Twitter snapshots show Venezuela’s government isolated from its people

How isolated is Venezuela’s government from the people it supposedly represents? Very isolated indeed, according to a study commissioned by beyondbrics from Marco Ruediger and colleages at FGV DAPP, the department of public policy analysis at the Fundação Getulio Vergas in Rio de Janeiro. The study, derived from activity on Twitter, demonstrates the extreme polarisation of opinion in the country and suggests that Venezuela’s media, often either controlled or suppressed by the government, is increasingly lining up with opposition voices.

Innovation and technology policy (ITP) for catching up: a three phase life cycle framework for industrializing economies

Includes bibliography

Francisco Weffort e o papel da intelligentsia nacional: considerações sobre uma trajetória

Pós-graduação em Ciências Sociais - FCLAR

Central Europeans towards Integration with the European Union: A Study of Public Opinion, Social Attitudes and National Identities

Since the turbulence of 1989, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe have striven to "return to Europe". Agreements have been signed with ten post-communist countries, beginning in 1991 with Czechoslovakia (before its division), Hungary and Poland. Since that time several countries have expressed a desire to become members of the EU. In 1997 the European Commission announced its opinion on the applications for EU membership of the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, and seven other applicant countries. The Commission recommended the commencement of negotiations on accession with the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia. Mr. Kucia's report, presented in the form of a series of manuscripts totalling 91 pages, written in English and Polish and including many pages of tables and graphs, presents the results of a study of public opinion on European integration in four countries of Central Europe (CE): the Czech Republic (CZ), Hungary (H), Poland (PL), and Slovakia (SK). The research results are primarily based on a public-opinion survey known as the Central and Eastern Eurobarometer (CEEB). CEEB has been conducted on behalf of the European Commission in the Central and Eastern European countries each year in autumn since 1990. Below is a very small selection of Mr. Kucia's research findings. Throughout the 90s people in the four countries increasingly saw their countries' future tied up with the EU, since economic and political connections to the EU were growing and prospects for EU membership were increasing. Regional co-operation within CE did not gain much popular recognition. However, initially high levels of enthusiasm for the EU were gradually superseded by a more realistic approach or even scepticism. Poland was the exception in this respect; its population was more positive about the EU in 1996 than ever before. Mr. Kucia concludes that, since the political "elites" in CE are more positive about the EU than the people they serve, they should do their best to bring people round to their beliefs, lest the project of European integration become purely the business of the elites, as Mr. Kucia claims it has been in the EU up till now. He accuses the governments of the region, the EU authorities and the media of failing to provide appropriate information, especially about the two subjects which most affect them, association with the EU and the PHARE assistance programme. Respondents were asked to rank in order the countries or regions they saw their country's future most closely tied up with. In the period 92-96 the EU received the highest ratings in all of CE. The ratings were highest in CZ in 92 and 93 (46%) and in Poland in 96 (46%). They were the lowest in Hungary (22% in 94). After the EU came "Other Western European countries (non EU)", that is Austria, Sweden and Finland (before they joined the EU in 1995), Switzerland and Norway. Mr. Kucia puts the high ratings of these countries down to historical connections and geographical proximity, particularly in the case of Austria. The USA always came second in Poland, and in Hungary too its standing has always been higher than in CZ or SK. Indeed Mr. Kucia suggests that the USA's standing is disproportionately low in especially the CZ. Germany was nominated frequently by Hungarians, though in the CZ and SK, figures have been consistently low (1-2%). "Other CE/EE countries" increased their ratings in all of CE except Poland between 92 and 96. With regard to these last figures, Mr. Kucia makes an interesting note. Assuming that for the respondents in the four countries this category covered the Visegrad 4, least support was found in Poland, whose government was the most in favour of close political co-operation within the V4, while most support was in evidence in CZ and SK, for whose governments V4 was simply not a priority. Again, there is evidence of a divide between the political elites and the people. Russia has occupied a consistently modest rank. It was the highest in PL, fairly low in H and SK and the lowest in CZ. The Slovak government's policy of closer ties with Russia is reflected in a growth in the figures from 2% in 93 to 6% in 95. Every year the spontaneous answer "we should depend on ourselves" appeared, which Mr. Kucia interprets as either a sign of isolationism and disillusionment or as a call for self-reliance. Unfortunately he regards both these tendencies as unfeasible in the uniting Europe. Moving to more general conclusions, Mr. Kucia finds that the concept "Central Europe" does not have much meaning for Central Europeans. He believes that this is probably due to the failure to establish a viable regional co-operation network. Group discussions also revealed that people thought themselves European as a consequence of being Czech or Polish etc. Thus European identity is based on national identities. Generally within the surveyed period, the numbers of those who said they often think themselves European decreased, while the numbers of those who said they never think themselves European increased from 41% in PL, 36% in CZ, and 30% in H in 1990, to 67% in CZ, 58% in PL, and 51% in H in 1995.

