Theory and measurement of social intelligence as a cognitive performance construct

Social intelligence

Objectives of social entrepreneurs and federal lending programs, and the optimal allocation of external funds

Magdeburg, Univ., Fak. für Wirtschaftswiss., Diss., 2010

Modulation of social and emotional behaviors by glutamic acid decarboxylase (GAD) and phytoestrogens

Magdeburg, Univ., Fak. für Naturwiss., Diss., 2014

The co-evolution of social behavior and cranial morphology in sheep and goats (Bovidae, caprini) [by] William M. Schaffer and Charles A. Reed.

v.61(1971)

Diversity of social wasps (Hymenoptera, Vespidae) in Cerrado biome of the southern of the state of Minas Gerais, Brazil

An inventory of social wasps in Cerrado biome of the southern of the state of Minas Gerais was performed. A comparison between field and Riparian Forest areas was made in relation to species richness; correlations between diversity, sample methods and environmental factors were conducted. A total of 32 species was registered and Polybia fastidiosuscula de Saussure, 1854 was the most abundant species. The higher richness was in the Cerrado Field, as well as the highest diversity index. The temperature and rainfall had significant correlation with species richness and a significant variation in richness between dry and wet seasons was observed. Polybia fastidiosuscula was more abundant in the Riparian Forest during the dry season and in the Cerrado Field during wet season. The study area showed a great diversity of social wasps, with record both widely distributed species such as rare species, which indicates the quality and potential area for future studies.

Does persistence of social exclusion exist in Spain?

The aim of this paper is to analyze the causes leading to social exclusion dynamics. In particular, we wish to understand why any individual experiencing social exclusion today is much more likely to experience it again. In fact, there are two distinct processes that may generate a persistence of social exclusion: heterogeneity (individuals are heterogeneous with respect to some observed and/or unobserved adverse characteristics that are relevant for the chance of experiencing social exclusion and persistence over time) and true state of dependence (experiencing social exclusion in a specific time period, in itself, increases the probability of undergoing social exclusion in subsequent periods). Distinguishing between the two processes is crucial since the policy implications are very different.

The mean dehn functions of Abelian groups

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The Measurement of social polarization in a multi-group context

Polarization indices presented up to now have only focused their attention on the distribution of income/wealth. However, in many circumstances income is not the only relevant dimension that might be the cause of social conflict, so it is very important to have a social polarization index able to cope with alternative dimensions. In this paper we present an axiomatic characterization of one of such indices: it has been obtained as an extension of the (income) polarization measure introduced in Duclos, Esteban and Ray (2004) to a wider domain. It turns out that the axiomatic structure introduced in that paper alone is not appropriate to obtain a fully satisfactory characterization of our measure, so additional axioms are proposed. As a byproduct, we present an alternative axiomatization of the aforementioned income polarization measure.

Ant genomics sheds light on the molecular regulation of social organization.

Ants are powerful model systems for the study of cooperation and sociality. In this review, we discuss how recent advances in ant genomics have contributed to our understanding of the evolution and organization of insect societies at the molecular level.

Differentiability of functions of contractions

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When Do We Learn to Cooperate? The Role of Social Learning in Social Dilemmas

In this paper, I look at the interaction between social learning and cooperative behavior. I model this using a social dilemma game with publicly observed sequential actions and asymmetric information about pay offs. I find that some informed agents in this model act, individually and without collusion, to conceal the privately optimal action. Because the privately optimal action is socially costly the behavior of informed agents can lead to a Pareto improvement in a social dilemma. In my model I show that it is possible to get cooperative behavior if information is restricted to a small but non-zero proportion of the population. Moreover, such cooperative behavior occurs in a finite setting where it is public knowledge which agent will act last. The proportion of cooperative agents within the population can be made arbitrarily close to 1 by increasing the finite number of agents playing the game. Finally, I show that under a broad set of conditions that it is a Pareto improvement on a corner value, in the ex-ante welfare sense, for an interior proportion of the population to be informed.