Rating corporate groups a modelling experience

This paper aims to provide a model that allows BPI to measure the credit risk, through its rating scale, of the subsidiaries included in the corporate groups who are their clients. This model should be simple enough to be applied in practice, accurate, and must give consistent results in comparison to what have been the ratings given by the bank. The model proposed includes operational, strategic, and financial factors and ends up giving one of three results: no support, partial support, or full support from the holding to the subsidiary, and each of them translates in adjustments in each subsidiary’s credit rating. As it would be expectable, most of the subsidiaries should have the same credit rating of its parent company.

Three essays in international finance

Executive Summary The first essay of this dissertation investigates whether greater exchange rate uncertainty (i.e., variation over time in the exchange rate) fosters or depresses the foreign investment of multinational firms. In addition to the direct capital financing it supplies, foreign investment can be a source of valuable technology and know-how, which can have substantial positive effects on a host country's economic growth. Thus, it is critically important for policy makers and central bankers, among others, to understand how multinationals base their investment decisions on the characteristics of foreign exchange markets. In this essay, I first develop a theoretical framework to improve our knowledge regarding how the aggregate level of foreign investment responds to exchange rate uncertainty when an economy consists of many firms, each of which is making decisions. The analysis predicts a U-shaped effect of exchange rate uncertainty on the total level of foreign investment of the economy. That is, the effect is negative for low levels of uncertainty and positive for higher levels of uncertainty. This pattern emerges because the relationship between exchange rate volatility and 'the probability of investment is negative for firms with low productivity at home (i.e., firms that find it profitable to invest abroad) and the relationship is positive for firms with high productivity at home (i.e., firms that prefer exporting their product). This finding stands in sharp contrast to predictions in the existing literature that consider a single firm's decision to invest in a unique project. The main contribution of this research is to show that the aggregation over many firms produces a U-shaped pattern between exchange rate uncertainty and the probability of investment. Using data from industrialized countries for the period of 1982-2002, this essay offers a comprehensive empirical analysis that provides evidence in support of the theoretical prediction. In the second essay, I aim to explain the time variation in sovereign credit risk, which captures the risk that a government may be unable to repay its debt. The importance of correctly evaluating such a risk is illustrated by the central role of sovereign debt in previous international lending crises. In addition, sovereign debt is the largest asset class in emerging markets. In this essay, I provide a pricing formula for the evaluation of sovereign credit risk in which the decision to default on sovereign debt is made by the government. The pricing formula explains the variation across time in daily credit spreads - a widely used measure of credit risk - to a degree not offered by existing theoretical and empirical models. I use information on a country's stock market to compute the prevailing sovereign credit spread in that country. The pricing formula explains a substantial fraction of the time variation in daily credit spread changes for Brazil, Mexico, Peru, and Russia for the 1998-2008 period, particularly during the recent subprime crisis. I also show that when a government incentive to default is allowed to depend on current economic conditions, one can best explain the level of credit spreads, especially during the recent period of financial distress. In the third essay, I show that the risk of sovereign default abroad can produce adverse consequences for the U.S. equity market through a decrease in returns and an increase in volatility. The risk of sovereign default, which is no longer limited to emerging economies, has recently become a major concern for financial markets. While sovereign debt plays an increasing role in today's financial environment, the effects of sovereign credit risk on the U.S. financial markets have been largely ignored in the literature. In this essay, I develop a theoretical framework that explores how the risk of sovereign default abroad helps explain the level and the volatility of U.S. equity returns. The intuition for this effect is that negative economic shocks deteriorate the fiscal situation of foreign governments, thereby increasing the risk of a sovereign default that would trigger a local contraction in economic growth. The increased risk of an economic slowdown abroad amplifies the direct effect of these shocks on the level and the volatility of equity returns in the U.S. through two channels. The first channel involves a decrease in the future earnings of U.S. exporters resulting from unfavorable adjustments to the exchange rate. The second channel involves investors' incentives to rebalance their portfolios toward safer assets, which depresses U.S. equity prices. An empirical estimation of the model with monthly data for the 1994-2008 period provides evidence that the risk of sovereign default abroad generates a strong leverage effect during economic downturns, which helps to substantially explain the level and the volatility of U.S. equity returns.