Firing Up the Crucible with Senator Lee Metcalf & Governor Forrest Anderson -- Judge Gordon Bennett in “The Crucible of Change”

During the lead-up to Montana second progressive era, Lee Metcalf and Forrest Anderson, along with others, kept the progressive flame lit in Montana. Metcalf’s political history is replete with close electoral wins because of his commitment to progressive ideals when the times were not always politically favorable for that. As State Legislator, MT Supreme Court Justice, Congressman and eventually as US Senator, Lee won races by as little as 55 votes because he stuck to his guns as a progressive. In Forrest Anderson’s career as a County Attorney, State Legislator, MT Supreme Court Justice and 12 years as MT Attorney General he was respected as a pragmatic practitioner of politics. But during that entire career leading up to his election as Governor, Forrest Anderson was also a stalwart supporter of the progressive agenda exemplified by FDR and the New Deal, which brought folks out of the Great Depression that was brought on by the bad policies of the GOP and big business. As MT’s second progressive period began in 1965, the first important election was Senator Metcalf’s successful re-election battle in 1966 with the sitting MT Governor, Tim Babcock. And the progressive express was really ignited by the election of Forrest Anderson as Governor in 1968 after 16 years of Republican Governors in MT. Gordon Bennett played a rather unique role, being a confidant of Metcalf and Anderson, both who respected his wide and varied experience, his intellect, and his roots in progressivism beginning with his formative years in the Red Corner of NE Montana. Working with Senator Metcalf and his team, including Brit Englund, Vic Reinemer, Peggy McLaughlin, Betty Davis and Jack Condon among others, Bennett helped shape the progressive message both in Washington DC and MT. Progressive labor and farm organizations, part of the progressive coalition, benefitted from Bennett’s advice and counsel and aided the Senator in his career including the huge challenge of having a sitting popular governor run against him for the Senate in 1966. Metcalf’s noted intern program produced a cadre of progressive leaders in Montana over the years. Most notably, Ron Richards transitioned from Metcalf Intern to Executive Secretary of the Montana Democratic Party (MDP) and assisted, along with Bennett, in the 1966 Metcalf-Babcock race in a big way. As Executive Secretary Richards was critical to the success of the MDP as a platform for Forrest Anderson’s general election run and win in 1968. After Forrest’s gubernatorial election, Richards became Executive Assistant (now called Chief of Staff) for Governor Anderson and also for Governor Thomas Judge. The Metcalf progressive strain, exemplified by many including Richards and Bennett, permeated Democratic politics during the second progressive era. So, too, did the coalition that supported Metcalf and his policies. The progressivism of the period of “In the Crucible of Change” was fired up by Lee Metcalf, Forrest Anderson and their supporters and coalitions, and Gordon Bennett was in the center of all of that, helping fire up the crucible, setting the stage for many policy advancements in both Washington DC and Montana. Gordon Bennett’s important role in the 1966 re-election of Senator Lee Metcalf and the 1968 election of Governor Forrest Anderson, as well as his wide experience in government and politics of that time allows him to provide us with an insider’s personal perspective of those races and other events at the beginning of the period of progressive change being documented “In the Crucible of Change,” as well as his personal insights into the larger political/policy picture of Montana. Gordon Bennett, a major and formative player “In the Crucible of Change,” was born in the far northeast town of Scobey, MT in 1922. He attended school in Scobey through the eighth grade and graduated from Helena High School. After attending Carroll College for two years, he received his BA in economics from Carleton College in Northfield, MN. During a brief stint on the east coast, his daily reading of the New York Times (“best newspaper in the world at that time … and now”) inspired him to pursue a career in journalism. He received his MA in Journalism from the University of Missouri and entered the field. As a reporter for the Great Falls Tribune under the ownership and management of the Warden Family, he observed and competed with the rigid control of Montana’s press by the Anaconda Company (the Great Falls Tribune was the only large newspaper in Montana NOT owned by ACM). Following his intellectual curiosity and his philosophical bend, he attended a number of Farm-Labor Institutes which he credits with motivating him to pursue solutions to economic and social woes through the law. In 1956, at the age of 34, he received his Juris Doctorate degree from the Georgetown University Law Center in Washington, DC. Bennett’s varied career included eighteen years as a farmer, four years in the US Army during WWII (1942-46), two years as Assistant MT Attorney General (1957-59) with Forrest Anderson, three years in private practice in Glasgow (1959-61), two years as Associate Solicitor in the Department of Interior in Washington, DC (1961-62), and private law practice in Helena from 1962 to 1969. While in Helena he was an unsuccessful candidate for the Montana Supreme Court (1962) and cemented his previous relationships with Attorney General Forrest Anderson and US Senator Lee Metcalf. Bennett modestly refuses to accept the title of Campaign Manager for either Lee Metcalf (1966 re-election over the challenger, MT Republican Governor Tim Babcock) or Forrest Anderson (his 1968 election as Governor), saying that “they ran their campaigns … we were only there to help.” But he has been generally recognized as having filled that critical role in both of those critical elections. After Governor Anderson’s election in 1968, Bennett was appointed Director of the MT Unemployment Compensation Commission, a position from where he could be a close advisor and confidant of the new Governor. In 1971, Governor Anderson appointed him Judge in the most important jurisdiction in Montana, the 1st Judicial District in Helena, a position he held for seventeen years (1971-88). Upon stepping down from his judgeship, for twenty years (1988-2008) he was a law instructor, mediator and arbitrator. He currently resides in Helena with his wife, Norma Tirrell, former newspaper reporter and researcher/writer. Bennett has two adult children and four grandchildren.

