Impacto del Internet en el ingreso laboral: análisis del lugar y manejo del Internet

Este estudio analiza el efecto del uso de Internet sobre el ingreso laboral, eliminado el problema de endogeneidad que existe por motivos de selección. También se analizan los efectos seg un el lugar de acceso y las actividades realizadas en Internet. Para esto se utiliza Propensity Score Matching, tomando información para Colombia entre el año 2009 a 2011. Los resultados muestran que existe un efecto positivo, significativo y heterogéneo entre trabajadores asalariados y cuenta propia, siendo los últimos los más beneficiados. Con respecto al lugar de uso se encuentra un impacto positivo del uso del Internet en el trabajo y/o en el hogar, con una mayor magnitud en el primer sitio de acceso. Para el tema del manejo del Internet, no se encuentra efecto cuando se utiliza en actividades de entretenimiento, pero si cuando se usa en tareas educativas diariamente. Esto siguiere que usar este servicio aumenta la productividad y el capital humano, lo que se transforma en un incremento en los ingresos. Por tanto, se encuentra que el lugar de uso es una señal informativa para el mercado laboral, mientras que el impacto del manejo de esta herramienta depende de la frecuencia con que se realicen las actividades.

Loan sales under asymmetric information

Loans are illiquid assets that can be sold in a secondary market even that buyers have no certainty about their quality. I study a model in which a lender has access to new investment opportunities when all her assets are illiquid. To raise funds, the lender may either borrow using her assets as collateral, or she can sell them in a secondary market. Given asymmetric information about assets quality, the lender cannot recover the total value of her assets. There is then a role for the government to correct the information problem using fiscal tools.

Measuring and testing for the systemically important financial institutions

This paper analyzes the measure of systemic importance ∆CoV aR proposed by Adrian and Brunnermeier (2009, 2010) within the context of a similar class of risk measures used in the risk management literature. In addition, we develop a series of testing procedures, based on ∆CoV aR, to identify and rank the systemically important institutions. We stress the importance of statistical testing in interpreting the measure of systemic importance. An empirical application illustrates the testing procedures, using equity data for three European banks.

Mixed oligopoly in education

This paper studies oligopolistic competition in education markets when schools can be private and public and when the quality of education depends on ìpeer groupî e§ects. In the Örst stage of our game schools set their quality and in the second stage they Öx their tuition fees. We examine how the (subgame perfect Nash) equilibrium allocation (qualities, tuition fees and welfare) is a§ected by the presence of public schools and by their relative position in the quality range. When there are no peer group e§ects, e¢ ciency is achieved when (at least) all but one school are public. In particular in the two school case, the impact of a public school is spectacular as we go from a setting of extreme di§erentiation to an e¢ cient allocation. However, in the three school case, a single public school will lower welfare compared to the private equilibrium. We then introduce a peer group e§ect which, for any given school is determined by its student with the highest ability. These PGE do have a signiÖcant impact on the results. The mixed equilibrium is now never e¢ cient. However, welfare continues to be improved if all but one school are public. Overall, the presence of PGE reduces the e§ectiveness of public schools as regulatory tool in an otherwise private education sector.

On the design of education conditional cash transfer programs and non education outcomes: the case of teenage pregnancy

We investigate the effect of education Conditional Cash Transfer programs (CCTs) on teenage pregnancy. Our main concern is with how the size and sign of the effect may depend on the design of the program. Using a simple model we show that an education CCT that conditions renewal on school performance reduces teenage pregnancy; the program can increase teenage pregnancy if it does not condition on school performance. Then, using an original data base, we estimate the causal impact on teenage pregnancy of two education CCTs implemented in Bogot´a (Subsidio Educativo, SE, and Familias en Acci´on, FA); both programs differ particularly on whether school success is a condition for renewal or not. We show that SE has negative average effect on teenage pregnancy while FA has a null average effect. We also find that SE has either null or no effect for adolescents in all age and grade groups while FA has positive, null or negative effects for adolescents in different age and grade groups. Since SE conditions renewal on school success and FA does not, we can argue that the empirical results are consistent with the predictions of our model and that conditioning renewal of the subsidy on school success crucially determines the effect of the subsidy on teenage pregnancy

Parametric pension reform and the intensive margin of labor supply, evidence from Colombia

We analyze the effect of a parametric reform of the fully-funded pension regime in Colombia on the intensive margin of the labor supply. We take advantage of a threshold defined by law in order to identify the causal effect using a regression discontinuity design. We find that a pension system that increases retirement age and the minimum weeks during which workers must contribute to claim pension benefits causes an increase of around 2 hours on the number of weekly worked hours; this corresponds to 4% of the average number of weekly worked hours or around 14% of a standard deviation of weekly worked hours. The effect is robust to different specifications, polynomial orders and sample sizes.

Partial decentralization as a safeguard against favoritism

In this paper I investigate the optimal level of decentralization of tasks for the provision of a local public good. I enrich the well-known trade-off between internalization of spillovers (that favors centralization) and accountability (that favors decentralization) by considering that public goods are produced through multiple tasks. This adds an additional institutional setting, partial decentralization, to the classical choice between full decentralization and full centralization. The main results are that partial decentralization is optimal when both the variance of exogenous shocks to electorate’s utility is large and the electorate expects high performance from politicians. I also show that the optimal institutional setting depends on the degree of substitutability / complementarity between tasks. In particular, I show that a large degree of substitutability between tasks makes favoritism more likely, which increases the desirability of partial decentralization as a safeguard against favoritism.

