EC Electronic Communications and Competition Law

Telecommunications have developed at an incredible speed over the last couple of decades. The decreasing size of our phones and the increasing number of ways in which we can communicate are barely the only result of this (r)evolutionary development. The latter has indeed multiple implications. The change of paradigm for telecommunications regulation, epitomised by the processes of liberalisation and reregulation, was not sufficient to answer all regulatory questions pertinent to communications. Today, after the transition from monopoly to competition, we are faced perhaps with an even harder regulatory puzzle, since we must figure out how to regulate a sector that is as dynamic and as unpredictable as electronic communications have proven to be, and as vital and fundamental to the economy and to society at large. The present book addresses the regulatory puzzle of contemporary electronic communications and suggests the outlines of a coherent model for their regulation. The search for such a model involves essentially deliberations on the question "Can competition law do it all?", since generic competition rules are largely seen as the appropriate regulatory tool for the communications domain. The latter perception has been the gist of the 2002 reform of the European Community (EC) telecommunications regime, which envisages a withdrawal of sectoral regulation, as communications markets become effectively competitive and ultimately bestows the regulation of the sector upon competition law only. The book argues that the question of whether competition law is the appropriate tool needs to be examined not in the conventional contexts of sector specific rules versus competition rules or deregulation versus regulation but in a broader governance context. Consequently, the reader is provided with an insight into the workings and specific characteristics of the communications sector as network-bound, converging, dynamic and endowed with a special societal role and function. A thorough evaluation of the regulatory objectives in the communications environment contributes further to the comprehensive picture of the communications industry. Upon this carefully prepared basis, the book analyses the communications regulatory toolkit. It explores the interplay between sectoral communications regulation, competition rules (in particular Article 82 of the EC Treaty) and the rules of the World Trade Organization (WTO) relevant to telecommunications services. The in-depth analysis of multilevel construct of EC communications law is up-to-date and takes into account important recent developments in the EC competition law in practice, in particular in the field of refusal to supply and tying, of the reform of the EC electronic communications framework and new decisions of the WTO dispute settlement body, such as notably the Mexico-Telecommunications Services Panel Report. Upon these building elements, an assessment of the regulatory potential of the EC competition rules is made. The conclusions drawn are beyond the scope of the current situation of EC electronic communications and the applicable law and explore the possible contours of an optimal regulatory framework for modern communications. The book is of particular interest to communications and antitrust law experts, as well as policy makers, government agencies, consultancies and think-tanks active in the field. Experts on other network industries (such as electricity or postal communications) can also profit from the substantial experience gathered in the communications sector as the most advanced one in terms of liberalisation and reregulation.

Is there a ‚Depth versus Participation‘ Dilemma in International Cooperation?

Much of the International Relations literature assumes that there is a “depth versus participation” dilemma in international politics: shallower international agreements attract more countries and greater depth is associated with less participation. We argue that this conjecture is too simple and probably misleading because the depth of any given cooperative effort is in fact multidimensional. This multidimensionality manifests itself in the design characteristics of international agreements: in particular, the specificity of obligations, monitoring and enforcement mechanisms, dispute settlement mechanisms, positive incentives (assistance), and organizational structures (secretariats). We theorize that the first three of these design characteristics have negative and the latter three have positive effects on participation in international cooperative efforts. Our empirical testing of these claims relies on a dataset that covers more than 200 global environmental treaties. We find a participation-limiting effect for the specificity of obligations, but not for monitoring and enforcement. In contrast, we observe that assistance provisions in treaties have a significant and substantial positive effect on participation. Similarly, dispute settlement mechanisms tend to promote treaty participation. The main implication of our study is that countries do not appear to stay away from agreements with monitoring and enforcement provisions, but that the inclusion of positive incentives and dispute settlement mechanisms can promote international cooperation. In other words, our findings suggest that policymakers do not necessarily need to water down global treaties in order to obtain more participation.

The Appellate Body Approach to the Applicability of Article XX GATT In the Light of China - Raw Materials: A Missed Opportunity?