Interbank Competition with Costly Screening

We analyse credit market equilibrium when banks screen loan applicants. When banks have a convex cost function of screening, a pure strategy equilibrium exists where banks optimally set interest rates at the same level as their competitors. This result complements Broecker s (1990) analysis, where he demonstrates that no pure strategy equilibrium exists when banks have zero screening costs. In our set up we show that interest rate on loans are largely independent of marginal costs, a feature consistent with the extant empirical evidence. In equilibrium, banks make positive profits in our model in spite of the threat of entry by inactive banks. Moreover, an increase in the number of active banks increases credit risk and so does not improve credit market effciency: this point has important regulatory implications. Finally, we extend our analysis to the case where banks have differing screening abilities.

Análise de Crédito e Avaliação de Riscos em Instituições Bancárias

É indubitável que o sistema financeiro é parte integrante de qualquer sociedade. Através da sua função de intermediação, as instituições financeiras recebem recursos dos agentes superavitários e emprestam aos agentes deficitários mediante promessa de pagamento futuro. Num banco, que tem intermediação financeira como sua principal actividade, o crédito consiste em disponibilizar ao cliente recursos em valores sob a forma de financiamento e ou empréstimo mediante uma promessa de pagamento numa data acordada entre as partes. A discussão e implementação dos acordos de BASILEIA, nomeadamente o Basileia II, veio dar uma nova forma a esse relacionamento sector bancário/clientes determinando as regras no que respeita a concessão de crédito e gestão de risco, estabelecendo os limites de crédito associado ao grau de risco das operações. Surge então, por parte das instituições uma maior preocupação em gerir o crédito e os riscos inerentes a cada operação, apostando em ferramentas e metodologias adequadas ao processo creditício. As instituições bancárias passam a criar departamentos de risco, colocando a gestão de crédito e de risco nas mãos de profissionais especializados, agindo sob regras e padrões internacionais uniformizados. There is no doubt that the financial system is an integral part of any society. Through their intermediary role, financial institutions receive funds from surplus agents and lend to deficit agents, with promises of future payment. Banks, with their primary activity being the financial intermediation, the credit is provided to customers in the form of funding or loans and a promise of payment on a date agreed between the parties. The discussion and implementation of the Basel Accord, Basel II in particular, has given a new form to that relationship banking/customer, setting out the rules regarding the granting of credit and risk management, establishing credit limits associated with the degree of risk of operations. Banking institutions got more and more concerned with credit and risk management, in all of their operations, using tools and methodologies that are designed to meet the needs of crediting processes. Banking institutions are creating departments of risk, putting the management of credit risk in the hands of trained professionals, acting under internationally uniform rules and standards

Processos de Reconhecimento, Mensuração e Contabilização do Rédito

O reconhecimento e mensuração do rédito tornaram-se cada vez mais complexos devido a factores como a concorrência internacional e a rápida evolução dos modelos empresariais. O rédito é a componente do rendimento proveniente da actividade operacional da empresa, daí ser de suprema importância determinar-se o momento em que o mesmo deve ser reconhecido bem como os critérios adequados para mensurá-lo. Neste trabalho debruçamo-nos sobre os processos de reconhecimento e mensuração do rédito. Este trabalho foi elaborado em duas partes, na primeira, efectuou-se uma revisão às normas de referência ao tratamento do rédito, com o objectivo de esclarecer algumas questões que suscitam grandes dúvidas, quer no meio académico, quer no meio profissional como é o exemplo do tratamento a dar ao rédito proveniente dos contratos de construção de imóveis numa empresa do ramo imobiliário. Na segunda parte do trabalho, elaborou-se um estudo de caso sobre a empresa TECNICIL Imobiliária, precisamente para verificar na prática o tratamento dado ao rédito proveniente dos acordos de construção levados a cabo por esta entidade. E desse estudo podemos concluir que a entidade não observa o tratamento prescrito pelas normas de referência, particularmente a IFRIC 15 – Acordos para Construção de Imóveis e IAS 18 – Rédito. There is no doubt that the financial system is an integral part of any society. Through their intermediary role, financial institutions receive funds from surplus agents and lend to deficit agents, with promises of future payment. Banks, with their primary activity being the financial intermediation, the credit is provided to customers in the form of funding or loans and a promise of payment on a date agreed between the parties. The discussion and implementation of the Basel Accord, Basel II in particular, has given a new form to that relationship banking/customer, setting out the rules regarding the granting of credit and risk management, establishing credit limits associated with the degree of risk of operations. Banking institutions got more and more concerned with credit and risk management, in all of their operations, using tools and methodologies that are designed to meet the needs of crediting processes. Banking institutions are creating departments of risk, putting the management of credit risk in the hands of trained professionals, acting under internationally uniform rules and standards.

