On the efficiency of the Argentinean electricity wholesale market

This paper discusses two key aspects regarding the efficiency of the Argentinean Electricity Market. Using hourly data on prices, marginal costs, and operational status of generators, it will be argued that, unlike the former British and Californian electricity spot markets, this market is not subject to the conventional forms of exercise of market power by generators. We then use Chao's (1983) model of optimal configuation of electricity supply to evaluate the social desirability of the change in the supply pattern of the Argentinean electricity industry, which took place throughout the last ten years.

Can a Newly Proposed Mechanism for Allocating Contracts in U.S. Electricity Wholesale Markets Lead to Lower Prices? A Game Theoretic Analysis

This study of the wholesale electricity market compares the cost-minimizing performance of the auction mechanism currently in place in U.S. markets with the performance of a proposed replacement. The current mechanism chooses an allocation of contracts that minimizes a fictional cost calculated using pay-as-offer pricing. Then suppliers are paid the market clearing price. The proposed mechanism uses the market clearing price in the allocation phase as well as in the payment phase. In concentrated markets, the proposed mechanism outperforms the current mechanism even when strategic behavior by suppliers is taken into account. The advantage of the proposed mechanism increases with increased price competition.

Electricity without borders: a plan to make the internal market work. Bruegel Blueprint Series 20, 5 September 2013

The most straightforward European single energy market design would entail a European system operator regulated by a single European regulator. This would ensure the predictable development of rules for the entire EU, significantly reducing regulatory uncertainty for electricity sector investments. But such a first-best market design is unlikely to be politically realistic in the European context for three reasons. First, the necessary changes compared to the current situation are substantial and would produce significant redistributive effects. Second, a European solution would deprive member states of the ability to manage their energy systems nationally. And third, a single European solution might fall short of being well-tailored to consumers’ preferences, which differ substantially across the EU. To nevertheless reap significant benefits from an integrated European electricity market, we propose the following blueprint: First, we suggest adding a European system-management layer to complement national operation centres and help them to better exchange information about the status of the system, expected changes and planned modifications. The ultimate aim should be to transfer the day-to-day responsibility for the safe and economic operation of the system to the European control centre. To further increase efficiency, electricity prices should be allowed to differ between all network points between and within countries. This would enable throughput of electricity through national and international lines to be safely increased without any major investments in infrastructure. Second, to ensure the consistency of national network plans and to ensure that they contribute to providing the infrastructure for a functioning single market, the role of the European ten year network development plan (TYNDP) needs to be upgraded by obliging national regulators to only approve projects planned at European level unless they can prove that deviations are beneficial. This boosted role of the TYNDP would need to be underpinned by resolving the issues of conflicting interests and information asymmetry. Therefore, the network planning process should be opened to all affected stakeholders (generators, network owners and operators, consumers, residents and others) and enable the European Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER) to act as a welfare-maximising referee. An ultimate political decision by the European Parliament on the entire plan will open a negotiation process around selecting alternatives and agreeing compensation. This ensures that all stakeholders have an interest in guaranteeing a certain degree of balance of interest in the earlier stages. In fact, transparent planning, early stakeholder involvement and democratic legitimisation are well suited for minimising as much as possible local opposition to new lines. Third, sharing the cost of network investments in Europe is a critical issue. One reason is that so far even the most sophisticated models have been unable to identify the individual long-term net benefit in an uncertain environment. A workable compromise to finance new network investments would consist of three components: (i) all easily attributable cost should be levied on the responsible party; (ii) all network users that sit at nodes that are expected to receive more imports through a line extension should be obliged to pay a share of the line extension cost through their network charges; (iii) the rest of the cost is socialised to all consumers. Such a cost-distribution scheme will involve some intra-European redistribution from the well-developed countries (infrastructure-wise) to those that are catching up. However, such a scheme would perform this redistribution in a much more efficient way than the Connecting Europe Facility’s ad-hoc disbursements to politically chosen projects, because it would provide the infrastructure that is really needed.

