How to avoid a double-dip recession in the eurozone. CEPS Commentary, 15 November 2012

This CEPS Commentary argues that the way in which the burden of adjustment to the imbalances in the eurozone is borne almost exclusively by the deficit countries in the periphery produces a deflationary bias in the region as a whole. Against the threat of double-dip recession, Paul De Grauwe asserts that the adjustment could be done differently and calls for implementation of a more symmetric macroeconomic policy that reduces the deflationary bias.

Smart choices for growth. Bruegel Policy Contribution 2012/21, November 2012

Recovery in Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain is held back in part by structural barriers. Overcoming these requires structural reform and public investment. Given the limited availability of political and financial capital, prioritising reform efforts and spending is important, but difficult. The different success factors for individual sectors are complementary. Using the example of the high-tech industry, we make the case that only investing in one success factor (eg broadband infrastructure) without having a sufficient endowment of others (eg education) is unlikely to make the sector successful. One consequence of the complementarity of the different success factors is that public investment and reform efforts should be fine-tuned in order to match the endowment of other factors. This might imply an increase in efforts to tackle several structural barriers at the same time, but it might also imply reducing investment in less promising fields. This in turn requires strategic thinking about whether it is worthwhile pursuing development strategies that require investment in many success factors but that do not promise much success. Such a strategic approach to public investment and reform efforts might make the allocation of scarce public financial and political capital more efficient.

A budget for Europe's Monetary Union. Bruegel Policy Contribution 2012/22, December 2012

In a monetary union, national fiscal deficits are of limited help to counteract deep recessions; union-wide support is needed. A common euro-area budget (1) should provide a temporary but significant transfer of resources in case of large regional shocks, (2) would be an instrument to counteract severe recessions in the area as a whole, and (3) would ensure financial stability. The four main options for stabilisation of regional shocks to the euro area are: unemployment insurance, payments related to deviations of output from potential, the narrowing of large spreads, and discretionary spending. The common resource would need to be well-designed to be distributionally neutral, avoid free-riding behaviour and foster structural change while be of sufficient size to have an impact. Linking budget support to large deviations of output from potential appears to be the best option. A borrowing capacity equipped with a structural balanced budget rule could address area-wide shocks. It could serve as the fiscal backstop to the bank resolution authority. Resources amounting to 2 percent of euro-area GDP would be needed for stabilisation policy and financial stability.

The false promise of a eurozone budget. CEPS Commentary, 7 December 2012

n this new CEPS commentary, CEPS Director Daniel Gros takes a closer look at the US experience to point out that the federal budget provides much less insurance against state specific shocks than widely assumed, while the US Banking Union act as a very powerful shock absorber. Accordingly, he argues that the euro’s long-term stability depends far more on completing plans for a European banking union than on the introduction of a fiscal capacity for the eurozone.

Private long-term investment in uncertain times. Bruegel Policy Contribution 2012/23, December 2012

The economic and financial crisis in Europe is affecting the financing of long-term infrastructure investment. There are multiple clearly identifiable channels: reduced demand for long-term investment, a tightening prudential framework for lending, upward adjustment of risk perception, complex transition of the financial system, and increasing macroeconomic, sovereign and regulatory risk. Some of the identified channels are potentially dangerous spillovers from the crisis that entail the risk of a downward spiral (eg increasing regulatory risk), while others are efficient market responses (eg reduced investment demand, correction of pricing of risk). Consequently, public policy instruments should not address the accessibility of long-term finance per se, but should explicitly target the critical channels.

Why is the Greek economy collapsing? A simple tale of high multipliers and low exports. CEPS Commentary, 21 December 2012

In an attempt to understand why the Greek economy is collapsing, this Commentary points out two key aspects that are often overlooked – the country’s large multiplier and a bad export performance. When combined with the need for a large fiscal adjustment, these factors help explain how fiscal consolidation in Greece has been associated with such a large drop in GDP.

Devolution and the political representation of business interests in the UK

The devolution of political power in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland and the developing regional agenda in England are widely read as a significant reconfiguration of the institutions and scales of economic governance. The process is furthest developed in Scotland while Wales and Northern Ireland, in their own distinct ways, provide intermediate cases. Devolution is least developed in England where regional political identities are generally weak and the historical legacy of regional institutions is limited. Within the overall context of devolution government policy has continued to emphasize partnership forms of. governance. Accordingly, the political representation of business interests has a particular salience in the new arrangements. This paper reports on findings from a study designed to examine the relationship between devolution and changes in the political representation of business interests in the territories and regions of the UK. It highlights a number of changes in the nature and extent of business representation. While some of these are significant the evidence suggests that they fail to mark a fundamental shift in the institutional foundation for sub-national business interest representation in the UK. Indeed the political geography of business representation remains dominated by an overarching centralism that is likely to provide a significant check on the further devolution of political power and democratic authority. (c) 2004 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Devolution and the political representation of business interests in the UK

The devolution of political power in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland and the developing regional agenda in England are widely read as a significant reconfiguration of the institutions and scales of economic governance. The process is furthest developed in Scotland while Wales and Northern Ireland, in their own distinct ways, provide intermediate cases. Devolution is least developed in England where regional political identities are generally weak and the historical legacy of regional institutions is limited. Within the overall context of devolution government policy has continued to emphasize partnership forms of. governance. Accordingly, the political representation of business interests has a particular salience in the new arrangements. This paper reports on findings from a study designed to examine the relationship between devolution and changes in the political representation of business interests in the territories and regions of the UK. It highlights a number of changes in the nature and extent of business representation. While some of these are significant the evidence suggests that they fail to mark a fundamental shift in the institutional foundation for sub-national business interest representation in the UK. Indeed the political geography of business representation remains dominated by an overarching centralism that is likely to provide a significant check on the further devolution of political power and democratic authority. (c) 2004 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