Saving the Australian War Effort in 1916? The Significance and Impact of Global Climatic Conditions and Pests on William Morris Hughes’ Negotiations with the British Government

Taking up the thesis of Dipesh Chakrabarty (2009) that human history (including cultural history) on the one hand and natural history on the other must be brought into conversation more than has been done so in the past, this presentation will focus more closely on the significance and the impact of global climatic conditions and pests on the negotiations that Australian Prime Minister William Morris Hughes carried on with the British government between March and November 1916. Whereas Australia had been able to sell most of its produce in 1914 and 1915 the situation looked more serious in 1916, not least due to the growing shortage in shipping. It was therefore imperative for the Australian government to find a way to solve this problem, not least because it wanted to keep up its own war effort at the pace it had been going so far. In this context intentions to make or press ahead with a contribution to a war perceived to be more total those of the past interacted with natural phenomena such as the declining harvest in many parts of the world in 1916 as a consequence of climatic conditions as well as pests in many parts of the world.

Figures and related data of a review of the "Global and Russian energy outlook up to 2040"

The Global and Russian Energy Outlook up to 2040, prepared by the Energy Research Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences and the Analytical Center for the Government of the Russian Federation, analyses the long-term changes in the main energy markets and thereby identifies the threats to the Russian economy and energy sector. Research has shown that shifts in the global energy sector, especially in hydrocarbon markets (primarily the development of technologies for shale oil and gas extraction), will result in a slowdown of Russia's economy by one percentage point each year on average due to a decrease in energy exports comparison with the official projections. Owing to the lack of development of an institutional framework, an outdated tax system, low competition and low investment efficiency, Russia will be the most sensitive to fluctuations in global hydrocarbon markets among all major energy market players within the forecast period.