Smart grid-demand side response model to mitigate prices and peak impact on the electrical system

The aims of this project is to develop demand side response model which assists electricity consumers who are exposed to the market price through aggregator to manage the air-conditioning peak electricity demand. The main contribution of this research is to show how consumers can optimise the energy cost caused by the air-conditioning load considering the electricity market price and network overload. The model is tested with selected characteristics of the room, Queensland electricity market data from Australian Energy Market Operator and data from the Bureau of Statistics on temperatures in Brisbane, during weekdays on hot days from 2011 - 2012.

Modelling interregional links in electricity price spikes

Abnormally high price spikes in spot electricity markets represent a significant risk to market participants. As such, a literature has developed that focuses on forecasting the probability of such spike events, moving beyond simply forecasting the level of price. Many univariate time series models have been proposed to dealwith spikes within an individual market region. This paper is the first to develop a multivariate self-exciting point process model for dealing with price spikes across connected regions in the Australian National Electricity Market. The importance of the physical infrastructure connecting the regions on the transmission of spikes is examined. It is found that spikes are transmitted between the regions, and the size of spikes is influenced by the available transmission capacity. It is also found that improved risk estimates are obtained when inter-regional linkages are taken into account.

Forecasting day-ahead electricity load using a multiple equation time series approach

The quality of short-term electricity load forecasting is crucial to the operation and trading activities of market participants in an electricity market. In this paper, it is shown that a multiple equation time-series model, which is estimated by repeated application of ordinary least squares, has the potential to match or even outperform more complex nonlinear and nonparametric forecasting models. The key ingredient of the success of this simple model is the effective use of lagged information by allowing for interaction between seasonal patterns and intra-day dependencies. Although the model is built using data for the Queensland region of Australia, the method is completely generic and applicable to any load forecasting problem. The model’s forecasting ability is assessed by means of the mean absolute percentage error (MAPE). For day-ahead forecast, the MAPE returned by the model over a period of 11 years is an impressive 1.36%. The forecast accuracy of the model is compared with a number of benchmarks including three popular alternatives and one industrial standard reported by the Australia Energy Market Operator (AEMO). The performance of the model developed in this paper is superior to all benchmarks and outperforms the AEMO forecasts by about a third in terms of the MAPE criterion.

Long Term Dynamics in CO2 Allowance Prices and Carbon Capture Investments

In this paper we analyse the behaviour of the EU market for CO2 emission allowances; specifically, we focus on the contracts maturing in the Kyoto Protocol's second period of application (2008 to 2012). We calibrate the underlying parameters for the allowance price in the long run and we also calibrate those from the Spanish wholesale electricity market. This information is then used to assess the option to install a carbon capture and storage (CCS) unit in a coal-fired power plant. We use a two-dimensional binomial lattice where costs and profits are valued and the optimal investment time is determined. In other words, we study the trigger allowance prices above which it is optimal to install the capture unit immediately. We further analyse the impact of several variables on the critical prices, among them allowance price volatility and a hypothetical government subsidy. We conclude that, at current permit prices, from a financial point of view, immediate installation does not seem justified. This need not be the case, though, if carbon market parameters change dramatically and/or a specific policy to promote these units is adopted.

A long-term risk management tool for electricity markets using swarm intelligence

This paper addresses the optimal involvement in derivatives electricity markets of a power producer to hedge against the pool price volatility. To achieve this aim, a swarm intelligence meta-heuristic optimization technique for long-term risk management tool is proposed. This tool investigates the long-term opportunities for risk hedging available for electric power producers through the use of contracts with physical (spot and forward contracts) and financial (options contracts) settlement. The producer risk preference is formulated as a utility function (U) expressing the trade-off between the expectation and the variance of the return. Variance of return and the expectation are based on a forecasted scenario interval determined by a long-term price range forecasting model. This model also makes use of particle swarm optimization (PSO) to find the best parameters allow to achieve better forecasting results. On the other hand, the price estimation depends on load forecasting. This work also presents a regressive long-term load forecast model that make use of PSO to find the best parameters as well as in price estimation. The PSO technique performance has been evaluated by comparison with a Genetic Algorithm (GA) based approach. A case study is presented and the results are discussed taking into account the real price and load historical data from mainland Spanish electricity market demonstrating the effectiveness of the methodology handling this type of problems. Finally, conclusions are dully drawn.