This article attempts to analyse and investigate the implications of the approach to the applicability of Article XX GATT adopted in the recent China – Raw Materials. Using the decision on the non-availability of Article XX defences for violations of China’s WTO-plus commitments on export duties as a backdrop, it scrutinizes the more general, ‘systemic’ approach to the applicability of Article XX exceptions developed by theWTO dispute settlement bodies, and sheds light on the implications of such approach with respect to the relationship between GATT 1994 andWTO obligations arising from different instruments of theWTOAgreement, such as new members’ accession protocols. It also suggests that an exception to this general approach could be envisaged when the fundamental environmental goals protected under Article XX b) and g) are at stake.

Low-Income Developing Countries and WTO Litigation: Why Wake Up the Sleeping Dog?

The World Trade Organization (WTO) is one of the most judicialized dispute settlement systems in international politics. While a general appreciation has developed that the system has worked quite well, research has not paid sufficient attention to the weakest actors in the system. This paper addresses the puzzle of missing cases of least-developed countries initiating WTO disputes settlement procedures. It challenges the existing literature on developing countries in WTO dispute settlement which predominantly focuses on legal capacity and economic interests. The paper provides an argument that the small universe of ‘actionable cases’, the option of free riding and the assessment of the perceived opportunity costs related to other foreign policy priorities better explain the absence of cases. In addition (and somewhat counterintuitively), we argue that the absence of cases is not necessarily bad news and shows how the weakest actors can use the dispute settlement system in a ‘lighter version’ or in indirect ways. The argument is empirically assessed by conducting a case study on four West African cotton-producing countries (C4) and their involvement in dispute settlement.

EC Electronic Communications and Competition Law

Telecommunications have developed at an incredible speed over the last couple of decades. The decreasing size of our phones and the increasing number of ways in which we can communicate are barely the only result of this (r)evolutionary development. The latter has indeed multiple implications. The change of paradigm for telecommunications regulation, epitomised by the processes of liberalisation and reregulation, was not sufficient to answer all regulatory questions pertinent to communications. Today, after the transition from monopoly to competition, we are faced perhaps with an even harder regulatory puzzle, since we must figure out how to regulate a sector that is as dynamic and as unpredictable as electronic communications have proven to be, and as vital and fundamental to the economy and to society at large. The present book addresses the regulatory puzzle of contemporary electronic communications and suggests the outlines of a coherent model for their regulation. The search for such a model involves essentially deliberations on the question "Can competition law do it all?", since generic competition rules are largely seen as the appropriate regulatory tool for the communications domain. The latter perception has been the gist of the 2002 reform of the European Community (EC) telecommunications regime, which envisages a withdrawal of sectoral regulation, as communications markets become effectively competitive and ultimately bestows the regulation of the sector upon competition law only. The book argues that the question of whether competition law is the appropriate tool needs to be examined not in the conventional contexts of sector specific rules versus competition rules or deregulation versus regulation but in a broader governance context. Consequently, the reader is provided with an insight into the workings and specific characteristics of the communications sector as network-bound, converging, dynamic and endowed with a special societal role and function. A thorough evaluation of the regulatory objectives in the communications environment contributes further to the comprehensive picture of the communications industry. Upon this carefully prepared basis, the book analyses the communications regulatory toolkit. It explores the interplay between sectoral communications regulation, competition rules (in particular Article 82 of the EC Treaty) and the rules of the World Trade Organization (WTO) relevant to telecommunications services. The in-depth analysis of multilevel construct of EC communications law is up-to-date and takes into account important recent developments in the EC competition law in practice, in particular in the field of refusal to supply and tying, of the reform of the EC electronic communications framework and new decisions of the WTO dispute settlement body, such as notably the Mexico-Telecommunications Services Panel Report. Upon these building elements, an assessment of the regulatory potential of the EC competition rules is made. The conclusions drawn are beyond the scope of the current situation of EC electronic communications and the applicable law and explore the possible contours of an optimal regulatory framework for modern communications. The book is of particular interest to communications and antitrust law experts, as well as policy makers, government agencies, consultancies and think-tanks active in the field. Experts on other network industries (such as electricity or postal communications) can also profit from the substantial experience gathered in the communications sector as the most advanced one in terms of liberalisation and reregulation.

