911 resultados para Legislative auditing
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WAGGGS, the World Association of Girl Guides and Girl Scouts, is the umbrella organization for Member Organizations from 145 countries around the world. As such one of its remits is to provide programmes that promote leadership development and opportunities for girls and young women to advocate on issues they care about. One of the ways WAGGGS is exploring to do this more widely and efficiently is through the use of digital technologies. This paper presents the results of an audit undertaken of the technologies already used by potential participants in online communities and courses and investigates the challenges faced in using technology to facilitate learning, within this context.
In the land of hidden legislative aims: HCJ 8665/14 (detention of asylum-seekers in Israel- round 3)
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European air quality legislation has reduced emissions of air pollutants across Europe since the 1970s, affecting air quality, human health and regional climate. We used a coupled composition-climate model to simulate the impacts of European air quality legislation and technology measures implemented between 1970 and 2010. We contrast simulations using two emission scenarios; one with actual emissions in 2010 and the other with emissions that would have occurred in 2010 in the absence of technological improvements and end-of-pipe treatment measures in the energy, industrial and road transport sectors. European emissions of sulphur dioxide, black carbon (BC) and organic carbon in 2010 are 53%, 59% and 32% lower respectively compared to emissions that would have occurred in 2010 in the absence of legislative and technology measures. These emission reductions decreased simulated European annual mean concentrations of fine particulate matter(PM2.5) by 35%, sulphate by 44%, BC by 56% and particulate organic matter by 23%. The reduction in PM2.5 concentrations is calculated to have prevented 80 000 (37 000–116 000, at 95% confidence intervals) premature deaths annually across the European Union, resulting in a perceived financial benefit to society of US$232 billion annually (1.4% of 2010 EU GDP). The reduction in aerosol concentrations due to legislative and technology measures caused a positive change in the aerosol radiative effect at the top of atmosphere, reduced atmospheric absorption and also increased the amount of solar radiation incident at the surface over Europe. We used an energy budget approximation to estimate that these changes in the radiative balance have increased European annual mean surface temperatures and precipitation by 0.45 ± 0.11 °C and by 13 ± 0.8 mm yr−1 respectively. Our results show that the implementation of European legislation and technological improvements to reduce the emission of air pollutants has improved air quality and human health over Europe, as well as having an unintended impact on the regional radiative balance and climate.
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How do presidents win legislative support under conditions of extreme multipartism? Comparative presidential research has offered two parallel answers, one relying on distributive politics and the other claiming that legislative success is a function of coalition formation. We merge these insights in an integrated approach to executive-legislative relations, also adding contextual factors related to dynamism and bargaining conditions. We find that the two presidential “tools” – pork and coalition goods – are substitutable resources, with pork functioning as a fine-tuning instrument that interacts reciprocally with legislative support. Pork expenditures also depend upon a president’s bargaining leverage and the distribution of legislative seats.
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Recent statistical data confirms that domestic violence is a structural problem of exceptional gravity. We analyze the frequent legislative changes in Brazil since 2000 as a result of social pressure for protection of abused women. Only the Law 11.340 of 2006 was well received by lawyers, judges and the public opinion. We present the innovations and peculiarities of this statute and the allegations on unconstitutionality. We discuss cases of judicial review of this law and reject the arguments of unconstitutionality. That notwithstanding, we argue that penalization decisions is the wrong way from a criminological point of view because they do not take into consideration the desires and needs of the victims.
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Effluents and surface waters around an area involved with the inking of tissues at Itatiba municipality, São Paulo State, Brazil, were chemically analyzed with the purpose of evaluating the influence on the water quality of the chemicals released, as well to provide answers to legislative requirements related to the São Paulo State Register 997 published on 31 May 1976.
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Includes bibliography
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Thank you for asking me to be here with you today. It's always a pleasure. I'm really pleased to talk about my requested topic, which deals with my vision for IANR. Believe me, my vision for the future of Nebraska agriculture and my vision for the future of the Institute of Agriculture and Natural Resources are intertwined, and very bright! That doesn't make me an oracle, of course, but it does make me enthusiastic about my topic!