Commercial agentes portfolio optimization in electricity markets

As it is well known, competitive electricity markets require new computing tools for power companies that operate in retail markets in order to enhance the management of its energy resources. During the last years there has been an increase of the renewable penetration into the micro-generation which begins to co-exist with the other existing power generation, giving rise to a new type of consumers. This paper develops a methodology to be applied to the management of the all the aggregators. The aggregator establishes bilateral contracts with its clients where the energy purchased and selling conditions are negotiated not only in terms of prices but also for other conditions that allow more flexibility in the way generation and consumption is addressed. The aggregator agent needs a tool to support the decision making in order to compose and select its customers' portfolio in an optimal way, for a given level of profitability and risk.

Metalearner based on Dynamic Neural Network for Strategic Bidding in electricity Markets

The restructuring of electricity markets, conducted to increase the competition in this sector, and decrease the electricity prices, brought with it an enormous increase in the complexity of the considered mechanisms. The electricity market became a complex and unpredictable environment, involving a large number of different entities, playing in a dynamic scene to obtain the best advantages and profits. Software tools became, therefore, essential to provide simulation and decision support capabilities, in order to potentiate the involved players’ actions. This paper presents the development of a metalearner, applied to the decision support of electricity markets’ negotiation entities. The proposed metalearner executes a dynamic artificial neural network to create its own output, taking advantage on several learning algorithms implemented in ALBidS, an adaptive learning system that provides decision support to electricity markets’ players. The proposed metalearner considers different weights for each strategy, depending on its individual quality of performance. The results of the proposed method are studied and analyzed in scenarios based on real electricity markets’ data, using MASCEM - a multi-agent electricity market simulator that simulates market players’ operation in the market.

A green future for European electricity? :Energy sources, policies and further determinants of the household price of electricity

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Economics from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

Pricing and competition in the Swedish retail market for electricity

Sweden, together with Norway, Finland and Denmark, have created a multi-national electricity market called NordPool. In this market, producers and retailers of electricity can buy and sell electricity, and the retailers then offers this electricity to end consumers such as households and industries. Previous studies have shown that pricing at the NordPool market is functioning quite well, but no other study has to my knowledge studied if pricing in the retail market to consumers in Sweden is well functioning. If the market is well functioning, with competition and low transaction costs when changing electricity retailer, we would expect that a homogeneous good such as electricity would be sold at the approximately same price, and that price changes would be highly correlated, in this market. Thus, the aim of this study is to test whether the price of Vattenfall, the largest energy firm in the Swedish market, is highly correlated to the price of other firms in the Swedish retail market for electricity. Descriptive statistics indicate that the price offered by Vattenfall is quite similar to the price of other firms in the market. In addition, regression analysis show that the correlation between the price of Vattenfall and other firms is as high as 0.98.

Analysis of the Iberian electricity forward market hedging efficiency

An assessment of the hedging performance in the Iberian Forward Electricity Market is performed. Aggregated data from the Portuguese and Spanish clearing houses for energy derivatives are considered. The hedging performance is measured through the ratio of the final open interest of a month derivatives contract divided by its accumulated cleared volume. The base load futures in the Iberian energy derivatives exchange show the lowest ratios due to good liquidity. The peak futures show bigger ratios as their reduced liquidity is produced by auctions fixed by Portuguese regulation. The base load swaps settled in the clearing house located in Spain show initially large values due to low registered volumes, as this clearing house is mainly used for short maturity (daily and weekly swaps). This hedging ratio can be a powerful oversight tool for energy regulators when accessing to all the derivatives transactions as envisaged by European regulation.