Seals and the Need for more Deference to Vienna by WTO Adjudicators

This paper asks how World Trade Organization (WTO) panels and the Appellate Body (AB) take public international law (PIL) into account when interpreting WTO rules as a part of international economic law (IEL). Splendid isolation of the latter is not new; indeed it is intended by the negotiators of the Understanding on the Settlement of Disputes (DSU). At the same time, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) is quite clear when it provides the general rules and the supplementary means of treaty interpretation. Despite such mandatory guidance, WTO adjudicators (when given a choice and assuming they see the conflict) prefer deference to WTO law over deference to Vienna and take a dogmatic way out of interpretation quandaries. The AB and panels make abundant reference to Vienna, though less so to substantive PIL. Often times, however, they do so simply in order to buttress their findings of violations of WTO rules. Perhaps tellingly, however, none of the reports in EC – Seals contains even a single mention of VCLT, despite numerous references to international standards addressing indigenous rights and animal welfare. In the longer term, and absent a breakthrough on the negotiation front, this pattern of carefully eschewing international treaty law and using PIL just for the sake of convenience could have serious consequences for the credibility and acceptance of the multilateral trading system. Following the adage ‘negotiate or litigate’ recourse to WTO dispute settlement increases when governments are less ready to make treaty commitments commensurate with the challenges of globalisation. This is true even for ‘societal choice’ cases on the margins of classic trade disputes. We will argue here that it is precisely for cases such as these that VCLT and PIL should be used more systematically by panels and the AB. Failing that, instead of building bridges for more coherent international regulation, WTO adjudicators could burn those same bridges which the DSU interpretation margin leaves open for accomplishing their job which is to find a ‘positive solution’. Worse, judicial incoherence could return to WTO dispute settlement like a boomerang and damage the credibility and thus the level of acceptance of the multilateral trading system per se.

The role of the state in investor-state arbitration

The Role of the State in Investor-State Arbitration is a collection of contributions from lawyers, arbitrators and political scientists on the development of the concept of the “State” in a field that currently presents an increasing number of controversial disputes: Investor-State Arbitration. The book analyzes the limits of the host State as a regulator, studying issues such as attribution and the role of State-Owned Enterprises and sub-State entities; the changing role of the home State in Investor-State disputes, including its direct participation in Investor-State arbitration and State to State dispute settlement; and the overall role that both home and host States can play in the improvement of Investor-State Dispute Settlement.

The Jurisprudence of the World Trade Organization 2014

In 2014, the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) of the World Trade Organization (WTO) adopted seven panel reports and six Appellate Body rulings. Two of the cases relate to anti-dumping measures. Three cases, comprising five complaints, are of particular interest and these are summarized and discussed below. China – Rare Earths further refines the relationship between protocols of accession and the general provisions of WTO agreements, in particular the exceptions of Article XX GATT. Recourse to that provision is no longer excluded but depends on a careful case-by-case analysis. While China failed to comply with the conditions for export restrictions, the case reiterates the problem of insufficiently developed disciplines on export restrictions on strategic minerals and other commodities in WTO law. EC – Seals Products is a landmark case for two reasons. Firstly, it limits the application of the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT Agreement) resulting henceforth in a narrow reading of technical regulations. Normative rules prescribing conditions for importation are to be dealt with under the rules of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) instead. Secondly, the ruling permits recourse to public morals in justifying import restrictions essentially on the basis of process and production methods (PPMs). Meanwhile, the more detailed implications for extraterritorial application of such rules and for the concept of PPMs remain open as these key issues were not raised by the parties to the case. Peru – Agricultural Products adds to the interpretation of the Agreement on Agriculture (AoA), but most importantly, it confirms the existing segregation of WTO law and the law of free trade agreements. The case is of particular importance for Switzerland in its relations with the European Union (EU). The case raises, but does not fully answer, the question whether in a bilateral agreement, Switzerland or the EU can, as a matter of WTO law, lawfully waive their right of lodging complaints against each other under WTO law within the scope of their bilateral agreement, for example the Agreement on Agriculture where such a clause exists.

