Efeitos da política fiscal sobre a dinâmica macroeconômica : dinâmica da dívida pública brasileira e seus efeitos no período recente

Este trabalho trata do tema da Política Fiscal, e mais especificamente, dos seus efeitos sobre a dinâmica macroeconômica. O trabalho analisa a dinâmica da dívida pública brasileira e seus efeitos no período recente. O objetivo geral do trabalho foi verificar se a dívida pública tem efeito enriquecedor, se ao se endividar existe crescimento real do produto da economia. O presente trabalho discute o debate acerca da questão da dívida pública, apresenta as diferentes visões sobre os efeitos da política fiscal na dinâmica macroeconômica, verifica qual tem sido o resultado encontrado por diferentes autores para a economia brasileira e analisar o caso brasileiro (pós-real).

Monetary and fiscal policies interactions in a monetary union with country-size asymmetry

Within a country-size asymmetric monetary union, idiosyncratic shocks and national fiscal stabilization policies cause asymmetric cross-border effects. These effects are a source of strategic interactions between noncoordinated fiscal and monetary policies: on the one hand, due to larger externalities imposed on the union, large countries face less incentives to develop free-riding fiscal policies; on the other hand, a larger strategic position vis-à-vis the central bank incentives the use of fiscal policy to, deliberately, influence monetary policy. Additionally, the existence of non-distortionary government financing may also shape policy interactions. As a result, optimal policy regimes may diverge not only across the union members, but also between the latter and the monetary union. In a two-country micro-founded New-Keynesian model for a monetary union, we consider two fiscal policy scenarios: (i) lump-sum taxes are raised to fully finance the government budget and (ii) lump-sum taxes do not ensure balanced budgets in each period; therefore, fiscal and monetary policies are expected to impinge on debt sustainability. For several degrees of country-size asymmetry, we compute optimal discretionary and dynamic non-cooperative policy games and compare their stabilization performance using a union-wide welfare measure. We also assess whether these outcomes could be improved, for the monetary union, through institutional policy arrangements. We find that, in the presence of government indebtedness, monetary policy optimally deviates from macroeconomic to debt stabilization. We also find that policy cooperation is always welfare increasing for the monetary union as a whole; however, indebted large countries may strongly oppose to this arrangement in favour of fiscal leadership. In this case, delegation of monetary policy to a conservative central bank proves to be fruitful to improve the union’s welfare.

Política fiscal e crescimento económico

Os recentes desenvolvimentos da teoria do crescimento económico sugerem que a política fiscal pode ter efeitos importantes no crescimento económico de longo prazo. O objectivo deste artigo é investigar o impacto da política fiscal no crescimento económico de longo prazo, utilizando dados em painel para os Estados-membros da UE15 (com excepção de Luxemburgo), no período 1965-2000. Partindo do enquadramento teórico de Barro (1990), formula-se um modelo onde a taxa de crescimento real é determinada por variáveis das finanças públicas, esperando que a redução de impostos distorcionários e o aumento de despesas públicas produtivas fomentem o crescimento económico. No caso da UE15, os resultados sugerem que o aumento da dimensão do sector público (despesas ou impostos) retarda o crescimento e, em particular, uma redução dos impostos sobre o trabalho e o capital podem acelerar o crescimento económico de longo prazo.

An RBC model with a rich fiscal sector

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Economics from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

Macroeconomic impacts of politics and policy: Applications to financial and real markets

A PhD Dissertation, presented as part of the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy from the NOVA - School of Business and Economics

The role of income inequality on fiscal multipliers

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Double Degree in Economics from the Nova School of Business and Economics and University of Maastricht

US fiscal dynamics in political perspective

Given the importance of fiscal balance for ensuring a sustainable fiscal policy, we conduct an empirical examination of fiscal dynamics in the United States in response to unsustainable budget deviations. We concentrate on the role of political factors, namely the Republican - Democrat presidential divide, in determining the fiscal response to budget disequilibria. Making use of an asymmetric cointegration framework, we explore politically motivated fiscal asymmetries in the US, from Eisenhower to Obama. We conclude that political factors such as the government’s political quadrant and the timing of elections are important determinants of the fiscal response to unsustainable budget deviations.