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L'Autore opera una ricostruzione teorica del concetto di unità della successione, apprezzandone diverse sfumature: un significato più ristretto, per cui esso si lega al concetto di universitas ed individua appunto come unico il complesso delle situazioni giuridiche soggettive riferibili al de cuius; un secondo concetto più ampio, per cui unitarietà della successione mortis causa è il fenomeno per cui la successione nella somma delle posizioni giuridiche spettanti al defunto riceve una unica regolazione legislativa; un terzo profilo, che abbandona il concetto di successione mortis causa in senso giuridico, per accostarsi ad un concetto (piuttosto di natura economica)di unità della vicenda successoria. Se il concetto di unità della successione possiede un triplice, valore, anche la deroga ad esso potrà assumere diverse vesti, a seconda che incida sul primo, sul secondo o sul terzo di questi significati. Se il terzo profilo riguarda piuttosto un concetto economico e non tecnico di successione, ed importa conseguentemente deroghe solo indirette all’unità della successione, l’anomalia può essere di due tipi: possono essere dettate regole particolari per singoli beni, che però rimangono entro l’unica massa ereditaria, pur avendo una destinazione loro propria, e può invece essere creata dal legislatore una separata massa per cui si fa luogo ad una distinta regolazione successoria. Procedendo nella classificazione, le ipotesi di una deroga del primo tipo possono essere definite successioni speciali, riservando alla seconda classe di anomalie il nome di successioni separate. Conclusivamente, l'autore rileva che la disciplina della vicenda successoria, così come consegnata dalla tradizione e sancita ancora nelle norme della codificazione del 1942, non è più caratterizzata dall’assoluto dominio del principio di unità della successione, anche perché non si è rivelata, nella esperienza giuridica successiva alla codificazione, del tutto adeguata, in relazione a determinate categorie di beni e ad alcune categorie di soggetti coinvolti. Il legislatore ha infatti ritenuto di introdurre deroghe, via via maggiori al principio, con riferimento sia ai beni d’impresa sia alla particolare posizione – ed agli interessi tutelati – dei soggetti più vicini al de cuius, come il coniuge ed i parenti che vivessero a suo carico.
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This project looked at the nature, contents, methods, means and legal and political effects of the influence that constitutional courts exercise upon the legislative and executive powers in the newly established democracies of Central and Eastern Europe. The basic hypothesis was that these courts work to provide a limitation of political power within the framework of the principal constitutional values and that they force the legislature and executive to exercise their powers and duties in strict accordance with the constitution. Following a study of the documentary sources, including primarily the relevant constitutional and statutory provisions and decisions of constitutional courts, Mr. Cvetkovski prepared a questionnaire on various aspects of the topics researched and sent it to the respective constitutional courts. A series of direct interviews with court officials in six of the ten countries then served to clarify a large number of questions relating to differences in procedures etc. that arose from the questionnaires. As a final stage, the findings were compared with those described in recent publications on constitutional control in general and in Central and Eastern Europe in particular. The study began by considering the constitutional and political environment of the constitutional courts' activities in controlling legislative and executive powers, which in all countries studied are based on the principles of the rule of law and the separation of powers. All courts are separate bodies with special status in terms of constitutional law and are independent of other political and judicial institutions. The range of matters within their jurisdiction is set by the constitution of the country in question but in all cases can be exercised only with the framework of procedural rules. This gives considerable significance to the question of who sets these rules and different countries have dealt with it in different ways. In some there is a special constitutional law with the same legal force as the constitution itself (Croatia), the majority of countries allow for regulation by an ordinary law, Macedonia gives the court the autonomy to create and change its own rules of procedure, while in Hungary the parliament fixes the rules on procedure at the suggestion of the constitutional court. The question of the appointment of constitutional judges was also considered and of the mechanisms for ensuring their impartiality and immunity. In the area of the courts' scope for providing normative control, considerable differences were found between the different countries. In some cases the courts' jurisdiction is limited to the normative acts of the respective parliaments, and there is generally no provision for challenging unconstitutional omissions by legislation and the executive. There are, however, some situations in which they may indirectly evaluate the constitutionality of legislative omissions, as when the constitution contains provision for a time limit on enacting legislation, when the parliament has made an omission in drafting a law which violates the constitutional provisions, or when a law grants favours to certain groups while excluding others, thereby violating the equal protection clause of the constitution. The control of constitutionality of normative acts can be either preventive or repressive, depending on whether it is implemented before or after the promulgation of the law or other enactment being challenged. In most countries in