The UK's Electoral Reform Referendum of May 2011

The UK’s second nationwide referendum, held in May 2011, offers rich opportunities for analysing the dynamics of a referendum campaign. The articles gathered together in this symposium address three themes. The first concerns the determinants and dynamics of public opinion during a referendum campaign, the second relates to the potential for interaction between the referendum and simultaneous elections, and the third focuses on coverage of the referendum in the media. Following a brief outline of the background to the referendum, this paper introduces the contribution that each article makes to these themes.

Terrorism and electoral accountability: one strike, you're out!

We examine the relationship between terrorism and electoral accountability. We find that terror has a robust positive effect on the probability that the incumbent government is replaced. The magnitude of the effect increases with the severity of the terrorist attack.

Is the future of electoral reform local?

The Electoral Reform Society has recently published two reports putting the case for electoral reform in local government. These suggest acceptance, in the wake of defeat in the 2011 Alternative Vote referendum, that the group’s ultimate goal of change to the Westminster electoral system is unlikely to be fulfilled soon and that a more gradual strategy is therefore needed. This paper examines this shift by asking three questions. First, is Westminster electoral reform really a dead letter? Second, is local electoral reform more likely—and, if so, just how much more likely? Third, would local electoral reform matter in itself?

Electoral rules, political competition and fiscal spending: regression discontinuity evidence from brazilian municipalities

We exploit a discontinuity in Brazilian municipal election rules to investigate whether political competition has a causal impact on policy choices. In municipalities with less than 200,000 voters mayors are elected with a plurality of the vote. In municipalities with more than 200,000 voters a run-off election takes place among the top two candidates if neither achieves a majority of the votes. At a first stage, we show that the possibility of runoff increases political competition. At a second stage, we use the discontinuity as a source of exogenous variation to infer causality from political competition to fiscal policy. Our second stage results suggest that political competition induces more investment and less current spending, particularly personnel expenses. Furthermore, the impact of political competition is larger when incumbents can run for reelection, suggesting incentives matter insofar as incumbents can themselves remain in office.

Electoral institutions,cleavage structures,and the number of parties

Theory: A classic question in political science concems ",hat deteImines the number of parties that compete in a given polity. Broadly speaking, there are two approaches to answering this question, one that emphasizes the role of electorallaws in structuring coalitional incentives, another that emphasizes the importance of pre-existing social cleavages. In tbis paper, we view the number of parties as a product of the interaction between these two forces, following Powell (1982) and Ordeshook and Shvetsova (1994). Hypotheses: The effective number of parties in a polity should be a multiplicative rather than an additive function ofthe peImissiveness ofthe electoral system and the heterogeneity ofthe society. Methods: Multiple regression on cross-sectional aggregate electoral statistics. Unlike previous studies, we (1) do not confine attention to developed democracies; (2) explicitly control for the influence of presidential elections, taking account of whether they are concurrent or nonconcurrent, and ofthe effective number ofpresidential candidates; and (3) also control for the presence and operation of upper tiers in legislative elections. Results: The hypothesis is confiImed, both as regards the number of legislative and the number of presidential parties .

Avenues to success : electoral strategies and ambition in the Brazilian chamber of deputies

In the second consecutive election for the Brazilian Chamber ofDeputies, the majority of incumbents (75% in 1998 and again 75% in 2002) decided to run for reelection and at least 70% ofthem in both elections were successful, suggesting thus it would be incorrect to ignore static ambition as the main target of Brazilian legislators. It also raises doubts about the assertion that incumbents use their posts to pursue their post-Iegislative careers. However, this number also suggests that not alIlegislators seek reelection, indicating that it is also incorrect to assume alI of them are driven by similar motivations. In their attempts at career survival, incumbents may also run for higher offices (Senator, Governor, Vicegovernor). A minority still, may run for state leveI offices (regressive ambition).Given that static and progressive ambition are the two main types of career choice in Brazil, we focus on the factors that influence the career decision and electoral success of those who choose to run for reelection and those who choose to run for higher-level offices, i.e. senator and governor. We use data recently colIected from the 2002 elections.

