State of Iowa Employee Benefits Handbook, December 2002

Examples of the information available include: • Links to health and dental plans • Health plan comparisons • Health and Dependent Care Flexible Spending Account information • Deferred Compensation information • Life and Long Term Disability insurance information • Link to Employee Assistance Program (EAP) Web site • Link to Employee Discount Program • Link to Wellness Web site which includes information about - Smoking Cessation Program - Prescription Drug information - Wellness activities

State of Iowa Employee Benefits Handbook, December 2002

Examples of the information available include: • Links to health and dental plans • Health plan comparisons • Health and Dependent Care Flexible Spending Account information • Deferred Compensation information • Life and Long Term Disability insurance information • Link to Employee Assistance Program (EAP) Web site • Link to Employee Discount Program • Link to Wellness Web site which includes information about - Smoking Cessation Program - Prescription Drug information - Wellness activities

Time consistent Pareto solutions in common access resource gameswith asymmetric players

In the analysis of equilibrium policies in a di erential game, if agents have different time preference rates, the cooperative (Pareto optimum) solution obtained by applying the Pontryagin's Maximum Principle becomes time inconsistent. In this work we derive a set of dynamic programming equations (in discrete and continuous time) whose solutions are time consistent equilibrium rules for N-player cooperative di erential games in which agents di er in their instantaneous utility functions and also in their discount rates of time preference. The results are applied to the study of a cake-eating problem describing the management of a common property exhaustible natural resource. The extension of the results to a simple common property renewable natural resource model in in nite horizon is also discussed.

Heterogeneous discounting in consumption-investment problems. Time consistent solutions

[cat] En aquest treball s'analitza un model estocàstic en temps continu en el que l'agent decisor descompta les utilitats instantànies i la funció final amb taxes de preferència temporal constants però diferents. En aquest context es poden modelitzar problemes en els quals, quan el temps s'acosta al moment final, la valoració de la funció final incrementa en comparació amb les utilitats instantànies. Aquest tipus d'asimetria no es pot descriure ni amb un descompte estàndard ni amb un variable. Per tal d'obtenir solucions consistents temporalment es deriva l'equació de programació dinàmica estocàstica, les solucions de la qual són equilibris Markovians. Per a aquest tipus de preferències temporals, s'estudia el model clàssic de consum i inversió (Merton, 1971) per a les funcions d'utilitat del tipus CRRA i CARA, comparant els equilibris Markovians amb les solucions inconsistents temporalment. Finalment es discuteix la introducció del temps final aleatori.

A note on the coincidence between Stackelberg and Nash equilibria in a differential game between government and firms

[cat] A Navas i Marín Solano es va demostrar la coincidència entre els equilibris de Nash i de Stackelberg per a una versi´o modificada del joc diferencial proposat por Lancaster (1973). Amb l’objectiu d’obtenir una solució interior, es van imposar restriccions importants sobre el valors dels paràmetres del model. En aquest treball estenem aquest resultat, en el límit en que la taxa de descompte és igual a zero, eliminant les restriccions i considerant totes les solucions possibles.

Discounting Arduousness

[cat] Hi ha una literatura creixent que considera desviacions del descompte exponencial estàndar. En aquest article combinem preferències temporalment inconsistents (descompte no constant) amb preferències recursives. Aquest formalisme l’apliquem a les propietats relatives a la demanda del que anomenem bens ardus. La justificació del descompte no estàndar proposat ve donada pel fet que la producció i el consum no són separables per a aquest tipus de bens. L’esforç implica que els individus descompten el consum d’aquests bens d’una manera especial, amb la presència de preferències esbiaixades i d’un ajustament recursiu dinàmic. D’aquesta manera, la voluntat de realitzar un esforç, caracteritzada per un factor de descompte, resulta endògena.

Worksharing and access discounts in the postal sector with asymmetrics information

This paper analyses the optimal worksharing discount granted to mailers and entrants in a liberalized sector when there is asymmetric information about the Post Office's cost. When the regulator is unable to ascertain which part of total cost of sorting has to be attributed to each sorting facility, the optimal 'accesss discount' given to the entrants is set in a pro-competitive way, thus facilitating the entry of firms that are less afficient than the Post Office. Howerver, with the same asymmetry of information, the optimal 'worksharing discount' given to the mailers is set to favor the Post Office, even when it is less efficient than the mailers in providing the sorting.