the region the constitutional courts provide only repressive control, although in Hungary and Poland the courts are competent to perform both preventive and repressive norm control, while in Romania the court's jurisdiction is limited to preventive norm control. Most countries are wary of vesting constitutional courts with preventive norm control because of the danger of their becoming too involved in the day-to-day political debate, but Mr. Cvetkovski points out certain advantages of such control. If combined with a short time limit it can provide early clarification of a constitutional issue, secondly it avoids the problems arising if a law that has been in force for some years is declared to be unconstitutional, and thirdly it may help preserve the prestige of the legislation. Its disadvantages include the difficulty of ascertaining the actual and potential consequences of a norm without the empirical experience of the administration and enforcement of the law, the desirability of a certain distance from the day-to-day arguments surrounding the political process of legislation, the possible effects of changing social and economic conditions, and the danger of placing obstacles in the way of rapid reactions to acute situations. In the case of repressive norm control, this can be either abstract or concrete. The former is initiated by the supreme state organs in order to protect abstract constitutional order and the latter is initiated by ordinary courts, administrative authorities or by individuals. Constitutional courts cannot directly oblige the legislature and executive to pass a new law and this remains a matter of legislative and executive political responsibility. In the case of Poland, the parliament even has the power to dismiss a constitutional court decision by a special majority of votes, which means that the last word lies with the legislature. As the current constitutions of Central and Eastern European countries are newly adopted and differ significantly from the previous ones, the courts' interpretative functions should ensure a degree of unification in the application of the constitution. Some countries (Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Russia) provide for the constitutional courts' decisions to have a binding role on the constitutions. While their decisions inevitably have an influence on the actions of public bodies, they do not set criteria for political behaviour, which depends rather on the overall political culture and traditions of the society. All constitutions except that of Belarus, provide for the courts to have jurisdiction over conflicts arising from the distribution of responsibilities between different organs and levels in the country, as well for impeachment procedures against the head of state, and for determining the constitutionality of political parties (except in Belarus, Hungary, Russia and Slovakia). All the constitutions studied guarantee individual rights and freedoms and most courts have jurisdiction over complaints of violation of these rights by the constitution. All courts also have some jurisdiction over international agreements and treaties, either directly (Belarus, Bulgaria and Hungary) before the treaty is ratified, or indirectly (Croatia, Czech Republic, Macedonia, Romania, Russia and Yugoslavia). In each country the question of who may initiate proceedings of norm control is of central importance and is usually regulated by the constitution itself. There are three main possibilities: statutory organs, normal courts and private individuals and the limitations on each of these is discussed in the report. Most courts are limited in their rights to institute ex officio a full-scale review of a point of law, and such rights as they do have rarely been used. In most countries courts' decisions do not have any binding force but must be approved by parliament or impose on parliament the obligation to bring the relevant law into conformity within a certain period. As a result, the courts' position is generally weaker than in other countries in Europe, with parliament remaining the supreme body. In the case of preventive norm control a finding of unconstitutionality may act to suspend the law and or to refer it back to the legislature, where in countries such as Romania it may even be overturned by a two-thirds majority. In repressive norm control a finding of unconstitutionality generally serves to take the relevant law out of legal force from the day of publication of the decision or from another date fixed by the court. If the law is annulled retrospectively this may or may not bring decisions of criminal courts under review, depending on the provisions laid down in the relevant constitution. In cases relating to conflicts of competencies the courts' decisions tend to be declaratory and so have a binding effect inter partes. In the case of a review of an individual act, decisions generally become effective primarily inter partes but is the individual act has been based on an unconstitutional generally binding normative act of the legislature or executive, the findings has quasi-legal effect as it automatically initiates special proceedings in which the law or other regulation is to be annulled or abrogated with effect erga omnes. This wards off further application of the law and thus further violations of individual constitutional rights, but also discourages further constitutional complaints against the same law. Thus the success of one individual's complaint extends to everyone else whose rights have equally been or might have been violated by the respective law. As the body whose act is repealed is obliged to adopt another act and in doing so is bound by the legal position of the constitutional court on the violation of constitutionally guaranteed freedoms and rights of the complainant, in this situation the decision of the constitutional court has the force of a precedent.