How accurate are surveyed preferences for public policies? Evidence from a unique institutional setup

Opinion polls are widely used to capture public sentiments on a varietyof issues. If citizens are unwilling to reveal certain policy preferences toothers, opinion polls may fail to characterize population preferences accurately.The innovation of this paper is to use unique data to measurebiases in opinion polls for a broad range of policies. I combine data on184 referenda held in Switzerland between 1987 and 2007, with postballotsurveys that ask for each proposal how the citizens voted. Thedifference between stated preferences in the survey and revealed preferences at the ballot box provides a direct measure of bias in opinion polls.I find that these biases vary by policy areas, with the largest ones occurring in policies on immigration, international integration, and votesinvolving liberal/conservative attitudes. Also, citizens show a tendencyto respond in accordance to the majority.

Turnout, political preferences and information: Experimental evidence from Perú

Electoral institutions that encourage citizens to vote are widely used around the world. Yet littleis known about the effects of such institutions on voter participation and the composition of the electorate.In this paper, I combine a field experiment with a change in Peruvian voting laws to identify theeffect of monetary (dis-)incentives on voting. Using the random variation in the fine for abstention andan objective measure of turnout at the individual level, I estimate the elasticity of voting with respectto cost to be -0.21. Consistent with the theoretical model presented, the reduction in turnout inducedby the reduction in the fine is driven by voters who (i) are in the center of the political spectrum, (ii)are less interested in politics, and (iii) hold less political information. However, voters who respondto changes in the cost of abstention do not have different preferences for policies than those who voteregardless of the cost. Further, involvement in politics, as measured by the decision to acquire politicalinformation, seems to be independent of the level of the fine. Additional results indicate that thereduction in the fine does not affect the incidence of vote buying, but increases the price paid for avote.

Biased representation of homothetic preferences on homogeneous sets

In the homogeneous case of one-dimensional objects, we show that any preference relation that is positive and homothetic can be represented by a quantitative utility function and unique bias. This bias may favor or disfavor the preference for an object. In the first case, preferences are complete but not transitive and an object may be preferred even when its utility is lower. In the second case, preferences are asymmetric and transitive but not negatively transitive and it may not be sufficient for an object to have a greater utility for be preferred. In this manner, the bias reflects the extent to which preferences depart from the maximization of a utility function.

Do market conditions affect preferences? Evidence from experimental markets with excess supply and excess demand

We study whether people's preferences in an unbalanced market are affected by whether they are on the excess supply side or the excess demand side of the market. Our analysis is based on the comparison of behavior between two types of experimental gift exchange markets, which vary only with respect to whether first or second movers are on the long side of the market. The direction of market imbalance could influence subjects' motivation, as second movers, workers, might react differently to favorable actions by first movers, firms, in the two cases. Our data show strong deviations from the standard game-theoretic prediction. However, we only find secondary treatment effects. First movers are not more generous when they are in excess supply and second movers do not respond less favorably when they are in excess demand. Competition has only minor psychological effects in our data.

General preferences for consumption goods in the random matching model of commodity money

This paper generalizes the original random matching model of money byKiyotaki and Wright (1989) (KW) in two aspects: first, the economy ischaracterized by an arbitrary distribution of agents who specialize in producing aparticular consumption good; and second, these agents have preferences suchthat they want to consume any good with some probability. The resultsdepend crucially on the size of the fraction of producers of each goodand the probability with which different agents want to consume eachgood. KW and other related models are shown to be parameterizations ofthis more general one.

Are Americans' musical preferences more omnivores today?

Although we found a general trend favouring the omnivorousness thesis, as soon as we adjusted it to a set of structural factors and consumers tastes it was clear that this was caused by elitist inclusive omnivores who had increased the scope of their tastes. In general, younger cohorts were becoming less omnivorous, nevertheless, they were also becoming more educated and had greater to higher levels of inc ome, making the youth moreomnivorous. As expected, upscale consumers set limits on their popular taste: musicalgenres, whose audiences had educational levels below the mean profile were less preferredby upscale respondents. In spite of this, as time passed, some popular brows gained socialstatus.