Human rights and international trade

Economic globalization and respect for human rights are both highly topical issues. In theory, more trade should increase economic welfare and protection of human rights should ensure individual dignity. Both fields of law protect certain freedoms: economic development should lead to higher human rights standards, and UN embargoes are used to secure compliance with human rights agreements. However the interaction between trade liberalisation and human rights protection is complex, and recently, tension has arisen between these two areas. Do WTO obligations covering intellectual property prevent governments from implementing their human rights obligations, including rights to food or health? Is it fair to accord the benefits of trade subject to a clean human rights record? This book first examines the theoretical framework of the interaction between the disciplines of international trade law and human rights. It builds upon the well-known debate between Professor Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, who construes trade obligations as human rights, and Professor Philip Alston, who warns of a merger and acquisition of human rights by trade law. From this starting point, further chapters explore the differing legal matrices of the two fields and examine how cooperation between them might be improved, both in international law-making and institutions,in dispute settlement. The interaction between trade and human rights is then explored through seven case studies:freedom of expression and competition law; IP protection and health; agricultural trade and the right to food; trade restrictions on conflict WHO convention on tobacco control; and, finally, human rights conditionalities in preferential trade schemes.

TTIP and Climate Change – How real are Race to the Bottom Concerns?

This paper examines concerns about the impact that TTIP could have on existing and future climate policies and laws from the inclusion of provisions on investment protection including investor-to-State dispute settlement (ISDS), the reduction of non-tariff barriers and the introduction of rules for trade in energy and raw materials. It argues that from an environmental perspective, ISDS should not necessarily be seen as a regime that goes against the defence of the environment or prevention of climate change. Although it might be used to challenge policies of an EU home State that increase levels of environmental protection, it can also be used to contest changes in an EU home State’s environmental policies that would reduce the protection of the environment, if foreign investment is affected. To a large extent, this also holds true for other areas of TTIP negotiations. While the achievement of a balance between rules that promote trade and those that maintain policy space for governments to respond to environmental concerns has to be closely monitored, benefits for climate could be seized from harmonisation of carbon laws at the level of the strictest regulations of two parties, provisions that promote trade in low carbon technologies and renewable energy and bilateral cooperation on climate change.

The Judicial Dimension of the European Neighbourhood Policy. EU Diplomacy Paper 08/2013, November 2013

In this paper, the expression “neighbourhood policy” of the European Union (EU) is understood in a broad way which includes the members of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) contracting parties to the European Economic Area (EEA), the EFTA State Switzerland, candidate states, the countries of the European Neighbour-hood Policy (ENP), and Russia. The European Court of Justice (ECJ) is the centre of gravity in the judicial dimension of this policy. The innermost circle of integration after the EU itself comprises the EFTA States who are party to the European Economic Area. With the EFTA Court, they have their own common court. The existence of two courts – the ECJ and the EFTA Court – raises the question of homogeneity of the case law. The EEA homogeneity rules resemble the ones of the Lugano Convention. The EFTA Court is basically obliged to follow or take into account relevant ECJ case law. But even if the ECJ has gone first, there may be constellations where the EFTA Court comes to the conclusion that it must go its own way. Such constellations may be given if there is new scientific evidence, if the ECJ has left certain questions open, where there is relevant case law of the European Court of Human Rights or where, in light of the specific circumstances of the case, there is room for “creative homogeneity”. However, in the majority of its cases the EFTA Court is faced with novel legal questions. In such cases, the ECJ, its Advocates General and the Court of First Instance make reference to the EFTA Court’s case law. The question may be posed whether the EEA could serve as a model for other regional associations. For the ENP states, candidate States and Russia this is hard to imagine. Their courts will to varying degrees look to the ECJ when giving interpretation to the relevant agreements. The Swiss Government is – at least for the time being – unwilling to make a second attempt to join the EEA. The European Commission has therefore proposed to the Swiss to dock their sectoral agreements with the EU to the institutions of the EFTA pillar, the EFTA Surveillance Authority (ESA) and the EFTA Court. Switzerland would then negotiate the right to nominate a member of the ESA College and of the EFTA Court. The Swiss Government has, however, opted for another model. Swiss courts would continue to look to the ECJ, as they did in the past, and conflicts should also in the future be resolved by diplomatic means. But the ECJ would play a decisive role in dispute settlement. It would, upon unilateral request of one side, give an “authoritative” interpretation of EU law as incorporated into the relevant bilateral agreement. In a “Non-Paper” which was drafted by the chief negotiators, the interpretations of the ECJ are even characterised as binding. The decision-making power would, however, remain with the Joint Committees where Switzerland could say no. The Swiss Government assumes that after a negative decision by the ECJ it would be able to negotiate a compromise solution with the Commission without the ECJ being able to express itself on the outcome. The Government has therefore not tried to emphasise that the ECJ would not be a foreign court. Whether the ECJ would accept its intended role, is an open question. And if it would, the Swiss Government would have to explain to its voters that Switzerland retains the freedom to disregard such a binding decision and that for this reason the ECJ is not only no foreign court, but no adjudicating court at all.

