Foreign Direct Investment in Agriculture: Land Grab or Food Security Improvement?

“Large-scale acquisition of land by foreign investors” is the correct term for a process where the verdict of guilt is often quicker than the examination. But is there something really new about land grab except in its extent? In comparison with colonial and post-colonial plantation operations, should foreign investors today behave differently? We generally accept coffee and banana exports as pro-growth and pro-development, just as for cars, beef and insurance. What then is wrong with an investment contract allowing the holder to buy a farm and to export wheat to Saudi Arabia, or soybeans and maize as cattle feed to Korea, or to plant and process sugar cane and palm oil into ethanol for Europe and China? Assuming their land acquisition was legal, should foreigners respect more than investment contracts and national legislation? And why would they not take advantage of the legal protection offered by international investment law and treaties, not to speak of concessional finance, infrastructure and technical cooperation by a development bank, or the tax holidays offered by the host state? Remember Milton Friedman’s often-quoted quip: “The business of business is business!” And why would the governments signing those contracts not know whether and which foreign investment projects are best for their country, and how to attract them? This chapter tries to show that land grab, where it occurs, is not only yet another symptom of regulatory failures at the national level and a lack of corporate social responsibility by certain private actors. National governance is clearly the most important factor. Nonetheless, I submit that there is an international dimension involving investor home states in various capacities. The implication is that land grab is not solely a question whether a particular investment contract is legal or not. This chapter deals with legal issues which seem to have largely escaped the attention of both human rights lawyers and, especially, of investment lawyers. I address this fragmentation between different legal disciplines, rules, and policies, by asking two basic questions: (i) Do governments and parliaments in investor home countries have any responsibility in respect of the behaviour of their investors abroad? (ii) What should they and international regulators do, if anything?

The Value of Waiting: Foreign Direct Investment with Uncertainty and Imperfect Local Knowledge

This paper examines the role of uncertainty and imperfect local knowledge in foreign direct investment. The main idea comes from the literature on investment under uncertainty, such as Pindyck (1991) and Dixit and Pindyck (1994). We empirically test .the value of waiting. with a dataset on foreign direct investment (FDI). Many factors (e.g., political and economic regulations) as well as uncertainty and the risks due to imperfect local knowledge, determine the attractiveness of FDI. The uncertainty and irreversibility of FDI links the time interval between permission and actual execution of such FDI with explanatory variables, including information on foreign (home) countries and domestic industries. Common factors, such as regulatory change and external shocks, may affect the uncertainty when foreign investors make irreversible FDI decisions. We derive testable hypotheses from models of investment under uncertainty to determine those possible factors that induce delays in FDI, using Korean data over 1962 to 2001.

Foreign Direct Investment Relations between Myanmar and ASEAN

Myanmar highly appreciates foreign direct investment (FDI) as a key solution reducing the development gap with leading ASEAN countries. Accordingly, it is welcomed by the government. Myanmar's Foreign Investment Law was enacted in 1988 soon after the adoption of a market-oriented economic system to boost the flow of FDI into the country. Foreign investors positively responded to these measures in the early years and FDI inflow into Myanmar gradually increased during the period from 1989 to 1996. However, after 1997, FDI inflow was dramatically reduced and markedly declined until 2004. In 2005, FDI inflow increased at an unprecedented rate and reached the highest level in the country's history. However, this growth was not sustainable in the subsequent years, as it declined again and turned stagnant at the previous level. In terms of source regions, ASEAN is a major investor in Myanmar, which investment is significantly exceeds the combined investment of other regions of the world. Among top ten countries, Thailand's investment alone is significantly more than combined total investments of the other nine countries. Next to Thailand in terms of investments in Myanmar are Singapore and Malaysia among ASEAN, at second and third places, respectively. The combined total FDI inflows into the power and oil and gas sector represent about 65 percent of the total investment. There are many opportunities for foreign investment in other sectors, which are not, yet exploited. ASEAN countries will certainly be source countries of Myanmar FDI in the future, and Myanmar should expand to other Asian countries like Japan, India, China, Korea, and Hong Kong where its FDI portfolio is concerned. To effectively attract FDI into the country, Myanmar needs to minimize the effect of policy while opening and encouraging other potential sectors of FDI to foreign investors in ASEAN and Asian countries.