Propuestas regulatorias para el diseño de un mercado ibérico a plazo eficiente de la energía = Regulatory proposals for the development of an efficient iberian energy forward market

El mercado ibérico de futuros de energía eléctrica gestionado por OMIP (“Operador do Mercado Ibérico de Energia, Pólo Português”, con sede en Lisboa), también conocido como el mercado ibérico de derivados de energía, comenzó a funcionar el 3 de julio de 2006. Se analiza la eficiencia de este mercado organizado, por lo que se estudia la precisión con la que sus precios de futuros predicen el precio de contado. En dicho mercado coexisten dos modos de negociación: el mercado continuo (modo por defecto) y la contratación mediante subasta. En la negociación en continuo, las órdenes anónimas de compra y de venta interactúan de manera inmediata e individual con órdenes contrarias, dando lugar a operaciones con un número indeterminado de precios para cada contrato. En la negociación a través de subasta, un precio único de equilibrio maximiza el volumen negociado, liquidándose todas las operaciones a ese precio. Adicionalmente, los miembros negociadores de OMIP pueden liquidar operaciones “Over-The-Counter” (OTC) a través de la cámara de compensación de OMIP (OMIClear). Las cinco mayores empresas españolas de distribución de energía eléctrica tenían la obligación de comprar electricidad hasta julio de 2009 en subastas en OMIP, para cubrir parte de sus suministros regulados. De igual manera, el suministrador de último recurso portugués mantuvo tal obligación hasta julio de 2010. Los precios de equilibrio de esas subastas no han resultado óptimos a efectos retributivos de tales suministros regulados dado que dichos precios tienden a situarse ligeramente sesgados al alza. La prima de riesgo ex-post, definida como la diferencia entre los precios a plazo y de contado en el periodo de entrega, se emplea para medir su eficiencia de precio. El mercado de contado, gestionado por OMIE (“Operador de Mercado Ibérico de la Energía”, conocido tradicionalmente como “OMEL”), tiene su sede en Madrid. Durante los dos primeros años del mercado de futuros, la prima de riesgo media tiende a resultar positiva, al igual que en otros mercados europeos de energía eléctrica y gas natural. En ese periodo, la prima de riesgo ex-post tiende a ser negativa en los mercados de petróleo y carbón. Los mercados de energía tienden a mostrar niveles limitados de eficiencia de mercado. La eficiencia de precio del mercado de futuros aumenta con el desarrollo de otros mecanismos coexistentes dentro del mercado ibérico de electricidad (conocido como “MIBEL”) –es decir, el mercado dominante OTC, las subastas de centrales virtuales de generación conocidas en España como Emisiones Primarias de Energía, y las subastas para cubrir parte de los suministros de último recurso conocidas en España como subastas CESUR– y con una mayor integración de los mercados regionales europeos de energía eléctrica. Se construye un modelo de regresión para analizar la evolución de los volúmenes negociados en el mercado continuo durante sus cuatro primeros años como una función de doce indicadores potenciales de liquidez. Los únicos indicadores significativos son los volúmenes negociados en las subastas obligatorias gestionadas por OMIP, los volúmenes negociados en el mercado OTC y los volúmenes OTC compensados por OMIClear. El número de creadores de mercado, la incorporación de agentes financieros y compañías de generación pertenecientes a grupos integrados con suministradores de último recurso, y los volúmenes OTC compensados por OMIClear muestran una fuerte correlación con los volúmenes negociados en el mercado continuo. La liquidez de OMIP está aún lejos de los niveles alcanzados por los mercados europeos más maduros (localizados en los países nórdicos (Nasdaq OMX Commodities) y Alemania (EEX)). El operador de mercado y su cámara de compensación podrían desarrollar acciones eficientes de marketing para atraer nuevos agentes activos en el mercado de contado (p.ej. industrias consumidoras intensivas de energía, suministradores, pequeños productores, compañías energéticas internacionales y empresas de energías renovables) y agentes financieros, captar volúmenes del opaco OTC, y mejorar el funcionamiento de los productos existentes aún no líquidos. Resultaría de gran utilidad para tales acciones un diálogo activo con todos los agentes (participantes en el mercado, operador de mercado de contado, y autoridades supervisoras). Durante sus primeros cinco años y medio, el mercado continuo presenta un crecimento de liquidez estable. Se mide el desempeño de sus funciones de cobertura mediante la ratio de posición neta obtenida al dividir la posición abierta final de un contrato de derivados mensual entre su volumen acumulado en la cámara de compensación. Los futuros carga base muestran la ratio más baja debido a su buena liquidez. Los futuros carga punta muestran una mayor ratio al producirse su menor liquidez a través de contadas subastas fijadas por