Insect feeding preferences on Piperaceae species observed in São Paulo city, Brazil

Piperaceae species have been placed among the basal angiosperm and are adapted to a variety of habitats including moist forests, secondary vegetation and dry high lands. The major anatomical/morphology features are of small trees, vines, and shrubs for Piper species, while the epiphytic and succulent characteristics are predominant forms among Peperomia species. Their secondary chemistry can be mostly represented by amides, phenylpropanoids/lignoids, and chromenes in addition to a phletoria of biosynthetically mixed-origin secondary compounds. Although several amides and lignans are known as insecticides, several phytophagous insects, among which some considered pests of economic importance, have been observed feeding vigorously on Piperaceae species. Herein we describe the feeding preferences of fourteen phytophagous species of Coleoptera, Lepidoptera and Hemiptera over approximately fifty Piperaceae species observed in São Paulo, SP, Brazil, in a long-term basis.

Voting with preferences over margins of victory

This paper analyzes a two-alternative voting model with the distinctive feature that voters have preferences over margins of victory. We study voting contests with a finite as well as an infinite number of voters, and with and without mandatory voting. The main result of the paper is the existence and characterization of a unique equilibrium outcome in all those situations. At equilibrium, voters who prefer a larger support for one of the alternatives vote for such alternative.The model also provides a formal argument for the conditional sincerity voting condition in Alesina and Rosenthal (1995) and the benefit of voting function in Llavador (2006). Finally, we offer new insights on explaining why some citizens may vote strategically for an alternative different from the one declared as the most preferred.

Social preferences and skill segregation

This paper shows that models where preferences of individuals dependnot only on their allocations, but also on the well-being of otherpersons, can produce both large and testable effects. We study theallocation of workers with heterogeneous productivities to firms. Weshow that even small deviations from purely selfish preferences leadsto widespread workplace skill segregation. That is, workers ofdifferent abilities tend to work in di¤erent firms, as long as theycare somewhat more about the utilities of workers who are close .

Social preferences: Some simple tests and a new model

Departures from pure self interest in economic experiments have recently inspired models of "social preferences". We conduct experiments on simple two-person and three-person games with binary choices that test these theories more directly than the array of games conventionally considered. Our experiments show strong support for the prevalence of "quasi-maximin" preferences: People sacrifice to increase the payoffs for all recipients, but especially for the lowest-payoff recipients. People are also motivated by reciprocity: While people are reluctant to sacrifice to reciprocate good or bad behavior beyond what they would sacrifice for neutral parties, they withdraw willingness to sacrifice to achieve a fair outcome when others are themselves unwilling to sacrifice. Some participants are averse to getting different payoffs than others, but based on our experiments and reinterpretation of previous experiments we argue that behavior that has been presented as "difference aversion" in recent papers is actually a combination of reciprocal and quasi-maximin motivations. We formulate a model in which each player is willing to sacrifice to allocate the quasi-maximin allocation only to those players also believed to be pursuing the quasi-maximin allocation, and may sacrifice to punish unfair players.

The gain-loss asymmetry and single-self preferences

Kahneman and Tversky asserted a fundamental asymmetry between gains and losses, namely a reflection effect which occurs when an individual prefers a sure gain of $ pz to anuncertain gain of $ z with probability p, while preferring an uncertain loss of $z with probability p to a certain loss of $ pz.We focus on this class of choices (actuarially fair), and explore the extent to which thereflection effect, understood as occurring at a range of wealth levels, is compatible with single-self preferences.We decompose the reflection effect into two components, a probability switch effect,which is compatible with single-self preferences, and a translation effect, which is not. To argue the first point, we analyze two classes of single-self, nonexpected utility preferences, which we label homothetic and weakly homothetic. In both cases, we characterize the switch effect as well as the dependence of risk attitudes on wealth.We also discuss two types of utility functions of a form reminiscent of expected utility but with distorted probabilities. Type I always distorts the probability of the worst outcome downwards, yielding attraction to small risks for all probabilities. Type II distorts low probabilities upwards, and high probabilities downwards, implying risk aversion when the probability of the worst outcome is low. By combining homothetic or weak homothetic preferences with Type I or Type II distortion functions, we present four explicit examples: All four display a switch effect and, hence, a form of reflection effect consistent a single self preferences.

Optimal contracts, adverse selection and social preferences: An experiment

It has long been standard in agency theory to search for incentive-compatible mechanisms on the assumption that people care only about their own material wealth. However, this assumption is clearly refuted by numerous experiments, and we feel that it may be useful to consider nonpecuniary utility in mechanism design and contract theory. Accordingly, we devise an experiment to explore optimal contracts in an adverse-selection context. A principal proposes one of three contract menus, each of which offers a choice of two incentive-compatible contracts, to two agents whose types are unknown to the principal. The agents know the set of possible menus, and choose to either accept one of the two contracts offered in the proposed menu or to reject the menu altogether; a rejection by either agent leads to lower (and equal) reservation payoffs for all parties. While all three possible menus favor the principal, they do so to varying degrees. We observe numerous rejections of the more lopsided menus, and approach an equilibrium where one of the more equitable contract menus (which one depends on the reservation payoffs) is proposed and agents accept a contract, selecting actions according to their types. Behavior is largely consistent with all recent models of social preferences, strongly suggesting there is value in considering nonpecuniary utility in agency theory.