Publicness of goods and violent conflict : evidence from Colombia

How the degree of publicness of goods affect violent conflict? Based on the theoretical model in Esteban and Ray (2001) we find that the effect of the degree of publicness depends on the group size. When the group is small (large), the degree of publicness increases (decreases) the likelihood of conflict. This opens an empirical question that we tackle using microdata from the Colombian conflict at the municipality level. We use three goods with different publicness degree to identify the sign of the effect of publicness on conflict. These goods are coca crops (private good), road density (public good subject to congestion) and average education quality (a purer public good). After dealing with endogeneity issues using an IV approach, we find that the degree of publicness reduces the likelihood of both paramilitary and guerrilla attacks. Moreover, coca production exacerbates conflict and the provision of both public goods mitigates conflict. These results are robust to size, geographical, and welfare controls. Policies that improve public goods provision will help to fight the onset of conflict.

Reflexiones economicistas sobre la izquierda y la derecha

Este documento está compuesto por cuatro secciones de las cuales esta introducción es la primera. En la segunda sección se analiza la visión que diferentes individuos pueden tener acerca del problema de la desigualdad y las implicaciones que estas diferencias tienen sobre el ideal de política re-distributiva. En la tercera sección se presenta una revisión analítica de la literatura económica que se ocupa de las relaciones entre distribución del ingreso y crecimiento económico. Finalmente, en la última sección se presentan algunas conclusiones.

Small-area variation in health care affecting the choice of cesarean delivery: the case of a Colombian health insurer

In the midst of health care reform, Colombia has succeeded in increasing health insurance coverage and the quality of health care. In spite of this, efficiency continues to be a matter of concern, and small-area variations in health care are one of the plausible causes of such inefficiencies. In order to understand this issue, we use individual data of all births from a Contributory-Regimen insurer in Colombia. We perform two different specifications of a multilevel logistic regression model. Our results reveal that hospitals account for 20% of variation on the probability of performing cesarean sections. Geographic area only explains 1/3 of the variance attributable to the hospital. Furthermore, some variables from both demand and supply sides are found to be also relevant on the probability of undergoing cesarean sections. This paper contributes to previous research by using a hierarchical model and by defining hospitals as cluster. Moreover, we also include clinical and supply induced demand variables.

Soft budget constraints in a dynamic general equilibrium model

This paper considers an overlapping generations model in which capital investment is financed in a credit market with adverse selection. Lenders’ inability to commit ex-ante not to bailout ex-post, together with a wealthy position of entrepreneurs gives rise to the soft budget constraint syndrome, i.e. the absence of liquidation of poor performing firms on a regular basis. This problem arises endogenously as a result of the interaction between the economic behavior of agents, without relying on political economy explanations. We found the problem more binding along the business cycle, providing an explanation to creditors leniency during booms in some LatinAmerican countries in the late seventies and early nineties.

¿Existe una trampa de pobreza en el sector rural en Colombia?

A diferencia de la generalidad de trabajos sobre la pobreza rural en Colombia, este estudio emplea un enfoque de activos para indagar acerca de los determinantes de la pobreza rural. En particular se examinan la existencia de no convexidades locales en el proceso de generación de ingresos, el grado de concentración de los hogares en ciertos rangos de acumulación de activos y la presencia de retornos marginales diferenciados a los activos. Con base en esto se proporciona evidencia prima facie acerca de la existencia de una trampa de pobreza en el sector rural, abriendo una línea promisoria de investigación sobre el tema, que puede contribuir de forma importante a su comprensión y a un mejor diseño de política social y sectorial.

Una Aproximación más a la relación existente entre crecimiento y desigualdad

La literatura económica ha abordado la discusión sobre el crecimiento y la equidad en distintas líneas. La necesidad de tener una sociedad más equitativa es una de las opciones y este escrito intenta aportar nuevas ideas a la discusión dando prioridad a la equidad. Para este efecto, discute, el espacio en el que se trabajará la desigualdad, las causalidades existentes frente a la relación crecimiento y equidad, y las fortalezas y debilidades de sobre los indicadores convencionalmente utilizados para su medición.

Uso estratégico de la deuda: un estudio a nivel de empresa para colombia 1995-2003

El presente trabajo intenta estimar si las empresas emplean estratégicamente la deuda para limitar la entrada de potenciales rivales. Mediante la metodología de Método Generalizado de Momentos (GMM) se evalúa el efecto que tienen los activos específicos, la cuota de mercado y el tamaño, como proxies de las rentas del mercado, y las barreras de entrada sobre los niveles de endeudamiento, a nivel de empresa para Colombia, durante 1995-2003. Se encuentra que las empresas utilizan los activos específicos para limitar la entrada al mercado y que el endeudamiento decrece a medida que las empresas aumentan su cuota en el mercado

Congress composition and electoral advantage

In 2003, an electoral reform changed the mechanism to assign seats in the Colombian Congress. I simulate the 2006 Senate elections using the previous assignment mechanism to determine which senators benefited from the reform, i.e. would have not been elected had the reform not been made. With the results of the simulation, I use a regression discontinuity design to compare the senators that would have been barely elected anyways with those who would have lost, but were near to be elected. I check the differences in the amount of law drafts presented, the attendance to voting sessions, and a discipline index for each senator as proxy of their legislative behavior. I find that the senators benefiting from the reform present a different legislative behavior during the 4-year term with respect to the senators that would have been elected anyways. Since the differential legislative behavior cannot be interpreted as being better (worse) politician, I examine if the behavioral difference gives them an electoral advantage. I find no difference in the electoral result of 2010 Senate election in terms of the probability of being (re)elected in 2010, the share of votes, the share of votes within their party list, and the concentration of their votes. Additionally, I check the probability of being investigated for links with paramilitary groups and I find no differences. The results suggest that political reforms can change the composition of governing or legislative bodies in terms of performance, but it does not necessarily translate into an electoral advantage.