Análise e Avaliação do Risco de Crédito Bancário nas PME’s – Utilização do modelo de rating

A análise de risco de crédito na actividade bancária é um tema bastante discutido no contexto das decisões das instituições financeiras. O presente estudo tem como objectivo demonstrar o processo de análise de crédito e avaliação do risco em instituições bancárias, evidenciando a utilização do modelo de rating. A implementação do acordo de Basileia veio dar uma nova forma ao relacionamento do sector bancário para com os seus clientes, estabelecendo regras no que respeita à concessão de crédito e avaliação do risco. Com isto as instituições passaram a ter uma maior preocupação em gerir o crédito e o risco inerentes a cada operação, apostando em ferramentas metodológicas adequadas ao processo creditício. As instituições bancárias acabaram por criar departamentos de risco, colocando a gestão de crédito e de risco nas mãos de profissionais especializados, agindo sobre regras e padrões internacionais uniformes. De realçar que o processo de análise de crédito envolve diversas etapas, cujo objectivo é avaliar o risco de incumprimento associado ao tomador de crédito, bem como suas consequências junto de quem concede o crédito. O rating de crédito é um instrumento cujo objectivo é atribuir uma nota que sintetiza o risco de incumprimento no pagamento de crédito, com o objectivo de reduzir a subjectividade associada ao processo de avaliação do risco. Da pesquisa realizada, constatou-se perante entrevistas junto das instituições bancárias locais que o modelo de rating ainda não é muito utilizado no nosso mercado bancário, e os que o utilizam tomam-no apenas como um indicador de risco. Segundo os entrevistados a realidade das PME’s Cabo-Verdianas não é adequada para a implementação de um modelo tão objectivo. The analysis of credit risk in banking activity is a widely discussed topic, and within the context of decisions of financial institutions. The present study aims to demonstrate the process of credit analysis and risk assessment in banking institutions, evidencing the use of internal rating model. The implementation of Basel II Accord has given a new shape to the relationship of the banking sector with its customers, establishing rules regarding the granting of credit and risk assessment. Consequently, institutions now have a greater concern in managing credit and the risk inherent to each transaction, relying on methodological tools that are appropriate to the credit process. The banks end up creating risk departments, placing credit risk management in the hands of skilled professionals that act conforming to international rules and standards. It should be noted that the credit analysis process involves several steps, aiming at assessing the default risk associated with credit borrower, and its consequences to whom grants credit. The credit rating is a process with the objective of assigning a grade, which summarizes the risk of default in payment of credit, in order to reduce the subjectivity associated with the process of risk assessment. The survey undertaken through interviews with local banking institutions showed that the rating model is not yet widely used in our banking market, and that the banks that actually use it, only do it as an indicator of risk. According to those interviewed, the reality of SMEs in Cape Verde is not suitable for the implementation of a model with such objectivity.

Crises and growth: A re-evaluation

We address the question of whether growth and welfare can be higher in crisis prone economies. First, we show that there is a robust empirical link between per-capita GDP growth and negative skewness of credit growth across countries with active financial markets. That is, countries that have experienced occasional crises have grown on average faster than countries with smooth credit conditions. We then present a two-sector endogenous growth model in which financial crises can occur, and analyze the relationship between financial fragility and growth. The underlying credit market imperfections generateborrowing constraints, bottlenecks and low growth. We show that under certain conditions endogenous real exchange rate risk arises and firms find it optimal to take on credit risk in the form of currency mismatch. Along such a risky path average growth is higher, but self-fulfilling crises occur occasionally. Furthermore, we establish conditions under which the adoption of credit risk is welfare improving and brings the allocation nearer to the Pareto optimal level. The design of the model is motivated by several features of recent crises: credit risk in the form of foreign currency denominated debt; costly crises that generate firesales and widespread bankruptcies; and asymmetric sectorial responses, wherethe nontradables sector falls more than the tradables sector in the wake of crises.

