms, their clients and the local media would benefit from greater cooperation.The theoretical base in this work is mostly supported by the interviews, though a few of the findings does not agree. The moulding of public opinions by professional consultants can be used for both good and bad. What the result will be is, not surprisingly, a question of ethics, responsibility, openness and professionalism.
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Throughout this section, I sought to establish a nexus between interest group theory and empirical observations. This in turn, would provide the framework from which I would set forth a series of hypotheses concerning the impact of the deviating 1980 elections on ideological liberal organizations. What I found in fact, was not just a link but a near perfect correlation between theory and practice, each reinforcing the other and pointing to the same ineluctable conclusion: The upshot of the Reagan/New Right landslide of 1980 was a dramatic renaissance of American liberalism. A renaissance so pervasive that ideological liberal organizations stand to benefit tremendously in terms of sustaining membership and raising funds. Moreover, it promises to facilitate the formation of liberal lobbying coalitions and enhance their capacity to cultivate grass roots support.
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We analize a discrete type version of a common agency model with informed principals of Martimort and Moreira (2005) in the context of lobby games. We begin discussing issues related to the common values nature of the model, i.e.the agent cares directly about the principal’s utility function. With this feature the equilibrium of Martimort and Moreira (2005) is not valid. We argue in favor of one solution, although we are not able to fully characterize the equilibrium in this context. We then turn to an application: a modification of the Grossman and Helpman (1994) model of lobbying for tariff protection to incoporate assimetric information (but disconsidering the problem of common values) in the lobbies objective function. We show that the main results of the original model do not hold and that lobbies may behave less agressively towards the police maker when there is private information in the lobbies valuation for the tariffs.
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This thesis consists of three chapters that have as unifying subject the frame-work of common agency with informed principals. The first two chapters analyze the economic effects of privately informed lobbying applied to tariff protection (Chapter 1) and to customs unions agreements (Chapter 2). The third chapter investigates the choice of retailing strutures when principals (the producers) are privately informed about their production costs. Chapter 1 analyzes how lobbying affects economic policy when the interest groups have private information. I assume that the competitiveness of producers are lobbies private information in a Grossman and Helpman (1994) lobby game. This allows us to analyze the e¤ects of information transmission within their model. I show that the information transmission generates two informational asymmetry problems in the political game. One refers to the cost of signaling the lobby's competitiveness to the policy maker and the other to the cost of screening the rival lobby's competitiveness from the policy maker. As an important consequence information transmission may improve welfare through the reduction of harmful lobbying activity. Chapter 2 uses the framework of chapter 1 to study a customs union agreement when governments are subject to the pressure of special interest groups that have better information about the competitiveness of the industries they represent. I focus on the agreement's effect on the structure of political influence. When join a customs union, the structure of political pressure changes and with privately informed lobbies, a new effect emerges: the governments can use the information they learn from the lobby of one country to extract rents from the lobbies of the other country. I call this the "information transmission effect". This effect enhances the governments'bargaining power in a customs union and makes lobbies demand less protection. Thus, I find that information transmission increases the welfare of the agreement and decreases tari¤s towards non-members. I also investigate the incentives for the creation of a customs union and find that information transmission makes such agreement more likely to be politically sustainable. Chapter 3 investigates the choice of retailing structure when the manufacturers are privately informed about their production costs. Two retailing structures are analyzed, one where each manufacturer chooses her own retailer (exclusive dealing) and another where the manufacturers choose the same retailer (common agency). It is shown that common agency mitigates downstream competition but gives the retailer bargaining power to extract informational rents from the manufacturers, while in exclusive dealing there is no downstream coordination but also there are no incentives problem in the contract between manufacture and retailer. A pre- liminary characterization of the choice of the retailing structure for the case of substitute goods shows that when the uncertainty about the cost increases relatively to the size of the market, exclusive dealing tends to be the chosen retailing structure. On the other hand, when the market is big relatively to the costs, common agency emerges as the retailing structure. This thesis has greatly benefited from the contribution of Professors Humberto Moreira and Thierry Verdier. It also benefited from the stimulating environment of the Toulouse School of Economics, where part of this work was developed during the year of 2007.
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As organizações da sociedade civil e suas formas de atuação têm ganhado importância tanto na sociedade como nos estudos acadêmicos. Uma das suas formas de atuação que vem se destacando é o papel de influenciar políticas públicas, também conhecido por advocacy, advocacy em políticas públicas e lobbying, dependendo do contexto e país de análise. O significado de advocacy e como esse fenômeno se manifesta constituem o foco deste estudo exploratório que busca, por meio de revisão da literatura, de entrevistas em profundidade e estudos de casos, comparar a atuação de três organizações da sociedade civil: o Independent Sector nos Estados Unidos, o Grupo de Institutos, Fundações e Empresas (GIFE) e a Associação Brasileira de Organizações não Governamentais (ABONG) no Brasil. Essas organizações se caracterizam por ser associações que representam outras organizações da sociedade civil e fazem advocacy em políticas públicas como parte de sua estratégia. É analisado como ocorre esse advocacy e qual o papel dessa forma de atuação dentro de um contexto de democracia deliberativa que pressupõe a discussão, a deliberação por parte dos cidadãos na esfera pública, de assuntos de seu interesse, como a elaboração, a execução e o monitoramento de políticas públicas.
