931 resultados para Frederik, prince of the Netherlands, 1797-1881.
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Imprint varies: v. 1-v. 2, pt. 1, Boston, 1785-1793; v. 2, pt. 2, Charlestown, 1804; v. 3-new ser., v. 2, Cambridge, 1809-1846; new ser., v. 3-9, pt. 1, v. 10, pt. 1, Cambridge and Boston, 1848-1868; new ser., v. 9, pt. 2, v. 10, pt. 2- Cambridge, 1873-
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Edited by J. C. Kapteyn, Director.
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Ceased with no. 61. Superseded by the Bulletin of the Astronomical Institutes of the Netherlands, Supplement series.
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A revision by G.K. Fortescue of the Hand-list, 1881, compiled by G.W. Porter.
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Goldsmiths'-Kress no. 17158.
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Goldsmiths'-Kress no. 17159.
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No. 2-3 and 15-16 issued together.
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Includes bibliographical references and index.
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Each work has also special t.-p.
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Cover title.
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Measurements of the stable isotopic composition (dD(H2) or dD) of atmospheric molecular hydrogen (H2) are a useful addition to mixing ratio (X(H2)) measurements for understanding the atmospheric H2 cycle. dD datasets published so far consist mostly of observations at background locations. We complement these with observations from the Cabauw tall tower at the CESAR site, situated in a densely populated region of the Netherlands. Our measurements show a large anthropogenic influence on the local H2 cycle, with frequently occurring pollution events that are characterized by X(H2) values that reach up to 1 ppm and low dD values. An isotopic source signature analysis yields an apparent source signature below -400 per mil, which is much more D-depleted than the fossil fuel combustion source signature commonly used in H2 budget studies. Two diurnal cycles that were sampled at a suburban site near London also show a more D-depleted source signature (-340 per mil), though not as extremely depleted as at Cabauw. The source signature of the Northwest European vehicle fleet may have shifted to somewhat lower values due to changes in vehicle technology and driving conditions. Even so, the surprisingly depleted apparent source signature at Cabauw requires additional explanation; microbial H2 production seems the most likely cause. The Cabauw tower site also allowed us to sample vertical profiles. We found no decrease in (H2) at lower sampling levels (20 and 60m) with respect to higher sampling levels (120 and 200m). There was a significant shift to lower median dD values at the lower levels. This confirms the limited role of soil uptake around Cabauw, and again points to microbial H2 production during an extended growing season, as well as to possible differences in average fossil fuel combustion source signature between the different footprint areas of the sampling levels. So, although knowledge of the background cycle of H2 has improved over the last decade, surprising features come to light when a non-background location is studied, revealing remaining gaps in our understanding.
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Two patients, returning to the Netherlands from pilgrimage in Medina and Mecca, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, were diagnosed with Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) infection in May 2014. The source and mode of transmission have not yet been determined. Hospital-acquired infection and community-acquired infection are both possible.