Time consistent Pareto solutions in common access resource gameswith asymmetric players

In the analysis of equilibrium policies in a di erential game, if agents have different time preference rates, the cooperative (Pareto optimum) solution obtained by applying the Pontryagin's Maximum Principle becomes time inconsistent. In this work we derive a set of dynamic programming equations (in discrete and continuous time) whose solutions are time consistent equilibrium rules for N-player cooperative di erential games in which agents di er in their instantaneous utility functions and also in their discount rates of time preference. The results are applied to the study of a cake-eating problem describing the management of a common property exhaustible natural resource. The extension of the results to a simple common property renewable natural resource model in in nite horizon is also discussed.

Heterogeneous discounting in consumption-investment problems. Time consistent solutions

[cat] En aquest treball s'analitza un model estocàstic en temps continu en el que l'agent decisor descompta les utilitats instantànies i la funció final amb taxes de preferència temporal constants però diferents. En aquest context es poden modelitzar problemes en els quals, quan el temps s'acosta al moment final, la valoració de la funció final incrementa en comparació amb les utilitats instantànies. Aquest tipus d'asimetria no es pot descriure ni amb un descompte estàndard ni amb un variable. Per tal d'obtenir solucions consistents temporalment es deriva l'equació de programació dinàmica estocàstica, les solucions de la qual són equilibris Markovians. Per a aquest tipus de preferències temporals, s'estudia el model clàssic de consum i inversió (Merton, 1971) per a les funcions d'utilitat del tipus CRRA i CARA, comparant els equilibris Markovians amb les solucions inconsistents temporalment. Finalment es discuteix la introducció del temps final aleatori.

A note on the coincidence between Stackelberg and Nash equilibria in a differential game between government and firms

[cat] A Navas i Marín Solano es va demostrar la coincidència entre els equilibris de Nash i de Stackelberg per a una versi´o modificada del joc diferencial proposat por Lancaster (1973). Amb l’objectiu d’obtenir una solució interior, es van imposar restriccions importants sobre el valors dels paràmetres del model. En aquest treball estenem aquest resultat, en el límit en que la taxa de descompte és igual a zero, eliminant les restriccions i considerant totes les solucions possibles.

Discounting Arduousness

[cat] Hi ha una literatura creixent que considera desviacions del descompte exponencial estàndar. En aquest article combinem preferències temporalment inconsistents (descompte no constant) amb preferències recursives. Aquest formalisme l’apliquem a les propietats relatives a la demanda del que anomenem bens ardus. La justificació del descompte no estàndar proposat ve donada pel fet que la producció i el consum no són separables per a aquest tipus de bens. L’esforç implica que els individus descompten el consum d’aquests bens d’una manera especial, amb la presència de preferències esbiaixades i d’un ajustament recursiu dinàmic. D’aquesta manera, la voluntat de realitzar un esforç, caracteritzada per un factor de descompte, resulta endògena.

Worksharing and access discounts in the postal sector with asymmetrics information

This paper analyses the optimal worksharing discount granted to mailers and entrants in a liberalized sector when there is asymmetric information about the Post Office's cost. When the regulator is unable to ascertain which part of total cost of sorting has to be attributed to each sorting facility, the optimal 'accesss discount' given to the entrants is set in a pro-competitive way, thus facilitating the entry of firms that are less afficient than the Post Office. Howerver, with the same asymmetry of information, the optimal 'worksharing discount' given to the mailers is set to favor the Post Office, even when it is less efficient than the mailers in providing the sorting.

Cost-effectiveness analysis of a European primary-care physician training in smoking cessation counseling.