Electoral control in the presence of gridlocks

This article presents a game-theoretic partisan model of voting and political bargaining. In a two-period setup, voters ¯rst elect an executive incumbent and the legislators from a pool of candidates belonging to di®erent parties. Once elected, the executive and the legislature bargain over a budget. Party origin and a relevant parameter of the economy, the state of the world, in°uence the bargaining cost, such that political gridlocks may occur. At the end of the ¯rst period voters observe the outcome of bargaining but do not observe the true estate of the world, and decide whether or not to reelect the same parties for the Executive and the Legislature. The model con¯rms the very recent literature by showing that voters tend to have more °exible reelection criteria when they believe the true state of the world is likely to be unfavorable. On the other hand, when voters believe the true state of the world is likely to be favorable, they become more demanding in order to reelect the incumbents. In particular, there will be government shutdown with positive probability in equilibrium. Gridlocks occur due to the imperfect information of voters and they constitute indeed an information revelation mechanism that improves electoral control in the second period.

Exposing corrupt politicians : the effects of Brazil's publicly released audits on electoral

This paper examines whether access to information enhances political accountabil- ity. Based upon the results of Brazil's recent anti-corruption program that randomly audits municipal expenditures of federally-transferred funds, it estimates the e®ects of the disclosure of local government corruption practices upon the re-election success of incumbent mayors. Comparing municipalities audited before and after the elections, we show that the audit policy reduced the incumbent's likelihood of re-election by approximately 20 percent, and was more pronounced in municipalities with radio sta- tions. These ¯ndings highlight the value of information and the role of the media in reducing informational asymmetries in the political process.

Polarización y resaca electoral en Brasil

Concluidas las exasperadas elecciones de 2014, el país pasa por un momento delicado. Por un lado, es esperado que la nueva composición del gobierno busque un tono de reconciliación posicionándose de una manera más moderada que permita el funcionamiento del modelo de gobierno de coalición aun en práctica. Por otro, ya queda evidente que será un arduo y doloroso proceso en virtud a la intensa polarización política que, a pesar de apuntar tendencias de distensión sigue un expresivo elemento en la conducción de la política brasileña

El principio constitucional de proporcionalidad en el sistema electoral autómico canario: análisis de su experiencia histórica en el autogobierno.

Programa de doctorado: La decisión jurídica: hechos y normas en la argumentación del Derecho.

Reflexiones sobre gobernanza; confianza en las instituciones públicas, densidad asociativa y participación electoral en Europa.

[ES] El presente estudio trata de forma abierta de los cambios que se están produciendo en los métodos de gobernar y en las posibilidades que ofrece la nueva gobernanza a la participación de la ciudadanía para influir en las decisiones que conciernen al territorio y su futuro. También introduce elementos relacionados con el dinamismo que han adquirido los movimientos sociales y la participación política no convencional, precisamente cuando más aumenta la desafección a la política y a los partidos políticos e igualmente se incrementan los índices de abstención electoral.

Cambios en la legislación electoral durante el sexenio (1868-1874): sus repercusiones en Canarias

[ES] El proceso de consolidación del régimen liberal a lo largo del siglo XIX plantea la necesidad de establecer un sistema de representación política. Conseguir el equilibrio del poder político, será el fin último que perseguirán los diversos modelos que se ofrecen para llevar a efecto esta representación a través del sufragio y los sistemas electorales. Modelos que varían en función de los intereses e ideologías que en esos momentos esté en juego.

The New Electoral Geography of Central Europe

Zarycki studied the political map of Central Europe today on the basis of results of recent parliamentary and/or presidential elections in the Czech Republic, Hungary, L8ithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Ukraine. He identified first the structure of regional political cleavages, then the spatial patterns emerging in different countries. He also considered the significance and eventual regional differentiation of various possible influences on these patterns, including urbanisation, historical heritage, ethnic factors, population movements, economic differentiation, the effects of the transformation, demographic factors, education and religion. Virtually all the countries showed a cleavage between more traditional, anti (or non-) communist regions and secular areas with higher post-communist support. Except in Ukraine and the Czech Republic, the post-communist party is dominated by the direct heirs of the former communist parties transformed into moderate left parties. The second major class of cleavages was typical of the Visegrad countries, i.e. the conflict between liberal, mostly metropolitan, regions and a different periphery, usually with a strong populist or anti-liberal appeal. This usually depends on the existence of a sizeable well-educated class, usually pro-market and pro-Western, and on the resolution of the conflict between post and anti-Communists. The third type of cleavage is based on ethnic factors and is clearest in Lithuania and Slovakia, where there are large ethnic minorities. Of factors influencing political behaviour, the two major ones identified were the historical heritage and urbanisation.