Scoring rules on dichotomous preferences

In this paper, we study individual incentives to report preferences truthfully for the special case when individuals have dichotomous preferences on the set of alternatives and preferences are aggregated in form of scoring rules. In particular, we show that (a) the Borda Count coincides with Approval Voting on the dichotomous preference domain, (b) the Borda Count is the only strategy-proof scoring rule on the dichotomous preference domain, and (c) if at least three individuals participate in the election, then the dichotomous preference domain is the unique maximal rich domain under which the Borda Count is strategy-proof.

A maximal domain of preferences for tops-only rules in the division problem

The division problem consists of allocating an amount M of a perfectly divisible good among a group of n agents. Sprumont (1991) showed that if agents have single-peaked preferences over their shares, the uniform rule is the unique strategy-proof, efficient, and anonymous rule. Ching and Serizawa (1998) extended this result by showing that the set of single-plateaued preferences is the largest domain, for all possible values of M, admitting a rule (the extended uniform rule) satisfying strategy-proofness, efficiency and symmetry. We identify, for each M and n, a maximal domain of preferences under which the extended uniform rule also satisfies the properties of strategy-proofness, efficiency, continuity, and "tops-onlyness". These domains (called weakly single-plateaued) are strictly larger than the set of single-plateaued preferences. However, their intersection, when M varies from zero to infinity, coincides with the set of single-plateaued preferences.

Corrigendum: stable matchings and preferences of couples

We correct an omission in the definition of the domain of weakly responsive preferences introduced in Klaus and Klijn (2005) or KK05 for short. The proof of the existence of stable matchings (KK05, Theorem 3.3) and a maximal domain result (KK05, Theorem 3.5) are adjusted accordingly.

The Benefits of building barrier-free: a contingent valuation of accessibilty as an attribute of housing

Estimating the social benefits of barrier-free building has always required indirect solutions, such as calculating the savings in social services, hospitalisation or adaptations made possible by the increase in accessibility. This research uses the Contingent Valuation Method to gain a direct appraisal of the benefits from barrier-free housing. When comparing two similar dwellings, with the only difference being their accessibility conditions, the 1,007 randomly chosen households that answered the direct survey would pay, on average 12.5 per cent more for being barrier-free. None of the different appraisals made on accessibility costs reaches 5 per cent. This confirms the social profitability of building without barriers and shows the potential size of the private market for those housing developers that meet the demand. Accessibility is a general concern, an economic good or attribute that most households value, irrespective of the physical conditions of their members.

Efficient and stable collective choices under gregarious preferences

We consider collective choice problems where a set of agents have to choose an alternative from a finite set and agents may or may not become users of the chosen alternative. An allocation is a pair given by the chosen alternative and the set of its users. Agents have gregarious preferences over allocations: given an allocation, they prefer that the set of users becomes larger. We require that the final allocation be efficient and stable (no agent can be forced to be a user and no agent who wants to be a user can be excluded). We propose a two-stage sequential mechanism whose unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome is an efficient and stable allocation which also satisfies a maximal participation property.

Productivity, Preferences and UIP deviations in an Open Economy Business Cycle Model

We show that a flex-price two-sector open economy DSGE model can explain the poor degree of international risk sharing and exchange rate disconnect. We use a suite of model evaluation measures and examine the role of (i) traded and non-traded sectors; (ii) financial market incompleteness; (iii) preference shocks; (iv) deviations from UIP condition for the exchange rates; and (v) creditor status in net foreign assets. We find that there is a good case for both traded and non-traded productivity shocks as well as UIP deviations in explaining the puzzles.

Volatility of Housing

The aim of the project is to develop a theoretical framework where homelessness arises due to various economic and social factors that vary over time. The ultimate goal is i) to understand whether homelessness spells, entrances and exits could be predicted and if so what information is necessary; and ii) to design and evaluate a homelessness prevention programme in a changing and uncertain environment. Examples of the questions we want to answer are: Should it be made easier for people to borrow money so that they can get out of homelessness, or will such borrowing allow people to over-consume today and so fall into homelessness tomorrow? Should precautionary savings be encouraged so that people have cushions to withstand future shocks, or will savings just delay entry into homelessness? What interventions will affect the probability of becoming homeless and how will they affect behaviour? How will interventions affect incentives to save and to consume before homelessness prevention programmes kick in?

Spatial Interactions in Hedonic Pricing Models: The Urban Housing Market of Aveiro, Portugal

Spatial heterogeneity, spatial dependence and spatial scale constitute key features of spatial analysis of housing markets. However, the common practice of modelling spatial dependence as being generated by spatial interactions through a known spatial weights matrix is often not satisfactory. While existing estimators of spatial weights matrices are based on repeat sales or panel data, this paper takes this approach to a cross-section setting. Specifically, based on an a priori definition of housing submarkets and the assumption of a multifactor model, we develop maximum likelihood methodology to estimate hedonic models that facilitate understanding of both spatial heterogeneity and spatial interactions. The methodology, based on statistical orthogonal factor analysis, is applied to the urban housing market of Aveiro, Portugal at two different spatial scales.

