Revised definitions of invasive fungal disease from the European Organization for Research and Treatment of Cancer/Invasive Fungal Infections Cooperative Group and the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases Mycoses Study Group (EORTC/MSG) Consensus Group.

BACKGROUND: Invasive fungal diseases are important causes of morbidity and mortality. Clarity and uniformity in defining these infections are important factors in improving the quality of clinical studies. A standard set of definitions strengthens the consistency and reproducibility of such studies. METHODS: After the introduction of the original European Organization for Research and Treatment of Cancer/Invasive Fungal Infections Cooperative Group and the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases Mycoses Study Group (EORTC/MSG) Consensus Group definitions, advances in diagnostic technology and the recognition of areas in need of improvement led to a revision of this document. The revision process started with a meeting of participants in 2003, to decide on the process and to draft the proposal. This was followed by several rounds of consultation until a final draft was approved in 2005. This was made available for 6 months to allow public comment, and then the manuscript was prepared and approved. RESULTS: The revised definitions retain the original classifications of "proven," "probable," and "possible" invasive fungal disease, but the definition of "probable" has been expanded, whereas the scope of the category "possible" has been diminished. The category of proven invasive fungal disease can apply to any patient, regardless of whether the patient is immunocompromised, whereas the probable and possible categories are proposed for immunocompromised patients only. CONCLUSIONS: These revised definitions of invasive fungal disease are intended to advance clinical and epidemiological research and may serve as a useful model for defining other infections in high-risk patients.

Co-evolution between sociality and dispersal: The role of synergistic cooperative benefits.

Explaining the evolution of sociality is challenging because social individuals face disadvantages that must be balanced by intrinsic benefits of living in a group. One potential route towards the evolution of sociality may emerge from the avoidance of dispersal, which can be risky in some environments. Although early studies found that local competition may cancel the benefits of cooperation in viscous populations, subsequent studies have identified conditions, such as the presence of kin recognition or specific demographic conditions, under which altruism will still spread. Most of these studies assume that the costs of cooperating outweigh the direct benefits (strong altruism). In nature, however, many organisms gain synergistic benefits from group living, which may counterbalance even costly altruistic behaviours. Here, we use an individual based model to investigate how dispersal and social behaviour co-evolve when social behaviours result in synergistic benefits that counterbalance the relative cost of altruism to a greater extent than assumed in previous models. When the cost of cooperation is high, selection for sociality responds strongly to the cost of dispersal. In particular, cooperation can begin to spread in a population when higher cooperation levels become correlated with lower dispersal tendencies within individuals. In contrast, less costly social behaviours are less sensitive to the cost of dispersal. In line with previous studies, we find that mechanisms of global population control also affect this relationship: when whole patches (groups) go extinct each generation, selection favours a relatively high dispersal propensity, and social behaviours evolve only when they are not very costly. If random individuals within groups experience mortality each generation to maintain a global carrying capacity, on the other hand, social behaviours spread and dispersal is reduced, even when the latter is not costly.

Cooperative games in strategic form

In this paper we view bargaining and cooperation as an interaction superimposed on a strategic form game. A multistage bargaining procedure for N players, the proposer commitment procedure, is presented. It is inspired by Nash s two-player variable-threat model; a key feature is the commitment to threats. We establish links to classical cooperative game theory solutions, such as the Shapley value in the transferable utility case. However, we show that even in standard pure exchange economies the traditional coalitional function may not be adequate when utilities are not transferable.

Cooperative Lakes Area Monitoring Project-Little Spirit Lake, 2007

Water fact sheet for Iowa Department of Natural Resources and the Geological Bureau.

Cooperative Lakes Area Monitoring Project-Project Overview, 2007

Water fact sheet for Iowa Department of Natural Resources and the Geological Bureau.

Cooperative Lakes Area Monitoring Project-Silver Lake, 2007

Water fact sheet for Iowa Department of Natural Resources and the Geological Bureau.

Cooperative Lakes Area Monitoring Project-Center Lake, 2007

Water fact sheet for Iowa Department of Natural Resources and the Geological Bureau.

Cooperative Lakes Area Monitoring Project-West Okoboji Lake, 2007

Water fact sheet for Iowa Department of Natural Resources and the Geological Bureau.

Cooperative Lakes Area Monitoring Project-Lower Gar Lake, 2007

Water fact sheet for Iowa Department of Natural Resources and the Geological Bureau.

Cooperative Lakes Area Monitoring Project-Lake Minnewashta, 2007

Water fact sheet for Iowa Department of Natural Resources and the Geological Bureau.

Cooperative Lakes Area Monitoring Project-Upper Gar Lake, 2007

Water fact sheet for Iowa Department of Natural Resources and the Geological Bureau.

Cooperative Lakes Area Monitoring Project-East Okoboji Lake, 2007

Water fact sheet for Iowa Department of Natural Resources and the Geological Bureau.

Cooperative Lakes Area Monitoring Project-Big Spirit Lake, 2007

Water fact sheet for Iowa Department of Natural Resources and the Geological Bureau.

Neuronal Thy-1 induces astrocyte adhesion by engaging syndecan-4 in a cooperative interaction with alphavbeta3 integrin that activates PKCalpha and RhoA.

Clustering of alphavbeta3 integrin after interaction with the RGD-like integrin-binding sequence present in neuronal Thy-1 triggers formation of focal adhesions and stress fibers in astrocytes via RhoA activation. A putative heparin-binding domain is present in Thy-1, raising the possibility that this membrane protein stimulates astrocyte adhesion via engagement of an integrin and the proteoglycan syndecan-4. Indeed, heparin, heparitinase treatment and mutation of the Thy-1 heparin-binding site each inhibited Thy-1-induced RhoA activation, as well as formation of focal adhesions and stress fibers in DI TNC(1) astrocytes. These responses required both syndecan-4 binding and signaling, as evidenced by silencing syndecan-4 expression and by overexpressing a syndecan-4 mutant lacking the intracellular domain, respectively. Furthermore, lack of RhoA activation and astrocyte responses in the presence of a PKC inhibitor or a dominant-negative form of PKCalpha implicated PKCalpha and RhoA activation in these events. Therefore, combined interaction of the astrocyte alphavbeta3-integrin-syndecan-4 receptor pair with Thy-1, promotes adhesion to the underlying matrix via PKCalpha- and RhoA-dependent pathways. Importantly, signaling events triggered by such receptor cooperation are shown here to be the consequence of cell-cell rather than cell-matrix interactions. These observations are likely to be of widespread biological relevance because Thy-1-integrin binding is reportedly relevant to melanoma invasion, monocyte transmigration through endothelial cells and host defense mechanisms.