Hardwicke's science-gossip : an illustrated medium of interchange and gossip for students and lovers of nature.

v.21=no.241-252 (1885)

The Nature-study review : devoted to all phases of nature-study in elementary schools.

v. 5 (1909)

The Nature-study review : devoted to all phases of nature-study in elementary schools.

v. 11 (1915)

The Nature-study review : devoted to all phases of nature-study in elementary schools.

v. 4 (1908)

Hardwicke's science-gossip : an illustrated medium of interchange and gossip for students and lovers of nature.

v.16=no.181-192 (1880)

Hardwicke's science-gossip : an illustrated medium of interchange and gossip for students and lovers of nature.

v.12=no.133-144;Index v.1-12 (1865-1876)

Hardwicke's science-gossip : an illustrated medium of interchange and gossip for students and lovers of nature.

v.19=no.217-228 (1883)

Hardwicke's science-gossip : an illustrated medium of interchange and gossip for students and lovers of nature.

v.23=no.265-276 (1887)

Hardwicke's science-gossip : an illustrated medium of interchange and gossip for students and lovers of nature.

v.22=no.253-264 (1886)

Hardwicke's science-gossip : an illustrated medium of interchange and gossip for students and lovers of nature.

v.14=no.157-168 (1878)

Hardwicke's science-gossip : an illustrated medium of interchange and gossip for students and lovers of nature.

v.17=no.193-204 (1881)

The Politics of Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations in Argentina

The search for political determinants of intergovernmental fiscal relations has shaped much of the recent literature on the economic viability of federalism. This study assesses the explanatory power of two competing views about intergovernmental transfers; one emphasizing the traditional neoclassical approach to federal-subnational fiscal relations and the other suggesting that transfers are contingent on the political fortunes and current political vulnerability of each level of government. The author tests these models using data from Argentina, a federation exhibiting one of the most decentralised fiscal systems in the world and severe imbalances in the territorial distribution of legislative and economic resources. It is shown that overrespresented provinces ruled by governors who belong to opposition parties can bring into play their political overrepresentation to attract shares of federal transfers beyond social welfare criteria and to shield themselves from unwanted reforms to increase fiscal co-responsibilty. This finding suggests that decision makers in federal countries must pay close heed to the need to synchronize institutional reforms and fiscal adjustment.