GATS and the Social Regulation of Services. IES WORKING PAPER 3/2010

Many service transactions are highly complex, and their quality is difficult to ascertain for consumers. In order to have properly functioning service markets, the services thus often require regulation. However, with the advent of the WTO, international trade in services has become increasingly rule-bound. GATS has considerable, intricate effects on social regulation due to the characteristics of services. The allocation of regulatory jurisdiction between home and host country, for example, is rendered difficult by the process-based nature of a lot of services. The WTO US – Gambling dispute settlement report is the first to address GATS disciplines on social regulation in a detailed manner. This working paper submits that the US - Gambling report has increased interference with domestic social regulation and created regulatory uncertainty for WTO members. However, it is also argued that the real impact of the GATS on social regulation can only be understood by looking beyond the text of the GATS. GATS disciplines may become amplified through their interaction with domestic and other international law. The GATS also contains some “political” counterbalancing mechanisms that allow members to renegotiate their commitments. It is argued that these political mechanisms strengthen subsidiarity in the GATS, and make WTO dispute settlement bodies accountable to WTO members.

Rule-Makers or Rule-Takers? Exploring the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership

The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) is an effort by the United States and the European Union to reposition themselves for a world of diffuse economic power and intensified global competition. It is a next-generation economic negotiation that breaks the mould of traditional trade agreements. At the heart of the ongoing talks is the question whether and in which areas the two major democratic actors in the global economy can address costly frictions generated by their deep commercial integration by aligning rules and other instruments. The aim is to reduce duplication in various ways in areas where levels of regulatory protection are equivalent as well as to foster wide-ranging regulatory cooperation and set a benchmark for high-quality global norms. In this volume, European and American experts explain the economic context of TTIP and its geopolitical implications, and then explore the challenges and consequences of US-EU negotiations across numerous sensitive areas, ranging from food safety and public procurement to economic and regulatory assessments of technical barriers to trade, automotive, chemicals, energy, services, investor-state dispute settlement mechanisms and regulatory cooperation. Their insights cut through the confusion and tremendous public controversies now swirling around TTIP, and help decision-makers understand how the United States and the European Union can remain rule-makers rather than rule-takers in a globalising world in which their relative influence is waning.

Labor clauses in regional trade agreements and effects on labor conditions : an empirical analysis

An increasing number of bilateral or plurilateral trade agreements (or regional trade agreements: RTAs) include "labor clauses" that require or urge the signatory countries to commit to maintaining a certain level of labor standards. This paper performs an empirical analysis of the impacts of such labor clauses provided in RTAs on working conditions that laborers in the RTA signatory countries actually face, using macro-level data for a wide variety of countries. The paper first examines the texts of labor provisions in more than 220 effective RTAs and (re-)classifies "RTAs with labor clauses" according to two criteria: (i) the agreement urges or expects the signatory countries to harmonize their domestic labor standards with internationally recognized standards, and (ii) the agreement stipulates the procedures for consultations and/or dispute settlement on labor-condition issues between the signatory countries. Based on this labor-clause RTA classification, the paper estimates the impacts of RTA labor clauses on working conditions in countries with two empirical specifications using the sample covering 136 countries or economies and years from 1995 through 2011. The estimation is extended to takes into account possible lags in the labor-condition effects of labor clauses as well as to consider potential difference in the impacts for countries in different income levels. The empirical results for the four measures of labor conditions (mean monthly real earnings, mean weekly work hours per employee, fatal occupational injury rate, and the number of the ILO's Core Conventions ratified) find no evidence for possible pro-labor-condition effects of RTA labor clauses overall, which should be consistent with the view of economics literature that questions the relevance of linking trade policy with issues in the domestic labor standards.