Biased quantitative measurement of interval ordered homothetic preferences

We represent interval ordered homothetic preferences with a quantitative homothetic utility function and a multiplicative bias. When preferences are weakly ordered (i.e. when indifference is transitive), such a bias equals 1. When indifference is intransitive, the biasing factor is a positive function smaller than 1 and measures a threshold of indifference. We show that the bias is constant if and only if preferences are semiordered, and we identify conditions ensuring a linear utility function. We illustrate our approach with indifference sets on a two dimensional commodity space.

Feeding and oviposition preferences of Ctenarytaina spatulata Taylor (Hemiptera, Psyllidae) for Eucalyptus spp. and other Myrtaceae in Brazil

Feeding and oviposition preferences of Ctenarytaina spatulata Taylor (Hemiptera, Psyllidae) for Eucalyptus spp. and other Myrtaceae in Brazil. The Australian psyllid, Ctenarytaina spatulata Taylor (Hemiptera, Psyllidae), was first detected in Brazil in 1994, where it was found on drought-affected shoots of Eucalyptus grandis in a plantation located in the northern part of Paraná State. The oviposition and feeding preferences of this psyllid were examined on 19 Eucalyptus species, one Eucalyptus hybrid (Cambiju), three Corymbia species and four native Myrtaceae species (Hexaclames edulis, Marlieria edulis, Plinia trunciflora, and Psydium sp.) under greenhouse conditions. The largest populations of C. spatulata were found on E. robusta and E. pellita, while sizeable infestations were also found on E. urophylla, E. grandis, and the Cambiju hybrid. The plants with the greatest symptoms of damage were E. grandis and E. resinifera. Eucalyptus cinerea, E. benthamii, E. pilularis, and E. dunnii were not infested and E. cloeziana was minimally infested. Among the Corymbia species, the number of eggs of C. spatulata was very low on C. citriodora and C. torelliana. No eggs and nymphs of C. spatulata were found on native Brazilian Myrtaceae. The number of eggs on plants was highly correlated with the subsequent levels of nymphs, suggesting that egg counts can be used as a viable monitoring tool to assist with the integrated management of this pest.

Systematic Assessment of Factors Influencing Preferences of Crohn's Disease Patients in Selecting an Anti-TNF agent (CHOOSE TNF TRIAL)

Background a nd A ims: I nfliximab (IFX), adalimumab (ADA)and certolizumab pegol (CZP) have similar efficacy for inductionand maintenance of clinical response and remission in Crohn'sdisease (CD). Given the comparable nature of t hese drugs,patients' p references m ay i nfluence the choice o f the product.Goal: to identify factors contributing to CD patients' decision inselecting one anti-TNF agent over the others.Methods: A p rospectdive s urvey was performed a mong a nti-TNF-naïve CD patients. Prior to completion of a questionnaire,patients were provided with a description of the three anti-TNFagents f ocusing on indications, route of administration, s ideeffects, and scientific evidence of efficacy and safety.Results: One hundred patients (47f/53m, mean age 45±16yrs)completed the questionnaire. Disease location was ileal, colonicand ileocolonic in 33%, 40% and 27% of patients, respectively.Thirty-six percent preferred ADA as medication of choice, while28% and 2 5% p referred CZP and IFX; 11% were u ndecided.Patients' decision in selecting an anti-TNF drug was influencedby t he following f actors: side effects ( 76%), p hysician'srecommendation (66%), route of administration (54%), efficacydata (52%), time required for therapy administration (27%),recommendations by other CD patients (21%) and interactionswith other medications (12%).Conclusions: T he majority of p atients p referred anti-TNFmedications t hat were a dministered by s ubcutaneous i njectionrather t han b y intravenous i nfusion. Side effect profile andphysicians' r ecommendation are t wo m ajor factors influencingthe patients' s election of a specific anti-TNF d rug. Patients'concerns about safety and lifestyle habits should be taken intoaccount when prescribing anti-TNF drugs.