regulación portuguesa. Las permutas carga base liquidadas en la cámara de compensación ubicada en Madrid –MEFF Power, activa desde el 21 de marzo de 2011– muestran inicialmente valores altos debido a bajos volúmenes registrados, dado que esta cámara se emplea principalmente para vencimientos pequeños (diario y semanal). Dicha ratio puede ser una poderosa herramienta de supervisión para los reguladores energéticos cuando accedan a todas las transacciones de derivados en virtud del Reglamento Europeo sobre Integridad y Transparencia de los Mercados de Energía (“REMIT”), en vigor desde el 28 de diciembre de 2011. La prima de riesgo ex-post tiende a ser positiva en todos los mecanismos (futuros en OMIP, mercado OTC y subastas CESUR) y disminuye debido a la curvas de aprendizaje y al efecto, desde el año 2011, del precio fijo para la retribución de la generación con carbón autóctono. Se realiza una comparativa con los costes a plazo de generación con gas natural (diferencial “clean spark spread”) obtenido como la diferencia entre el precio del futuro eléctrico y el coste a plazo de generación con ciclo combinado internalizando los costes de emisión de CO2. Los futuros eléctricos tienen una elevada correlación con los precios de gas europeos. Los diferenciales de contratos con vencimiento inmediato tienden a ser positivos. Los mayores diferenciales se dan para los contratos mensuales, seguidos de los trimestrales y anuales. Los generadores eléctricos con gas pueden maximizar beneficios con contratos de menor vencimiento. Los informes de monitorización por el operador de mercado que proporcionan transparencia post-operacional, el acceso a datos OTC por el regulador energético, y la valoración del riesgo regulatorio pueden contribuir a ganancias de eficiencia. Estas recomendaciones son también válidas para un potencial mercado ibérico de futuros de gas, una vez que el hub ibérico de gas –actualmente en fase de diseño, con reuniones mensuales de los agentes desde enero de 2013 en el grupo de trabajo liderado por el regulador energético español– esté operativo. El hub ibérico de gas proporcionará transparencia al atraer más agentes y mejorar la competencia, incrementando su eficiencia, dado que en el mercado OTC actual no se revela precio alguno de gas. ABSTRACT The Iberian Power Futures Market, managed by OMIP (“Operador do Mercado Ibérico de Energia, Pólo Português”, located in Lisbon), also known as the Iberian Energy Derivatives Market, started operations on 3 July 2006. The market efficiency, regarding how well the future price predicts the spot price, is analysed for this energy derivatives exchange. There are two trading modes coexisting within OMIP: the continuous market (default mode) and the call auction. In the continuous trading, anonymous buy and sell orders interact immediately and individually with opposite side orders, generating trades with an undetermined number of prices for each contract. In the call auction trading, a single price auction maximizes the traded volume, being all trades settled at the same price (equilibrium price). Additionally, OMIP trading members may settle Over-the-Counter (OTC) trades through OMIP clearing house (OMIClear). The five largest Spanish distribution companies have been obliged to purchase in auctions managed by OMIP until July 2009, in order to partly cover their portfolios of end users’ regulated supplies. Likewise, the Portuguese last resort supplier kept that obligation until July 2010. The auction equilibrium prices are not optimal for remuneration purposes of regulated supplies as such prices seem to be slightly upward biased. The ex-post forward risk premium, defined as the difference between the forward and spot prices in the delivery period, is used to measure its price efficiency. The spot market, managed by OMIE (Market Operator of the Iberian Energy Market, Spanish Pool, known traditionally as “OMEL”), is located in Madrid. During the first two years of the futures market, the average forward risk premium tends to be positive, as it occurs with other European power and natural gas markets. In that period, the ex-post forward risk premium tends to be negative in oil and coal markets. Energy markets tend to show limited levels of market efficiency. The price efficiency of the Iberian Power Futures Market improves with the market development of all the coexistent forward contracting mechanisms within the Iberian Electricity Market (known as “MIBEL”) – namely, the dominant OTC market, the Virtual Power Plant Auctions known in Spain as Energy Primary Emissions, and the auctions catering for part of the last resort supplies known in Spain as CESUR auctions – and with further integration of European Regional Electricity Markets. A regression model tracking the evolution of the traded volumes in the continuous market during its first four years is built as a function of twelve potential liquidity drivers. The only significant drivers are the traded volumes in OMIP compulsory auctions, the traded volumes