BACKGROUND: Physician training in smoking cessation counseling has been shown to be effective as a means to increase quit success. We assessed the cost-effectiveness ratio of a smoking cessation counseling training programme. Its effectiveness was previously demonstrated in a cluster randomized, control trial performed in two Swiss university outpatients clinics, in which residents were randomized to receive training in smoking interventions or a control educational intervention. DESIGN AND METHODS: We used a Markov simulation model for effectiveness analysis. This model incorporates the intervention efficacy, the natural quit rate, and the lifetime probability of relapse after 1-year abstinence. We used previously published results in addition to hospital service and outpatient clinic cost data. The time horizon was 1 year, and we opted for a third-party payer perspective. RESULTS: The incremental cost of the intervention amounted to US$2.58 per consultation by a smoker, translating into a cost per life-year saved of US$25.4 for men and 35.2 for women. One-way sensitivity analyses yielded a range of US$4.0-107.1 in men and US$9.7-148.6 in women. Variations in the quit rate of the control intervention, the length of training effectiveness, and the discount rate yielded moderately large effects on the outcome. Variations in the natural cessation rate, the lifetime probability of relapse, the cost of physician training, the counseling time, the cost per hour of physician time, and the cost of the booklets had little effect on the cost-effectiveness ratio. CONCLUSIONS: Training residents in smoking cessation counseling is a very cost-effective intervention and may be more efficient than currently accepted tobacco control interventions.

The cost effectiveness of pharmacological smoking cessation therapies in developing countries: a case study in the Seychelles

OBJECTIVE: To examine the incremental cost effectiveness of the five first line pharmacological smoking cessation therapies in the Seychelles and other developing countries. DESIGN: A Markov chain cohort simulation. SUBJECTS: Two simulated cohorts of smokers: (1) a reference cohort given physician counselling only; (2) a treatment cohort given counselling plus cessation therapy. INTERVENTION: Addition of each of the five pharmacological cessation therapies to physician provided smoking cessation counselling. MAIN OUTCOME MEASURES: Cost per life-year saved (LYS) associated with the five pharmacotherapies. Effectiveness expressed as odds ratios for quitting associated with pharmacotherapies. Costs based on the additional physician time required and retail prices of the medications. RESULTS: Based on prices for currently available generic medications on the global market, the incremental cost per LYS for a 45 year old in the Seychelles was 599 US dollars for gum and 227 dollars for bupropion. Assuming US treatment prices as a conservative estimate, the incremental cost per LYS was significantly higher, though still favourable in comparison to other common medical interventions: 3712 dollars for nicotine gum, 1982 dollars for nicotine patch, 4597 dollars for nicotine spray, 4291 dollars for nicotine inhaler, and 1324 dollars for bupropion. Cost per LYS increased significantly upon application of higher discount rates, which may be used to reflect relatively high opportunity costs for health expenditures in developing countries with highly constrained resources and high overall mortality. CONCLUSION: Pharmacological cessation therapy can be highly cost effective as compared to other common medical interventions in low mortality, middle income countries, particularly if medications can be procured at low prices.

The evolution of social discounting in hierarchically clustered populations.

The expression of a social behaviour may affect the fitness of actors and recipients living in the present and in the future of the population. When there is a risk that a future reward will not be experienced in such a context, the value of that reward should be discounted; but by how much? Here, we evaluate social discount rates for delayed fitness rewards to group of recipients living at different positions in both space and time than the actor in a hierarchically clustered population. This is a population where individuals are grouped into families, families into villages, villages into clans, and so on, possibly ad infinitum. The group-wide fitness effects are assumed to either increase or decrease the fecundity or the survival of recipients and can be arbitrarily extended in space and time. We find that actions changing the survival of individuals living in the future are generally more strongly discounted than fecundity-changing actions for all future times and that the value of future rewards increases as individuals live longer. We also find that delayed fitness effects may not only be discounted by a constant factor per unit delay (exponential discounting), but that, as soon as there is localized dispersal in a population, discounting per unit delay is likely to fall rapidly for small delays and then slowly for longer delays (hyperbolic discounting). As dispersal tends to be localized in natural populations, our results suggest that evolution is likely to favour individuals that express present-biased behaviours and that may be time-inconsistent with respect to their group-wide effects.