A relational contract for water demand management

For necessary goods like water, under supply constraints, fairness considerations lead to negative externalities. The objective of this paper is to design an infinite horizon contract or relational contract (a type of long-term contract) that ensures self-enforcing (instead of court-enforced) behaviour by the agents to mitigate the externality due to fairness issues. In this contract, the consumer is induced to consume at firm-supply level using the threat of higher fair price for future time periods. The pricing mechanism, computed in this paper, internalizes the externality and is shown to be economically efficient and provides revenue sufficiency.

Enhanced photoabsorption efficiency of incomplete nanoshells

The rather low scattering or extinction efficiency of small nanoparticles, metallic and otherwise, is significantly enhanced when they are adsorbed on a larger core particle. But the photoabsorption by particles with varying surface area fractions on a larger core particle is found to be limited by saturation. It is found that the core-shell particle can have a lower absorption efficiency than a dielectric core with its surface partially nucleated with absorbing particles-an ``incomplete nanoshell'' particle. We have both numerically and experimentally studied the optical efficiencies of titania (TiO2) nucleated in various degrees on silica (SiO2) nanospheres. We show that optimal surface nucleation over cores of appropriate sizes and optical properties will have a direct impact on the applications exploiting the absorption and scattering properties of such composite particles.

Average Overlap for Clustering Incomplete Data using Symmetric Non-Negative Matrix Factorization

Clustering techniques which can handle incomplete data have become increasingly important due to varied applications in marketing research, medical diagnosis and survey data analysis. Existing techniques cope up with missing values either by using data modification/imputation or by partial distance computation, often unreliable depending on the number of features available. In this paper, we propose a novel approach for clustering data with missing values, which performs the task by Symmetric Non-Negative Matrix Factorization (SNMF) of a complete pair-wise similarity matrix, computed from the given incomplete data. To accomplish this, we define a novel similarity measure based on Average Overlap similarity metric which can effectively handle missing values without modification of data. Further, the similarity measure is more reliable than partial distances and inherently possesses the properties required to perform SNMF. The experimental evaluation on real world datasets demonstrates that the proposed approach is efficient, scalable and shows significantly better performance compared to the existing techniques.

Evolution of Cooperation in the Snowdrift Game with Incomplete Information and Heterogeneous Population

Differently from previous studies of tag-based cooperation, we assume that individuals fail to recognize their own tag. Due to such incomplete information, the action taken against the opponent cannot be based on similarity, although it is still motivated by the tag displayed by the opponent. We present stability conditions for the case when individuals play unconditional cooperation, unconditional defection or conditional cooperation. We then consider the removal of one or two strategies. Results show that conditional cooperators are the most resilient agents against extinction and that the removal of unconditional cooperators may lead to the extinction of unconditional defectors.

Effects of the Maryland hydraulic clam dredge on populations of the soft-shell clam, Mya arenaria: final contract report

Final report on a three year study designed to investigate the effects of the Maryland hydraulic escalator clam dredge on populations and recruitment of the soft-shell clam, Mya arenaria. Experimental plots were established in the Potomac river, Maryland, and were dredged ina commerical manner by removing only legal size clams. quarterly samples were taken in the experimental and control plots by means of a van Veen grab for juvenile clams and the hydraulic dredge for older, deeper burrowing clams. Sediment samples were taken at selected periods for organic carbon and grain size analysis. Clams were separated into two size-groups. (PDF contains 38 pages)

Voting games with incomplete information

We examine voting situations in which individuals have incomplete information over each others' true preferences. In many respects, this work is motivated by a desire to provide a more complete understanding of so-called probabilistic voting.

Chapter 2 examines the similarities and differences between the incentives faced by politicians who seek to maximize expected vote share, expected plurality, or probability of victory in single member: single vote, simple plurality electoral systems. We find that, in general, the candidates' optimal policies in such an electoral system vary greatly depending on their objective function. We provide several examples, as well as a genericity result which states that almost all such electoral systems (with respect to the distributions of voter behavior) will exhibit different incentives for candidates who seek to maximize expected vote share and those who seek to maximize probability of victory.

In Chapter 3, we adopt a random utility maximizing framework in which individuals' preferences are subject to action-specific exogenous shocks. We show that Nash equilibria exist in voting games possessing such an information structure and in which voters and candidates are each aware that every voter's preferences are subject to such shocks. A special case of our framework is that in which voters are playing a Quantal Response Equilibrium (McKelvey and Palfrey (1995), (1998)). We then examine candidate competition in such games and show that, for sufficiently large electorates, regardless of the dimensionality of the policy space or the number of candidates, there exists a strict equilibrium at the social welfare optimum (i.e., the point which maximizes the sum of voters' utility functions). In two candidate contests we find that this equilibrium is unique.

Finally, in Chapter 4, we attempt the first steps towards a theory of equilibrium in games possessing both continuous action spaces and action-specific preference shocks. Our notion of equilibrium, Variational Response Equilibrium, is shown to exist in all games with continuous payoff functions. We discuss the similarities and differences between this notion of equilibrium and the notion of Quantal Response Equilibrium and offer possible extensions of our framework.