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The text analyses the intelligence activity against Poland in the period 1944-1989. The paper also contains a case study, i.e. an analysis of the American intelligence service activity held against Poland. While examining the research thesis, the author used the documents and analyses prepared by the Ministry of Internal Affairs. In order to best illustrate the point, the author presented a number of cases of persons who spied for the USA, which was possible thanks to the analysis of the training materials of the Ministry of Internal Affairs directed to the officers of the Security Service and the Citizens’ Militia. The text tackles the following issues: (1) to what extent did the character of the socio-political system influence the number of persons convicted for espionage against Poland in the period under examination?, (2) what was the level of interest of the foreign intelligence services in Poland before the year 1990?, (3) is it possible to indicate the specificity of the U.S. intelligence activity against Poland? 1) The analysis of data indicates that the period 1946-1956 witnessed a great number of convictions for espionage, which is often associated with the peculiar political situation in Poland of that time. Up to 1953, the countries of the Eastern bloc had reproduced the Stalin’s system, which only ceased due to the death of Stalin himself. Since then, the communist systems gradually transformed into the system of nomenklatura. Irrespective of these changes, Poland still witnessed a wave of repressions, which resulted from the threats continuously looming over the communist authorities – combating the anti-communist underground movement, fighting with the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, the Polish government-in-exile, possible revisionism of borders, social discontent related to the socio-political reforms. Hence, a great number of convictions for espionage at that time could be ascribed to purely political sentences. Moreover, equally significant was the fact that the then judicial practice was preoccupied assessing negatively any contacts and relations with foreigners. This excessive number of convictions could ensue from other criminal-law provisions, which applied with respect to the crimes against the State, including espionage. What is also important is the fact that in the Stalin’s period the judiciary personnel acquired their skills and qualifications through intensive courses in law with the predominant spirit of the theory of evidence and law by Andrey Vyshinsky. Additionally, by the decree of 1944 the Penal Code of the Polish Armed Forces was introduced; the code envisaged the increase in the number of offences classified as penalised with death penalty, whereas the high treason was subject to the military jurisdiction (the civilians were prosecuted in military courts till 1955; the espionage, however, still stood under the military jurisdiction). In 1946, there was introduced the Decree on particularly dangerous crimes in the period of the State’s recovery, which was later called a Small Penal Code. 2) The interest that foreign intelligence services expressed in relation to Poland was similar to the one they had in all countries of Eastern and Central Europe. In the case of Poland, it should be noted that foreign intelligence services recruited Polish citizens who had previously stayed abroad and after WWII returned to their home country. The services also gathered information from Poles staying in immigrant camps (e.g. in FRG). The activity of the American intelligence service on the territory of FRG and West Berlin played a key role. The documents of the Ministry of Internal Affairs pointed to the global range of this activity, e.g. through the recruitment of Polish sailors in the ports of the Netherlands, Japan, etc. In line with the development in the 1970s, espionage, which had so far concentrated on the defence and strategic sectors, became focused on science and technology of the People’s Republic of Poland. The acquisition of collaborators in academic circles was much easier, as PRL opened to academic exchange. Due to the system of visas, the process of candidate selection for intelligence services (e.g. the American) began in embassies. In the 1980s, the activity of the foreign intelligence services concentrated on the specific political situation in Poland, i.e. the growing significance of the “Solidarity” social movement. 3) The specificity of the American intelligence activity against Poland was related to the composition of the residency staff, which was the largest in comparison to other Western countries. The wide range of these activities can be proved by the quantitative data of convictions for espionage in the years 1944-1984 (however, one has to bear in mind the factors mentioned earlier in the text, which led to the misinterpretation of these data). Analysing the data and the documents prepared by the Ministry of Internal Affairs, one should treat them with caution, as, frequently, the Polish counter-intelligence service used to classify the ordinary diplomatic practice and any contacts with foreigners as espionage threats. It is clearly visible in the language of the training materials concerned with “secret service methods of the intelligence activity” as well as in the documents on operational activities of the Security Service in relation to foreigners. The level of interest the USA had in Poland was mirrored in the classification of diplomatic posts, according to which Warsaw occupied the second place (the so-called Group “B”) on the three-point scale. The CIA experienced spectacular defeats during their activity in Poland: supporting the Polish underground anti-communist organisation Freedom and Independence and the so-called Munich-Berg episode (both cases took place in the 1950s). The text focuses only on selected issues related to the espionage activities against Poland. Similarly, the analysis of the problem has been based on selected sources, which has limited the research scope - however, it was not the aim of the author to present the espionage activity against Poland in a comprehensive way. In order to assess the real threat posed by the espionage activity, one should analyse the case of persons convicted for espionage in the period 1944-1989, as the available quantitative data, mentioned in the text, cannot constitute an explicit benchmark for the scale of espionage activity. The inaccuracies in the interpretation of data and variables, which can affect the evaluation of this phenomenon, have been pointed out in the text.
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Mode of access: Internet.