Interbank comptetition with costly screening

We analyse credit market equilibrium when banks screen loan applicants. When banks have a convex cost function of screening, a pure strategy equilibrium exists where banks optimally set interest rates at the same level as their competitors. This result complements Broecker s (1990) analysis, where he demonstrates that no pure strategy equilibrium exists when banks have zero screening costs. In our set up we show that interest rate on loansare largely independent of marginal costs, a feature consistent with the extant empirical evidence. In equilibrium, banks make positive profits in our model in spite of the threat of entry by inactive banks. Moreover, an increase in the number of active banks increases credit risk and so does not improve credit market effciency: this point has important regulatory implications. Finally, we extend our analysis to the case where banks havediffering screening abilities.

The Impact of Monetary Union on EU-15 Sovereign Debt Yield Spreads

With European Monetary Union (EMU), there was an increase in the adjusted spreads (corrected from the foreign exchange risk) of euro participating countries' sovereign securities over Germany and a decrease in those of non-euro countries. The objective of this paper is to study the reasons for this result, and in particular, whether the change in the price assigned by markets was due to domestic factors such as credit risk and/or market liquidity, or to international risk factors. The empirical evidence suggests that market size scale economies have increased since EMU for all European markets, so the effect of the various risk factors, even though it differs between euro and non-euro countries, is always dependent on the size of the market.

Un modelo de riesgo de crédito basado en opciones compuestas con barrera. Aplicación al mercado continuo español

In this work the valuation methodology of compound option written on a downand-out call option, developed by Ericsson and Reneby (2003), has been applied to deduce a credit risk model. It is supposed that the firm has a debt structure with two maturity dates and that the credit event takes place when the assets firm value falls under a determined level called barrier. An empirical application of the model for 105 firms of Spanish continuous market is carried out. For each one of them its value in the date of analysis, the volatility and the critical value are obtained and from these, the default probability to short and long-term and the implicit probability in the two previous probabilities are deduced. The results are compared with the ones obtained from the Geskemodel (1977).

Monetary integration and the cost of borrowing

With the beginning of the European Monetary Union (EMU), euro-area sovereign securities¿ adjusted spreads over Germany (corrected from the foreign exchange risk) experienced an increase that caused a lower than expected decline in borrowing costs. The objective of this paper is to study what explains that rising. In particular, if it took place a change in the price assigned by markets to domestic (credit risk and/or market liquidity) or to international risk factors. The empirical evidence supports the idea that a change in the market value of liquidity occurred with the EMU. International and default risk play a smaller role

Un modelo de riesgo de crédito basado en opciones compuestas con barrera. Aplicación al mercado continuo español

In this work the valuation methodology of compound option written on a downand-out call option, developed by Ericsson and Reneby (2003), has been applied to deduce a credit risk model. It is supposed that the firm has a debt structure with two maturity dates and that the credit event takes place when the assets firm value falls under a determined level called barrier. An empirical application of the model for 105 firms of Spanish continuous market is carried out. For each one of them its value in the date of analysis, the volatility and the critical value are obtained and from these, the default probability to short and long-term and the implicit probability in the two previous probabilities are deduced. The results are compared with the ones obtained from the Geskemodel (1977).

Monetary integration and the cost of borrowing

With the beginning of the European Monetary Union (EMU), euro-area sovereign securities¿ adjusted spreads over Germany (corrected from the foreign exchange risk) experienced an increase that caused a lower than expected decline in borrowing costs. The objective of this paper is to study what explains that rising. In particular, if it took place a change in the price assigned by markets to domestic (credit risk and/or market liquidity) or to international risk factors. The empirical evidence supports the idea that a change in the market value of liquidity occurred with the EMU. International and default risk play a smaller role

The Impact of Monetary Union on EU-15 Sovereign Debt Yield Spreads

With European Monetary Union (EMU), there was an increase in the adjusted spreads (corrected from the foreign exchange risk) of euro participating countries' sovereign securities over Germany and a decrease in those of non-euro countries. The objective of this paper is to study the reasons for this result, and in particular, whether the change in the price assigned by markets was due to domestic factors such as credit risk and/or market liquidity, or to international risk factors. The empirical evidence suggests that market size scale economies have increased since EMU for all European markets, so the effect of the various risk factors, even though it differs between euro and non-euro countries, is always dependent on the size of the market.