Parque eólico Cassino

La energía eólica, así como otras energías renovables, ha experimentado en la última década un gran auge que va extendiéndose alrededor de todo el mundo, cada vez más concienciado de la importancia de las energías renovables como una fuente alternativa de energía. Se han sumado al reto todos los países acogidos al Protocolo de Kyoto, que a fin de reducir emisiones están potenciando la energía eólica como la fuente de energía renovable hoy día más viable para la generación eléctrica. Brasil alcanzó en 2011 los 1.509 MW instalados, lo que representa el 50% de Latinoamérica, seguido por México con el 31%. Las características del sector eléctrico así como un marco legal favorable y el alto potencial eólico, hacen que la perspectiva de crecimiento en este tipo de energía sea muy favorable durante los próximos años, con estimaciones de unos 20.000 MW para 2020. El asentamiento del sector en el país de algunos de los fabricantes más importantes y los avances en cuanto a eficiencia de los aerogeneradores, mayor aprovechamiento de la energía de los vientos menos intensos, amplía las posibles ubicaciones de parques eólicos permitiendo una expansión grande del sector. El parque eólico objeto del proyecto está ubicado en el estado de Rio Grande do Sul, al sur del país, y está constituido por 33 aerogeneradores de 2,0 MW de potencia unitaria, lo que supone una potencia total instalada de 66 MW. La energía eléctrica generada en él será de 272,8 GWh/año. Esta energía se venderá mediante un contrato de compraventa de energía (PPA, Power Purchase Agreement) adjudicado por el gobierno Brasileño en sus sistemas de subasta de energía. En el proyecto se aborda primeramente la selección del emplazamiento del parque eólico a partir de datos de viento de la zona. Estos datos son estudiados para evaluar el potencial eólico y así poder optimizar la ubicación de las turbinas eólicas. Posteriormente se evalúan varios tipos de aerogeneradores para su implantación en el emplazamiento. La elección se realiza teniendo en cuenta las características técnicas de las máquinas y mediante un estudio de la productividad del parque con el aerogenerador correspondiente. Finalmente se opta por el aerogenerador G97-2.0 de GAMESA. La ejecución técnica del parque eólico se realiza de forma que se minimicen los impactos ambientales y de acuerdo a lo establecido en el Estudio de Impacto Ambiental realizado. Este proyecto requiere una inversión de 75,4 M€, financiada externamente en un 80 % y el 20 % con recursos propios del promotor. Del estudio económico-financiero se deduce que el proyecto diseñado es rentable económicamente y viable, tanto desde el punto de vista técnico como financiero. Abstract Wind energy, as well as other renewable energies, has experienced over the last decade a boom that is spreading around the world increasingly aware of the importance of renewable energy as an alternative energy source. All countries that ratified the Kyoto Protocol have joined the challenge promoting wind energy in order to reduce emissions as the more feasible renewable energy for power generation. In 2011 Brazil reached 1509 MW installed, 50% of Latin America, followed by Mexico with 31%. Electric sector characteristics as well as a favorable legal framework and the high wind potential, make the perspective of growth in this kind of energy very positive in the coming years, with estimates of about 20,000 MW by 2020. Some leading manufacturers have settled in the country and improvements in wind turbines efficiency with less intense winds, make higher the number of possible locations for wind farms allowing a major expansion of the sector. The planned wind farm is located in the state of Rio Grande do Sul, in the south of the Brazil, and is made up of 33 wind turbines of 2,0 MW each, representing a total capacity of 66 MW. The electricity generated, 272,8 GWh/year will be sold through a power purchase agreement (PPA) awarded by the Brazilian government in its energy auction systems. The project deals with the site selection of the wind farm from wind data in the area. These data are studied to evaluate the wind potential and thus optimize the location of wind turbines. Then several types of turbines are evaluated for implementation at the site. The choice is made taking into account the technical characteristics of the machines and a study of the productivity of the park with the corresponding turbine. Finally selected wind turbine is Gamesa G97-2.0. The technical implementation of the wind farm is done to minimize environmental impacts as established in the Environmental Impact Study. This project requires an investment of 75,4 M€, financed externally by 80% and 20% with equity from the promoter. The economic-financial study shows that the project is economically viable, both technically and financially.

Croatia and the EU: the catch-up issue. CEPS Commentary, 28 June 2013

To become a prosperous country devoid of institutional preconditions for corruption, Croatia will have to define its own goals, persevere in reaching them and introduce some sort of internal monitoring. True political will, democratisation, government accountability and appropriate policies are crucial, particularly for the institutions and mechanisms that monitor government accountability and citizen participation. One can only reiterate the European Commission’s hope that membership will prove to be an additional incentive to Croatia’s politicians to change their behaviour and start addressing state capture in the country.