in the OTC market, and the OTC cleared volumes by OMIClear. The amount of market makers, the enrolment of financial members and generation companies belonging to the integrated group of last resort suppliers, and the OTC cleared volume by OMIClear show strong correlation with the traded volumes in the continuous market. OMIP liquidity is still far from the levels reached by the most mature European markets (located in the Nordic countries (Nasdaq OMX Commodities) and Germany (EEX)). The market operator and its clearing house could develop efficient marketing actions to attract new entrants active in the spot market (e.g. energy intensive industries, suppliers, small producers, international energy companies and renewable generation companies) and financial agents as well as volumes from the opaque OTC market, and to improve the performance of existing illiquid products. An active dialogue with all the stakeholders (market participants, spot market operator, and supervisory authorities) will help to implement such actions. During its firs five and a half years, the continuous market shows steady liquidity growth. The hedging performance is measured through a net position ratio obtained from the final open interest of a month derivatives contract divided by its accumulated cleared volume. The base load futures in the Iberian energy derivatives exchange show the lowest ratios due to good liquidity. The peak futures show bigger ratios as their reduced liquidity is produced by auctions fixed by Portuguese regulation. The base load swaps settled in the clearing house located in Spain – MEFF Power, operating since 21 March 2011, with a new denomination (BME Clearing) since 9 September 2013 – show initially large values due to low registered volumes, as this clearing house is mainly used for short maturity (daily and weekly swaps). The net position ratio can be a powerful oversight tool for energy regulators when accessing to all the derivatives transactions as envisaged by European regulation on Energy Market Integrity and Transparency (“REMIT”), in force since 28 December 2011. The ex-post forward risk premium tends to be positive in all existing mechanisms (OMIP futures, OTC market and CESUR auctions) and diminishes due to the learning curve and the effect – since year 2011 – of the fixed price retributing the indigenous coal fired generation. Comparison with the forward generation costs from natural gas (“clean spark spread”) – obtained as the difference between the power futures price and the forward generation cost with a gas fired combined cycle plant taking into account the CO2 emission rates – is also performed. The power futures are strongly correlated with European gas prices. The clean spark spreads built with prompt contracts tend to be positive. The biggest clean spark spreads are for the month contract, followed by the quarter contract and then by the year contract. Therefore, gas fired generation companies can maximize profits trading with contracts of shorter maturity. Market monitoring reports by the market operator providing post-trade transparency, OTC data access by the energy regulator, and assessment of the regulatory risk can contribute to efficiency gains. The same recommendations are also valid for a potential Iberian gas futures market, once an Iberian gas hub – currently in a design phase, with monthly meetings amongst the stakeholders in a Working Group led by the Spanish energy regulatory authority since January 2013 – is operating. The Iberian gas hub would bring transparency attracting more shippers and improving competition and thus its efficiency, as no gas price is currently disclosed in the existing OTC market.

Explanation of changes in real estate stock market

The aim of this study is to explain the changes in the real estate prices as well as in the real estate stock market prices, using some macro-economic explanatory variables, such as the gross domestic product (GDP), the real interest rate and the unemployment rate. Several regressions have been carried out in order to express some types of incremental and absolute deflated real estate lock market indexes in terms of the macro-economic variables. The analyses are applied to the Swedish economy. The period under study is 1984-1994. Time series on monthly data are used. i.e. the number of data-points is 132. If time leads/lags are introduced in the e regressions, significant improvements in the already high correlations are achieved. The signs of the coefficients for IR, UE and GDP are all what one would expect to see from an economic point of view: those for GDP are all positive, those for both IR and UE are negative. All the regressions have high R2 values. Both markets anticipate change in the unemployment rate by 6 to 9 months, which seems reasonable because such change can be forecast quite reliably. But, on the contrary, there is no reason why they should anticipate by 3-6 months changes in the interest rate that can hardly be reliably forecast so far in advance.