Determinants of human rights attitudes and behavior: A comparison and integration of psychological perspectives

Following several political-psychological approaches, the present research analyzed whether orientations toward human rights are a function of right-wing authoritarianism (RWA), social dominance orientation (SDO), basic human values in the sense of Schwartz (1992), and political ideology. Three dimensions of human rights attitudes (endorsement, restriction, and enforcement) were differentiated from human rights knowledge and behavior. In a time-lagged Internet survey (N = 479), using structural equation modeling, RWA, universalism and power values, and political ideology (measured at Time 1) differentially predicted dimensions of human rights attitudes (measured at Time 2 five months later). RWA and universalism values also predicted self-reported human rights behavior, with the effects mediated through human rights endorsement. Human rights knowledge also predicted behavior. The psychological roots of positive and negative orientations toward human rights, consequences for human rights education, and the particular role of military enforcement of human rights are discussed.

The European Court of Human Rights and Domestic Violence

Domestic violence is an issue that affects vast numbers of women throughout the world. It seems to constitute a clear violation of at least three articles of the European Convention on Human Rights, however it has only been recognised as being a human rights issue relatively recently. Indeed, until 2007 domestic violence had not been directly addressed by the European Court of Human Rights. However, the Court has now addressed the issue in a series of recent cases. This paper discusses what positive obligations states parties to the Convention now have in relation to the issue of domestic violence. It proceeds to discuss the gaps in the Court’s jurisprudence in this area at present and how the case law of the Court may develop in the future.

Realising political equality: the European Court of Human Rights and positive obligations in a democracy'

The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) speaks of the importance of an “effective political democracy” in its Preamble, though it is only in Article 3 of Protocol 1 (P1-3) that we find a right to free elections. This paper discusses the role of “positive obligations” under P1-3. This paper outlines the positive obligations in P1-3 focusing on obligations where the state is required to do more than just change the law. This may mean providing resources or facilities, adopting regulatory frameworks or creating new institutions. The paper highlights specific positive obligations that need to be further developed in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). Sometimes these can be developed by analogy with positive obligations recognised in other areas of ECtHR jurisprudence. However, beyond these cases, states should ensure that members of vulnerable and disadvantaged minorities are able to participate in the electoral process and should ensure that dominant political groups cannot abuse their political power to exclude other parties unfairly. This is necessary to realise equal political rights. The second section of this paper sketches some preliminary points about the Strasbourg institutions’ approach to P1-3. After that, the third section identifies circumstances where the ECtHR should apply a more intense scrutiny in P1-3 cases. The fourth, fifth and sixth sections look at positive obligations relating to the right to vote, the right to run for election and the regulation of political parties.

Human Dignity and judicial Interpretation of Human Rights

The Universal Declaration on Human Rights was pivotal in popularizing the use of 'dignity' or 'human dignity' in human rights discourse. This article argues that the use of 'dignity', beyond a basic minimum core, does not provide a universalistic, principled basis for judicial decision-making in the human rights context, in the sense that there is little common understanding of what dignity requires substantively within or across jurisdictions. The meaning of dignity is therefore context-specific, varying significantly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and (often) over time within particular jurisdictions. Indeed, instead of providing a basis for principled decision-making, dignity seems open to significant judicial manipulation. increasing rather than decreasing judicial discretion. That is one of its significant attractions to both judges and litigators alike. Dignity provides a convenient language for the adoption of substantive interpretations of human rights guarantees which appear to be intentionally, not just coincidentally. highly contingent on local circumstances. Despite that, however, I argue that the concept of 'human dignity' plays an important role in the development of human rights adjudication, not in providing an agreed content to human rights but in contributing to particular methods of human rights interpretation and adjudication.