Government failure, opposition success? Electoral performance in Portugal and Italy at the time of the crisis. Jean Monnet Occasional Paper 05/2014

The costs of the crisis in Southern European countries have not been only economic but political. Economic crises tend to lead to government instability and termination while political challengers are expected to exploit this contingent window of opportunity to gain an advantage over incumbents in national elections. The current crisis seems to make no exception, looking at the results of the general elections recently held in Southern Europe. However, this did not always lead to a clear victory of the main opposition parties. In most of the elections, in fact, the incumbent parties’ loss did not coincide with the official opposition’s gain. The extreme case is represented by Italy, where both the outgoing government coalition led by Silvio Berlusconi – setting aside for the moment the technocratic phase – and its main challenger, the centre left coalition, ended up losing millions of voters and a new political force, the Five Star Movement, obtained about 25 per cent of votes. On the opposite side there is Portugal. Only in Portugal did the vote increase for the centre right PSD, in fact, exceed the incumbent socialists’ loss. The present work aims at exploring the factors which might account for this significant divergence between the two cases.

Under the veneer of decentralisation. Ukraine's modernisation efforts stall due to lack of local government reform. OSW Commentary No. 102, 2013-02-12

President Viktor Yanukovych and his Party of Regions have been repeating the pledge to decentralise power in Ukraine and to give local government a greater decision-making role ever since the party appeared on the Ukrainian political scene. The implementation of this reform is crucial both for the economic recovery of Ukraine’s regions and the overall modernisation efforts of the Ukrainian state. At present relations between central government and the regions are regulated by Soviet-era legislation that fails to address the modern-day challenges facing Ukraine. The political elite in the country, including the opposition, appear to have reached consensus on the importance of the decentralisation reform. The first attempts to implement changes in this area were made in the late 1990s, followed by a comprehensive reform programme developed between 2007 and 2009 by Yulia Tymoshenko’s government. In 2012, the Constitutional Assembly under the President of Ukraine appointed a team of experts who drafted a document detailing the reform of local government and the territorial organisation of power1. The document envisages the implementation of what effectively are two major reforms: (1) an administrative-territorial reform, which would help consolidate the fragmented administrative structure, creating larger and more economically self-sufficient administrative units, and (2) local government reform, focusing on creating clearly defined powers for local authorities with a view to securing government funding for specific tasks delegated from central government. Nonetheless, despite these measures, and in spite of the rhetoric coming from President Yanukovych and other members of the Party of Regions, it seems unlikely that the reform will be implemented in the foreseeable future. A series of concrete political decisions taken by the president over the past three years indicate that Yanukovych has not abandoned his plan to build a highly centralised political system. This in turn limits the capacity to govern of local authorities and further restricts the sources of funding for Ukraine’s regions. This apparent resistance to change stems from the fact that by implementing the proposed reforms, the president and his political allies would be forced to relinquish much of their control over the political processes taking place in the country and would have to free up the distribution of budgetary resources between Kyiv and the regions. The implementation of the reform within the specified timeframe (i.e. by 2015) is also unlikely due to the upcoming presidential election and the deteriorating economic situation in Ukraine. Without a comprehensive reform of local government, however, Ukraine will be unable to undertake effective modernisation measures, which are key for the socio-economic development of the country’s regions.

Brexit will deepen the fault lines within the EU over mobility. CEPS Commentary, 12 July 2016

Much has been made of the divide that opened up in 2015 between eastern and western member states as a result of acrimonious discussions on how to handle the refugee crisis and distribute asylum applicants across the EU. Against the prevailing political sentiment in certain member state capitals, Germany and France pushed through a plan devised by the European Commission to relocate 120,000 refugees, by a qualified majority vote in the Council. Rather than creating an east/west divide, however, the vote split the group of (relatively) new Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) of the EU into two factions: Romania, Czechia, Slovakia and Hungary voted against the plan, whereas several other CEECs, namely Poland, Bulgaria and the Baltic states, joined the controversial motion on the side of the other (northern, southern and western) member states. Finland abstained. Few member states have shifted their positions in the meantime. If anything, in fact, they have coalesced among the Visegrad 4, following a change of government in Poland; and they have hardened, as a result of new proposals by the Commission to fine member states that refuse to accept refugees. With Hungary’s referendum on the Commission’s relocation scheme scheduled for October 2nd, tensions are set to intensify even further.

Rules of the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, 1930 : appendix, form of method of taking appeals, making up transcripts of records, docketing cases, printing records, etc.

Includes index.

"Hurry-up" spending [microform] : a report /

Reuse of record except for individual research requires license from Congressional Information Service, Inc.