The Role of Consciousness in Memory

Conscious events interact with memory systems in learning, rehearsal and retrieval (Ebbinghaus 1885/1964; Tulving 1985). Here we present hypotheses that arise from the IDA computional model (Franklin, Kelemen and McCauley 1998; Franklin 2001b) of global workspace theory (Baars 1988, 2002). Our primary tool for this exploration is a flexible cognitive cycle employed by the IDA computational model and hypothesized to be a basic element of human cognitive processing. Since cognitive cycles are hypothesized to occur five to ten times a second and include interaction between conscious contents and several of the memory systems, they provide the means for an exceptionally fine-grained analysis of various cognitive tasks. We apply this tool to the small effect size of subliminal learning compared to supraliminal learning, to process dissociation, to implicit learning, to recognition vs. recall, and to the availability heuristic in recall. The IDA model elucidates the role of consciousness in the updating of perceptual memory, transient episodic memory, and procedural memory. In most cases, memory is hypothesized to interact with conscious events for its normal functioning. The methodology of the paper is unusual in that the hypotheses and explanations presented are derived from an empirically based, but broad and qualitative computational model of human cognition.

Exploring "fringe" consciousness: the subjective experience of perceptual fluency and its objective bases

Perceptual fluency is the subjective experience of ease with which an incoming stimulus is processed. Although perceptual fluency is assessed by speed of processing, it remains unclear how objective speed is related to subjective experiences of fluency. We present evidence that speed at different stages of the perceptual process contributes to perceptual fluency. In an experiment, figure-ground contrast influenced detection of briefly presented words, but not their identification at longer exposure durations. Conversely, font in which the word was written influenced identification, but not detection. Both contrast and font influenced subjective fluency. These findings suggest that speed of processing at different stages condensed into a unified subjective experience of perceptual fluency.

Change in perfusion, hallucinations and fluctuations in consciousness in dementia with Lewy bodies.

Fluctuations in consciousness and visual hallucinations are common neuropsychiatric features of dementia with Lewy bodies and Parkinson's disease dementia. To investigate potential neural correlates, we compared how changes in brain perfusion over a 1-year period were related to changes in the severity of these key clinical features. We recruited 29 subjects with either Parkinson's disease with dementia (15 subjects) or dementia with Lewy bodies (14 subjects). Cerebral perfusion was measured using HMPAO SPECT at baseline, and repeated 1 year later. The presence of hallucinations (Neuropsychiatric Inventory), severity of fluctuations in consciousness (fluctuation assessment scale) and cognitive ability (CAMCOG) were assessed at both time points. After controlling for changes in cognitive ability and effect of cholinesterase medication, we found a significant correlation between an increase in perfusion in midline posterior cingulate and decrease in hallucination severity. There was also a significant correlation between increased fluctuations of consciousness and increased thalamic and decreased inferior occipital perfusion. We have identified important neural correlates of key clinical features in Lewy body dementia and postulate that the associations can be understood through the influence of the cholinergic system on attention.

Integrating Events Across Levels of Consciousness

Our knowledge grows as we integrate events experienced at different points in time. We may or may not become aware of events, their integration, and their impact on our knowledge and decisions. But can we mentally integrate two events, if they are experienced at different time points and at different levels of consciousness? In this study, an event consisted of the presentation of two unrelated words. In the stream of events, half of events shared one component ("tree desk" … "desk fish") to facilitate event integration. We manipulated the amount of time and trials that separated two corresponding events. The contents of one event were presented subliminally (invisible) and the contents of the corresponding overlapping event supraliminally (visible). Hence, event integration required the binding of contents between consciousness levels and between time points. At the final test of integration, participants judged whether two supraliminal test words ("tree fish") fit together semantically or not. Unbeknown to participants, half of test words were episodically related through an overlap ("desk"; experimental condition) and half were not (control condition). Participants judged episodically related test words to be closer semantically than unrelated test words. This subjective decrease in the semantic distance between test words was both independent of whether the invisible event was encoded first or second in order and independent of the number of trials and the time that separated two corresponding events. Hence, conscious and unconscious memories were mentally integrated into a linked mnemonic representation.

Control of human behavior, mental processes and consciousness : essays in honor of the 60th birthday of August Flammer

In this book, an international group of leading scientists present perspectives on the control of human behavior, awareness, consciousness, and the meaning and function of perceived control or self-efficacy in people's lives. The book breaks down the barriers between subdisciplines, and thus constitutes an occasion to reflect on various facets of control in human life. Each expert reviews his or her field through the lens of perceived control and shows how these insights can be applied in practice.

Transient loss of consciousness and syncope

Syncope describes a sudden and brief transient loss of consciousness (TLOC) with postural failure due to cerebral global hypoperfusion. The term TLOC is used when the cause is either unrelated to cerebral hypoperfusion or is unknown. The most common causes of syncopal TLOC include: (1) cardiogenic syncope (cardiac arrhythmias, structural cardiac diseases, others); (2) orthostatic hypotension (due to drugs, hypovolemia, primary or secondary autonomic failure, others); (3) neurally mediated syncope (cardioinhibitory, vasodepressor, and mixed forms). Rarely neurologic disorders (such as epilepsy, transient ischemic attacks, and the subclavian steal syndrome) can lead to cerebal hypoperfusion and syncope. Nonsyncopal TLOC may be due to neurologic (epilepsy, sleep attacks, and other states with fluctuating vigilance), medical (hypoglycemia, drugs), psychiatric, or post-traumatic disorders. Basic diagnostic workup of TLOC includes a thorough history and physical examination, and a 12-lead electrocardiogram (ECG). Blood testing, electroencephalogram (EEG), magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) of the brain, echocardiography, head-up tilt test, carotid sinus massage, Holter monitoring, and loop recorders should be obtained only in specific contexts. Management strategies involve pharmacologic and nonpharmacologic interventions, and cardiac pacing.