The bio-economy and the competition state : transcending the dichotomy between coordinated and liberal market economies

This article examines the role of the state in the emerging bio-economy. The starting point is that state interventions, including supportive regulatory arrangements and the shaping of public attitudes, constitute core assets in the evolution of bio-industrial complexes. Public policy in the bio-economy, across advanced industrial countries, is well captured by the “competition state” concept. This type of state takes different forms, analogously with the historical variants of the Keynesian welfare state. The article compares patterns of governance of the biotechnology sector in Finland and Sweden, the USA and the UK, and Australia. It is concluded that the bio-industry sector does not fit with the “models of capitalism” paradigm which postulates coherence within, and systemic divergences between, national models of economic governance. The bio-economy displays trends toward convergence, in particular mounting public investments in health care and in research and development. On the other hand, countries differ in their approach to market regulation, industrial support, and ethical restrictions. These differences do not follow the dichotomy between “liberal” and “coordinated” models of capitalism.

The G20’s role in legitimating global capitalism: beyond crisis diplomacy?

The rising profile of the G20 in the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis has led to various forms of concern about the legitimacy of this forum. While debates about the legitimacy of the G20 are important and ongoing, they overlook the important observation that the G20 is also attempting to perform a key role in legitimating global capitalism. This role of legitimating global capitalism emphasises the importance of the G20 to act, and be seen to act, to normalise global capitalism, to strengthen global economic governance, and also facilitate a political consensus with regard to key policy issues. This essay critically examines the role that the G20 plays in legitimating global capitalism and contends that the G20 is not just a technical forum of international policy-making but also a political forum for creating and performing visible responses to problems which are seen to be socially responsive.

Preliminary Overview of the Economies of Latin America and the Caribbean 2003

Includes bibliography

Climate Change and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean. Overview 2009

Includes bibliography

El gobierno económico de la Unión Europea y los principios de justicia del gasto público en una hacienda plural

A partir de 2011 se ha reforzado el gobierno económico de la UE a través de seis instrumentos legislativos, el llamado Six Pack, que supone fundamentalmente una reforma de la supervisión de la política presupuestaria de los Estados miembros. Más recientemente el Tratado de estabilidad, coordinación y gobernanza de UE de marzo de 2012 (TECGUE) establece un conjunto de normas destinadas a promover la disciplina presupuestaria a través de un pacto presupuestario; a reforzar la coordinación de sus políticas económicas; y a mejorar la gobernanza de la zona del euro. En el presente trabajo se analiza si este modelo basado en una estricta disciplina presupuestaria es compatible con los postulados del Estado social, y más concretamente con los principios de justicia del gasto público. En efecto, a partir de la reforma del art. 135 de la Constitución Española, el principio de estabilidad presupuestaria debe ser interpretado coordinadamente con otros principios constitucionales que en el momento presente están plenamente vigentes y pueden adquirir una nueva función: la de actuar como límite y medida del objetivo de estabilidad presupuestaria. Del mismo modo se analizan los principios de coordinación entre las políticas presupuestarias y de endeudamiento de los Estados miembros en un Estado con una pluralidad de Haciendas, como es el caso español.

International financial regulation: A role for the Eurozone? EU Diplomacy Paper 08/2012, October 2012

The deepest financial crisis to strike the global economy since the Great Depression has unceremoniously called into question the very foundations of the Western economic model. The liberalisation of capital flows and the growing internationalisation of financial markets outpaced global regulatory and supervisory efforts. The repercussions of the financial crisis have given new dynamism to the reform of financial regulation both globally and within the European Union (EU). The Eurozone, by way of its own failings, has emerged as a stronger conceptual and legitimate entity since the onset of the crisis, but to what extent does this equate to a greater external role, in particular in the reform of international financial regulation? This paper argues that the Eurozone is currently not in a position to play an important role in the reform of international financial regulation, as it is a weak actor in the context of the EU financial architecture, which is still largely characterised by differing national regimes, a prevailing influence from the UK and fragmented external representation. The key finding from this study is that internal tensions in the EU are at the very heart of the Eurozone’s difficulties in playing a role in the reform of international financial regulation. Surmounting these tensions is a pre-requisite for the Eurozone if it is to overcome its structural weakness in international financial politics. However, the implications of such evolutions to the Eurozone, as an entity, and to European integration are far-reaching.

Reflections on the institutional balance, the Community Method and the interplay between jurisdictions after Lisbon. Research Papers in Law, 04/2012

[Introduction.] Over the last two years, not only inside but also outside the framework of the EU treaties, far reaching measures have been taken at the highest political level in order to address the financial and economic crisis in Europe and in particular the sovereign debt crisis in the Euro area. This has triggered debates forecasting the “renationalisation of European politics.” Herman Van Rompuy, the President of the European Council, countered the prediction that Europe is doomed because of such a renationalisation: “If national politics have a prominent place in our Union, why would this not strengthen it?” He took the view that not a renationalisation of European politics was at stake, but an Europeanization of national politics emphasising that post war Europe was never developed in contradiction with nation states.1 Indeed, the European project is based on a mobilisation of bundled, national forces which are of vital importance to a democratically structured and robust Union that is capable of acting in a globalised world. To that end, the Treaty of Lisbon created a legal basis. The new legal framework redefines the balance between the Union institutions and confirms the central role of the Community method in the EU legislative and judiciary process. This contribution critically discusses the development of the EU's institutional balance after the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, with a particular emphasis on the use of the Community Method and the current interplay between national constitutional courts and the Court of Justice. This interplay has to date been characterised by suspicion and mistrust, rather than by a genuine dialogue between the pertinent judicial actors.