Iowa Department of Transportation Office of Contracts Letting Summary - July 1, 2004 through June 30, 2005

A summary of the regularly scheduled lettings and emergency/special lettings held by the Iowa Department of Transportation for construction and maintenance work during the period July 1, 2004, through June 30, 2005.

Department of Transportation, A Review of Selected Service Contracts, July 1, 2001 through June 30, 2004

Other Audit Reports

CNOT3 is a modifier of PRPF31 mutations in retinitis pigmentosa with incomplete penetrance.

Heterozygous mutations in the PRPF31 gene cause autosomal dominant retinitis pigmentosa (adRP), a hereditary disorder leading to progressive blindness. In some cases, such mutations display incomplete penetrance, implying that certain carriers develop retinal degeneration while others have no symptoms at all. Asymptomatic carriers are protected from the disease by a higher than average expression of the PRPF31 allele that is not mutated, mainly through the action of an unknown modifier gene mapping to chromosome 19q13.4. We investigated a large family with adRP segregating an 11-bp deletion in PRPF31. The analysis of cell lines derived from asymptomatic and affected individuals revealed that the expression of only one gene among a number of candidates within the 19q13.4 interval significantly correlated with that of PRPF31, both at the mRNA and protein levels, and according to an inverse relationship. This gene was CNOT3, encoding a subunit of the Ccr4-not transcription complex. In cultured cells, siRNA-mediated silencing of CNOT3 provoked an increase in PRPF31 expression, confirming a repressive nature of CNOT3 on PRPF31. Furthermore, chromatin immunoprecipitation revealed that CNOT3 directly binds to a specific PRPF31 promoter sequence, while next-generation sequencing of the CNOT3 genomic region indicated that its variable expression is associated with a common intronic SNP. In conclusion, we identify CNOT3 as the main modifier gene determining penetrance of PRPF31 mutations, via a mechanism of transcriptional repression. In asymptomatic carriers CNOT3 is expressed at low levels, allowing higher amounts of wild-type PRPF31 transcripts to be produced and preventing manifestation of retinal degeneration.

Optimal Contracts, Adverse Selection, and Social Preferences: An Experiment

It has long been standard in agency theory to search for incentive-compatible mechanisms on the assumption that people care only about their own material wealth. However, this assumption is clearly refuted by numerous experiments, and we feel that it may be useful to consider nonpecuniary utility in mechanism design and contract theory. Accordingly, we devise an experiment to explore optimal contracts in an adverse-selection context. A principal proposes one of three contract menus, each of which offers a choice of two incentive-compatible contracts, to two agents whose types are unknown to the principal. The agents know the set of possible menus, and choose to either accept one of the two contracts offered in the proposed menu or to reject the menu altogether; a rejection by either agent leads to lower (and equal) reservation payoffs for all parties. While all three possible menus favor the principal, they do so to varying degrees. We observe numerous rejections of the more lopsided menus, and approach an equilibrium where one of the more equitable contract menus (which one depends on the reservation payoffs) is proposed and agents accept a contract, selecting actions according to their types. Behavior is largely consistent with all recent models of social preferences, strongly suggesting there is value in considering nonpecuniary utility in agency theory.

Iowa Department of Transportation Office of Contracts Letting Summary, July 1, 2005 thru June 30, 2006

Pursuant to the Code section 307.12(14)the DOT is providing the summary of contracts let from July 1, 2005 to June 20, 2006.

Equilibrium asset prices and savings of heterogeneous agents in the presence of incomplete markets and portfolio constraints

We study the quantitative properties of a dynamic general equilibrium model in which agents face both idiosyncratic and aggregate income risk, state-dependent borrowing constraints that bind in some but not all periods and markets are incomplete. Optimal individual consumption-savings plans and equilibrium asset prices are computed under various assumptions about income uncertainty. Then we investigate whether our general equilibrium model with incomplete markets replicates two empirical observations: the high correlation between individual consumption and individual income, and the equity premium puzzle. We find that, when the driving processes are calibrated according to the data from wage income in different sectors of the US economy, the results move in the direction of explaining these observations, but the model falls short of explaining the observed correlations quantitatively. If the incomes of agents are assumed independent of each other, the observations can be explained quantitatively.

Information revelation and market incompleteness

\documentstyle[portada,11pt]{article}This paper shows that the presence of private information in aneconomy can be a source of market incompleteness even when it is feasibleto issue a set of securities that completely eliminates the informationalasymmetries in equilibrium. We analyze a simple security design model in which avolume maximizing futures exchange chooses not only the characteristics ofeach individual contract but also the number of contracts. Agents have rationalexpectations and differ in information, endowments and, possibly, attitudestoward risk. The emergence of complete or incomplete markets in equilibriumdepends on whether the {\it adverse selection effect} is stronger or weakerthan the {\it Hirshleifer effect}, as new securitiesare issued and prices reveal more information. When the Hirshleifer effectdominates, the exchange chooses an incomplete set of financial contracts, andthe equilibrium price is partially revealing.