Social Housing Policies in Latin America and Singapore: Lessons for China

This paper addresses the challenges facing China in accelerating the pace of rural-urban migration as part of its on-going economic development programme. It explains the push and pull influences on migration and in particular explains why a continuing focus on urbanisation is justified by the very large gap between rural and urban incomes and the relatively higher income elasticity of demand for urban-based goods and services. The provision of affordable housing is an integral part of this structural shift programme. The paper thus considers the most appropriate ways in which housing finance can be mobilised, and thence how both the quality and the affordability of the housing stock can be increased. Positive and negative lessons for China are offered from the different urbanisation experiences of Latin America (especially Colombia) and Singapore.

Two Studies on the Interplay between Social Preferences and Individual Biological Features

Biological features and social preferences have been studied separately as factors influencing human strategic behaviour. We run two studies in order to explore the interplay between these two sets of factors. In the first study, we investigate to what extent social preferences may have some biological underpinnings. We use simple one-shot distribution experiments to attribute subjects one out of four types of social preferences: Self-interested (SI), Competitive (C), Inequality averse (IA) and Efficiency-seeking (ES). We then investigate whether these four groups display differences in their levels of facial Fluctuating Asymmetry (FA) and in proxies for exposure to testosterone during phoetal development and puberty. We observe that development-related biological features and social preferences are relatively independent. In the second study, we compare the relative weight of these two set of factors by studying how they affect subjects’ behaviour in the Ultimatum Game (UG). We find differences in offers made and rejection rates across the four social preference groups. The effect of social preferences is stronger than the effect of biological features even though the latter is significant. We also report a novel link between facial masculinity (a proxy for exposure to testosterone during puberty) and rejection rates in the UG. Our results suggest that biological features influence behaviour both directly and through their relation with the type of social preferences that individuals hold.

An Investigation of Housing Affordability in the UK Regions

The housing market has been extensively investigated in the literature; however there is a lack of understanding of the fundamentals a ffecting housing affordability across UK regions as measured by the price to income ratio. The aim of this paper is twofold; fi rstly we calculate the a ffordability ratio based on individuals' incomes. Second we set o f to ask which socio-economic factors could a affect this ratio. The analysis finds a strong influence coming from the mortgage rate, the residents' age and academic quali fications. We also report a positive and signifi cant e ffect from foreign capital coming to the UK. Finally, we record a non-negligible degree of heterogeneity across the twelve regions.

On Cobb-Douglas Preferences in Bilateral Oligopoly

Bilateral oligopoly is a simple model of exchange in which a finite set of sellers seek to exchange the goods they are endowed with for money with a finite set of buyers, and no price-taking assumptions are imposed. If trade takes place via a strategic market game bilateral oligopoly can be thought of as two linked proportional-sharing contests: in one the sellers share the aggregate bid from the buyers in proportion to their supply and in the other the buyers share the aggregate supply in proportion to their bids. The analysis can be separated into two ‘partial games’. First, fix the aggregate bid at B; in the first partial game the sellers contest this fixed prize in proportion to their supply and the aggregate supply in the equilibrium of this game is X˜ (B). Next, fix the aggregate supply at X; in the second partial game the buyers contest this fixed prize in proportion to their bids and the aggregate bid in the equilibrium of this game is ˜B (X). The analysis of these two partial games takes into account competition within each side of the market. Equilibrium in bilateral oligopoly must take into account competition between sellers and buyers and requires, for example, ˜B (X˜ (B)) = B. When all traders have Cobb-Douglas preferences ˜ X(B) does not depend on B and ˜B (X) does not depend on X: whilst there is competition within each side of the market there is no strategic interdependence between the sides of the market. The Cobb-Douglas assumption provides a tractable framework in which to explore the features of fully strategic trade but it misses perhaps the most interesting feature of bilateral oligopoly, the implications of which are investigated.

A Case of Framing Effects: The Elicitation of Time Preferences.

We compare three methods for the elicitation of time preferences in an experimental setting: the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak procedure (BDM); the second price auction; and the multiple price list format. The first two methods have been used rarely to elicit time preferences. All methods used are perfectly equivalent from a decision theoretic point of view, and they should induce the same ‘truthful’ revelation i dominant strategies. In spite of this, we find that framing does matter: the money discount rates elicited with the multiple price list tend to be higher than those elicited with the other two methods. In addition, our results shed some light on attitudes towards time, and they permit a broad classification of subjects depending on how the size of the elicited values varies with the time horizon.