Improving the Foreign Direct Investment Capacity of the Mountainous Provinces in Viet Nam

The main purpose of this research is to suggest policies to improve the foreign direct investment attraction capacity in Northern Mountainous Provinces of Vietnam in short and medium-term. Though this region has huge potentials to develop, but poor infrastructure, remote location and bad FDI climate have hindered the FDI inflows. This research focuses on FDI climate factors, pays attention on region’s constraints, and suggests policy for three levels consisting of national, regional and provincial levels.

How does country risk matter for foreign direct investment?

In this paper, we aim to identify the political and financial risk components that matter most for the activities of multinational corporations. Our paper is the first paper to comprehensively examine the impact of various components of not only political risk but also financial risk on inward FDI, from both long-run and short-run perspectives. Using a sample of 93 countries (including 60 developing countries) for the period 1985-2007, we find that among the political risk components, government stability, socioeconomic conditions, investment profile, internal conflict, external conflict, corruption, religious tensions, democratic accountability, and ethnic tensions have a close association with FDI flows. In particular, socioeconomic conditions, investment profile, and external conflict appear to be the most influential components of political risk in attracting foreign investment. Among the financial risk components, only exchange rate stability yields statistically significant positive coefficients when estimated only for developing countries. In contrast, current account as a percentage of exports of goods and services, foreign debt as a percentage of GDP, net international liquidity as the number of months of import cover, and current account as a percentage of GDP yield negative coefficients in some specifications. Thus, multinationals do not seem to consider seriously the financial risk of the host country.

Export platform foreign direct investment : theory and evidence

This paper proposes a model that accounts for “export platform” FDI – a form of FDI that is common in the data but rarely discussed in the theoretical literature. Unlike the previous literature, this paper’s theory nests all the typical modes of supply, including exports, horizontal and vertical FDI, horizontal and vertical export platform FDI. The theory yields the testable hypothesis that a decrease in either inter-regional or intra-regional trade costs induces firms to choose export platform FDI. The empirical analysis provides descriptive statistics which point to large proportions of third country exports of US FDI, and an econometric analysis, whose results are in line with the model’s predictions. The last section suggests policy implications for nations seeking to attract FDI.

U.S.-Israel Foreign Direct Investment and Terrorism. ACES Working Paper No. 9, 2007

The Israeli economy has been subjected to a continuous flow of terror since its creation. The focus of our study is how terrorism's impacts the level of production of the high-tech sector. The two main objectives and novelties of the paper are: First our paper can be a major contribution to as yet a new subfield in applied microeconomics attempting to measure the impact of terror on economic issues like FDI and Industry output in general and that focused on the High-Tech industries. Second our research is designed to help us understand the impact of terror news, especially on U.S citizens' reactions to terror in Israel. Our terror variable isn't how many bodies or but how many negative articles regarding terror there are in leading American news paper. We focus on the volatility clustering of terror information arrivals in major US financial papers and its impact on high-tech production and FDI to Israel.

Law and Foreign Direct Investment. IES WORKING PAPER 4/2011

In this paper we examine the effect of law on foreign direct investment outflows with a specific interest in the relationship between international investment law and domestic private property laws. Our results indicate that FDI investor is indifferent to host country property rights, hence shareholder protection by law is not a significant determinant of FDI outflows. We argue that FDI, in contrast with other types of capital flows, can effectively mitigate the agency problem through majority ownership and control, hence reduce exposure to ex-post expropriation by the affiliate. On the other hand, FDI investor remains exposed to risk of expropriation by the host government and is strongly sensitive to the enforcement of law in the host country. In contrast with recent literature we conclude that there are no causal relationship between bilateral investment treaties and FDI.