The risk premium for equity: implications for resource allocation, welfare and policy

Analysis of the equity premium puzzle has focused on private sector capital markets. The object of this paper is to consider the welfare and policy implications of each of the broad classes of explanations of the equity premium puzzle. As would be expected, the greater the deviation from the first-best outcome implied by a given explanation of the equity premium puzzle, the more interventionist are the implied policy conclusions. Nevertheless, even explanations of the equity premium puzzle consistent with a general consumption-based asset pricing model have important welfare and policy implications.

Resource allocation in sparse graphs

Resource allocation in sparsely connected networks, a representative problem of systems with real variables, is studied using the replica and Bethe approximation methods. An efficient distributed algorithm is devised on the basis of insights gained from the analysis and is examined using numerical simulations,showing excellent performance and full agreement with the theoretical results. The physical properties of the resource allocation model are discussed.

An integrated multiple criteria decision making approach for resource allocation in higher education

Resource allocation is one of the major decision problems arising in higher education. Resources must be allocated optimally in such a way that the performance of universities can be improved. This paper applies an integrated multiple criteria decision making approach to the resource allocation problem. In the approach, the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) is first used to determine the priority or relative importance of proposed projects with respect to the goals of the universities. Then, the Goal Programming (GP) model incorporating the constraints of AHP priority, system, and resource is formulated for selecting the best set of projects without exceeding the limited available resources. The projects include 'hardware' (tangible university's infrastructures), and 'software' (intangible effects that can be beneficial to the university, its members, and its students). In this paper, two commercial packages are used: Expert Choice for determining the AHP priority ranking of the projects, and LINDO for solving the GP model. Copyright © 2007 Inderscience Enterprises Ltd.

Centralised or decentralised? Strategic implications of resource allocation models

This paper examines the strategic implications of resource allocation models (RAMs). Four interrelated aspects of resource allocation are discussed: degree of centralisation, locus of strategic direction, cross-subsidy, and locus of control. The paper begins with a theoretical overview of these concepts, locating the study in the contexts of both strategic management literature and the university. The concepts are then examined empirically, drawing upon a longitudinal study of three UK universities, Warwick, London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE), and Oxford Brookes. Findings suggest that RAMs are historically and culturally situated within the context of each university and this is associated with different patterns of strategic direction and forms of strategic control. As such, the RAM in use may be less a matter of best practice than one of internal fit. The paper concludes with some implications for theory and practice by discussing the potential trajectories of each type of RAM.

The role of trust in the resource allocation process of an old university

Allocation procedures, have attracted considerable interest among higher education institutions in recent years. Relevant previous research indicates that several universities adopt different approaches to the resource allocation problem, employing models and procedures that reflect their organisational arrangements and their internal socio – political dynamics. We argue that while studying accounting processes in their organisational context, the role of trust should also be considered carefully. In particular, it is very important to consider the attitudes of the individuals involved and interacting within organisational processes, and especially the trust between them, which plays an important role to the overall good governance of these processes. In our study, the role of interpersonal trust in an old Scottish University resource allocation process is examined. The study indicates that trust is a very necessary insight to the facilitation of social structures of accountability that enhance a better governance of the resource allocation process.

Adaptive resource allocation for multicast orthogonal frequency division multiple access systems with guaranteed BER and rate

In this paper, we propose a resource allocation scheme to minimize transmit power for multicast orthogonal frequency division multiple access systems. The proposed scheme allows users to have different symbol error rate (SER) across subcarriers and guarantees an average bit error rate and transmission rate for all users. We first provide an algorithm to determine the optimal bits and target SER on subcarriers. Because the worst-case complexity of the optimal algorithm is exponential, we further propose a suboptimal algorithm that separately assigns bit and adjusts SER with a lower complexity. Numerical results show that the proposed algorithm can effectively improve the performance of multicast orthogonal frequency division multiple access systems and that the performance of the suboptimal algorithm is close to that of the optimal one. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. This paper proposes optimal and suboptimal algorithms for minimizing transmitting power of multicast orthogonal frequency division multiple access systems with guaranteed average bit error rate and data rate requirement. The proposed scheme allows users to have different symbol error rate across subcarriers and guarantees an average bit error rate and transmission rate for all users. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Resource allocation in decentralised computational systems:an evolutionary market-based approach

We present a novel market-based method, inspired by retail markets, for resource allocation in fully decentralised systems where agents are self-interested. Our market mechanism requires no coordinating node or complex negotiation. The stability of outcome allocations, those at equilibrium, is analysed and compared for three buyer behaviour models. In order to capture the interaction between self-interested agents, we propose the use of competitive coevolution. Our approach is both highly scalable and may be tuned to achieve specified outcome resource allocations. We demonstrate the behaviour of our approach in simulation, where evolutionary market agents act on behalf of service providing nodes to adaptively price their resources over time, in response to market conditions. We show that this leads the system to the predicted outcome resource allocation. Furthermore, the system remains stable in the presence of small changes in price, when buyers' decision functions degrade gracefully. © 2009 The Author(s).

Human resource allocation in a call centre

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Evolutionary market agents for resource allocation in decentralised systems

We introduce self-interested evolutionary market agents, which act on behalf of service providers in a large decentralised system, to adaptively price their resources over time. Our agents competitively co-evolve in the live market, driving it towards the Bertrand equilibrium, the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium, at which all sellers charge their reserve price and share the market equally. We demonstrate that this outcome results in even load-balancing between the service providers. Our contribution in this paper is twofold; the use of on-line competitive co-evolution of self-interested service providers to drive a decentralised market towards equilibrium, and a demonstration that load-balancing behaviour emerges under the assumptions we describe. Unlike previous studies on this topic, all our agents are entirely self-interested; no cooperation is assumed. This makes our problem a non-trivial and more realistic one.