A política fiscal da União Europeia: diagnóstico e desafios: o caso da Taxa sobre Transações Financeiras (TTF)

Trabalho de projeto de mestrado em Políticas Comunitárias e Cooperação Territorial

Should fiscal authorities cooperate in a monetary union with public deficit targets?

In this paper we analyse the setting of optimal policies in a monetary union with one monetary authority and various fiscal authorities that have a public deficit target. We will show that fiscal cooperation among the fiscal authorities, in the presence of positive supply shocks, ends up producing higher public deficits than in a non-cooperative regime. JEL No. E61, E63, F33, H0. Keywords: monetary union, fiscal policy coordination.

Would Fiscal Authorities in the EMU prefer to coordinate?

This article studies whether fiscal authorities would prefer to operate like in the current EMU or to coordinate according to the theoretical literature. The EMU approach will lead to higher volatility of interest rates, output, inflation and average budget deficits, but the SGP deficit target will be breached less often. Keywords: fiscal policy coordination, monetary union, Stability and Growth Pact. JEL No. E61, E63, F33, H0

The Global Dimension to Fiscal Sustainability

This paper examines the issue of fiscal sustainability in emerging market countries and industrial countries. We highlight the importance of the time series properties of the primary surplus and debt, and find evidence of a positive long run relationship. Consequently we emphasise, that especially for emerging markets, it is important to recognise the implications of global capital market shocks for fiscal sustainability, a relationship which has hitherto been ignored in the empirical literature. Using a factor model we demonstrate that the relationship between deficit and debt is conditional upon a global factor and we suggest that this global factor is related to world-wide liquidity. We also demonstrate that this acts as a constraint on emerging market economies’ fiscal policy.

When is Monetary Policy All we Need?

We consider optimal monetary and scal policies in a New Keynesian model of a small open economy with sticky prices and wages. In this benchmark setting monetary policy is all we need - analytical results demonstrate that variations in government spending should play no role in the stabilization of shocks. In extensions we show, rstly, that this is even when true when allowing for in ation inertia through backward-looking rule-of-thumb price and wage-setting, as long as there is no discrepancy between the private and social evaluation of the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure. Secondly, the optimal neutrality of government spending is robust to the issuance of public debt. In the presence of debt government spending will deviate from the optimal steady-state but only to the extent required to cover the deficit, not to provide any additional macroeconomic stabilization. However, unlike government spending variations in tax rates can play a complementary role to monetary policy, as they change relative prices rather than demand.

Discretionary Policy in a Monetary Union with Sovereign Debt

This paper examines the interactions between multiple national fiscal policy- makers and a single monetary policy maker in response to shocks to government debt in some or all of the countries of a monetary union. We assume that national governments respond to excess debt in an optimal manner, but that they do not have access to a commitment technology. This implies that national fi scal policy gradually reduces debt: the lack of a commitment technology precludes a random walk in steady state debt, but the need to maintain national competitiveness avoids excessively rapid debt reduction. If the central bank can commit, it adjusts its policies only slightly in response to higher debt, allowing national fiscal policy to undertake most of the adjustment. However if it cannot commit, then optimal monetary policy involves using interest rates to rapidly reduce debt, with signifi cant welfare costs. We show that in these circumstances the central bank would do better to ignore national fiscal policies in formulating its policy.

Subsidies as Optimal Fiscal Stimuli

In the theoretical macroeconomics literature, fiscal policy is almost uniformly taken to mean taxing and spending by a ‘benevolent government’ that exploits the potential aggregate demand externalities inherent in the imperfectly competitive nature of goods markets. Whilst shown to raise aggregate output and employment, these policies crowd-out private consumption and hence typically reduce welfare. In this paper we consider the use of ‘tax-and-subsidise’ instead of ‘taxand- spend’ policies on account of their widespread use by governments, even in the recent recession, to stimulate economic activity. Within a static general equilibrium macro-model with imperfectly competitive good markets we examine the effect of wage and output subsidies and show that, for a small open economy, positive tax and subsidy rates exist which maximise welfare, rendering no intervention as a suboptimal state. We also show that, within a two-country setting, a Nash non-cooperative symmetric equilibrium with positive tax and subsidy rates exists, and that cooperation between trading partners in setting these rates is more expansionary and leads to an improvement upon the non-cooperative solution.