Employment consequences of restrictive permanent contracts: Evidence from Spanish labor market reforms

Temporary employment contracts allowing unrestricted dismissals wereintroduced in Spain in 1984 and quickly came to account for most new jobs.As a result, temporary employment increased from around 10% in themid-eighties to more than 30% in the early nineties. In 1997, however,the Spanish government attempted to reduce the incidence of temporaryemployment by reducing payroll taxes and dismissal costs for permanentcontracts. In this paper, we use individual data from the Spanish LaborForce Survey to estimate the effects of reduced payroll taxes anddismissal costs on the distribution of employment and worker flows. Weexploit the fact that recent reforms apply only to certain demographicgroups to set up a natural experiment research design that can be usedto study the effects of contract regulations. Our results show that thereduction of payroll taxes and dismissal costs increased the employmentof young workers on permanent contracts, although the effects for youngwomen are not always significant. Results for older workers showinsignificant effects. The results suggest a moderately elastic responseof permanent employment to non-wage labor costs for young men. We alsofind positive effects on the transitions from unemployment and temporaryemployment into permanent employment for young and older workers, althoughthe effects for older workers are not always significant. On the otherhand, transitions from permanent employment to non-employment increasedonly for older men, suggesting that the reform had little effect ondismissals.

Recursive contracts

We obtain a recursive formulation for a general class of contractingproblems involving incentive constraints. Under these constraints,the corresponding maximization (sup) problems fails to have arecursive solution. Our approach consists of studying the Lagrangian.We show that, under standard assumptions, the solution to theLagrangian is characterized by a recursive saddle point (infsup)functional equation, analogous to Bellman's equation. Our approachapplies to a large class of contractual problems. As examples, westudy the optimal policy in a model with intertemporal participationconstraints (which arise in models of default) and intertemporalcompetitive constraints (which arise in Ramsey equilibria).

Fixed-term contracts and the duration distribution of unemployment

In the mid-1980s, many European countries introduced fixed-term contracts.Since then their labor markets have become more dynamic. This paper studiesthe implications of such reforms for the duration distribution ofunemployment, with particular emphasis on the changes in the durationdependence. I estimate a parametric duration model using cross-sectionaldata drawn from the Spanish Labor Force Survey from 1980 to 1994 to analyzethe chances of leaving unemployment before and after the introduction offixed-term contracts. I find that duration dependence has increased sincesuch reform. Semi-parametric estimation of the model also shows that forlong spells, the probability of leaving unemployment has decreased sincesuch reform.

Iowa Department of Transportation Office of Contracts Letting Summary July 1, 2006 through June 30, 2007

Twelve regularly scheduled lettings and seven emergency/special lettings were held by the Iowa Department of Transportation for construction and maintenance work during the period covered by this report. At these lettings, projects totaling $492,299,871 were approved.

PyRate: a new program to estimate speciation and extinction rates from incomplete fossil data

Despite the advancement of phylogenetic methods to estimate speciation and extinction rates, their power can be limited under variable rates, in particular for clades with high extinction rates and small number of extant species. Fossil data can provide a powerful alternative source of information to investigate diversification processes. Here, we present PyRate, a computer program to estimate speciation and extinction rates and their temporal dynamics from fossil occurrence data. The rates are inferred in a Bayesian framework and are comparable to those estimated from phylogenetic trees. We describe how PyRate can be used to explore different models of diversification. In addition to the diversification rates, it provides estimates of the parameters of the preservation process (fossilization and sampling) and the times of speciation and extinction of each species in the data set. Moreover, we develop a new birth-death model to correlate the variation of speciation/extinction rates with changes of a continuous trait. Finally, we demonstrate the use of Bayes factors for model selection and show how the posterior estimates of a PyRate analysis can be used to generate calibration densities for Bayesian molecular clock analysis. PyRate is an open-source command-line Python program available at http://sourceforge.net/projects/pyrate/.

Incomplete markets, labor supply and capital accumulation

In this paper we explore the accumulation of capital in the presence oflimited insurance against idiosyncratic shocks, borrowing constraintsand endogenous labor supply. As in the exogenous labor supply case(e.g. Aiyagari 1994, Huggett 1997), we find that steady states arecharacterized with an interest rate smaller than the rate of timepreference. However,wealsofind that when labor supply is endogenous thepresence of uncertainty and a borrowing limit are not enough to giverise to aggregate precautionary savings .