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Teorias consideradas mainstream em estratégia dão reduzida ênfase ao relacionamento entre empresas e governos. A importância desse relacionamento é fundamental, dado que a influência governamental pode ter papel determinante na lucratividade das empresas. A este campo de estudos das atividades das empresas na tentativa de moldar as políticas públicas denominou-se Corporate Political Activity (CPA) ou ainda estratégias políticas. A importância da atividade se traduz nos valores investidos pelas empresas nestas atividades, que tem apresentado crescimento. As despesas com lobbying nos Estados Unidos representaram US$ 3,3 bilhões em 2011, frente a US$ 1,7 bilhões em 2001. As contribuições totais de campanha no Brasil foram da ordem de R$ 3,7 bilhões em 2010, comparados a R$ 1,7 bilhões doados em 2006. Este trabalho trata da influência dos aspectos cognitivos na formação de estratégias políticas no setor sucroalcooleiro brasileiro. Utilizando-se as proposições da existência de comunidades cognitivas formadas a partir do esforço em interpretar desafios estratégicos, que por sua vez levam a criação de estruturas cognitivas compartilhadas (Porac e Thomas, 2002), explorou-se como estas estruturas cognitivas influenciam as escolhas em CPA (Hillman et al., 2004). Os resultados dão suporte à influência das estruturas cognitivas nas escolhas em CPA. A partir da definição das dimensões que compõe as estruturas cognitivas de cada uma das comunidades, demonstrou-se que as escolhas em CPA estavam ligadas a estas estruturas, e não puramente a decisões racionais e econômicas. Ao demonstrar suporte à influência cognitiva sobre as escolhas em CPA, este trabalho contribui para as discussões sobre os antecedentes “não estruturais” (ou como colocam Cook e Berry (1995) comportamentais) que afetam as escolhas em CPA.
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In a nonnative approach, I analyze trade policies when the industrial sector genentes positive extemalities in production, and there are adjustments costs to changing production from one sector to the other. Protectionist trade policy can make workers intemalize the benetits from moving into the industrial sector, but it is a second best policy as it also causes consumption distortions. I show that if the govemment is able to fully commit to its tariff schedule for the future, the welfare maximizing policy is to maintain a positive tariff forever, even after all adjustment has already taken place . However, if the govemment is not able to commit at all, the only time consistent policy is zero tariff at any point in time. The time inconsistency of the full commitment policy is derived from the fact that in the model only production needs interference, and the production distortion is lagged one period with respect to the tariff wbile the consumption distortion is simultaneous to the tariff. In the intermediary case, i.e., when the government can commit for a limited period of time, the time consistent optimal tariff will be positive but lower than the "full commitment" tariff. This result indicates that some institutions that have always been considered pure sources of inefficiency, such as protectionist lobbying, may in fact be welfare improving in some cases!
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This paper studies the political viability of free trade agreements (FTAs). The key element of the analysis is the “rent dissipation” that these arrangements induce: by eliminating intra-bloc trade barriers, an FTA reduces the incentives of the local firms to lobby for higher external tariffs, thereby causing a reduction of the rents created in the lobbying process. The prospect of rent dissipation moderates the governments’ willingness to participate in FTAs; they will support only arrangements that are “substantially” welfare improving, and no FTA that reduces welfare. Rent dissipation also implies that the prospects of political turnover may create strategic reasons for the formation of FTAs. Specifically, a government facing a high enough probability of losing power may want to form a trade bloc simply to “tie the hands” of its successor. An FTA can affect the likelihood of political turnover as well. If the incumbent party has a known bias toward special interests, it may want to commit to less distortionary policies in order to reduce its electoral disadvantage; the rent dissipation effect ensures that an FTA can serve as the vehicle for such a commitment. In nascent/unstable democracies, the incumbent government can use a free trade agreement also to reduce the likelihood of a dictatorial takeover and to “consolidate” democracy – a finding that is consistent with the timing of numerous accessions to and formations of preferential arrangements.
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We study N-bidders, asymmetric all-pay auctions under incomplete information. First, we solve for the equilibrium of a parametric model. Each bidder’s valuation is independently drawn from an uniform [0, αi] where the parameter αi may vary across bidders. In this game, asymmetries are exogenously given. Next, a two-stage game where asymmetries are endogenously generated is studied. At the first stage, each bidder chooses the level of an observable, costly, value-enhancing action. The second stage is the bidding sub-game, whose equilibrium is simply the equilibrium of the, previously analyzed, game with exogenous asymmetries. Finally, natural applications of the all pay-auction in the context of political lobbying are considered: the effects of excluding bidders, as well as, the impact of caps on bids.
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Este estudo objetivou identificar os stakeholders que influenciam a agenda do gás de xisto no parlamento brasileiro. A pesquisa teve uma abordagem qualitativa, uma vez que não houve preocupação com os números e sim com a percepção dos entrevistados. Além disso, os dados coletados na pesquisa de campo foram interpretados e alinhados com o referencial teórico desse trabalho. Quanto à metodologia, foi classificada como exploratória, uma vez que ainda há pouco conhecimento sobre a influência de grupos de interesse no Congresso Nacional, do tipo pesquisa de campo e de estudo de caso por se tratar especificamente da exploração do gás de xisto. A coleta de dados foi feita por meio de entrevistas e da aplicação de questionário com um roteiro previamente estabelecido. Após a análise dos dados, concluiu-se que há duas correntes que atuam na agenda do gás de xisto. A primeira tem um posicionamento que preza pela precaução, ou seja, é necessário que se descubra os impactos da exploração da atividade no meio ambiente antes que se decida iniciar a exploração e a produção do gás de xisto. A segunda corrente defende a exploração desse gás não convencional como forma de reduzir os custos de produção e aumentar a competitividade do país. Foram identificados 39 stakeholders que influenciam o andamento do Projeto de Lei 6904/2013, que suspende a autorização e a exploração do gás de xisto por um período de cinco anos. Isso mostra que os grupos de interesse, uns mais poderosos que outros, têm papel importante na formulação de políticas públicas e, através do lobby, buscam influenciar os tomadores de decisão de acordo com os seus objetivos.