Variació segons edat i sexe del component força de l'escala de Constant de valoració de la funció de l’espatlla

Un dels instruments més utilitzats per a mesurar la funció de l’espatlla és el conegut com a Constant Score on una quarta part del valor total de la valoració funcional de l’espatlla correspon a la força d’aquesta regió anatòmica. En el disseny original del Constant Score no es tingueren en compte les possibles variacions dels valors normals de força en funció de l’edat o del sexe. Aquesta variació no ha estat mai correctament establerta. Aquest treball pretén establir l’existència de diferències en la força de l’espatlla entre diferents grups d’edat i entre sexes.

Large-scale analysis of orthologs and paralogs under covarion-like and constant-but-different models of amino acid evolution.

Functional divergence between homologous proteins is expected to affect amino acid sequences in two main ways, which can be considered as proxies of biochemical divergence: a "covarion-like" pattern of correlated changes in evolutionary rates, and switches in conserved residues ("conserved but different"). Although these patterns have been used in case studies, a large-scale analysis is needed to estimate their frequency and distribution. We use a phylogenomic framework of animal genes to answer three questions: 1) What is the prevalence of such patterns? 2) Can we link such patterns at the amino acid level with selection inferred at the codon level? 3) Are patterns different between paralogs and orthologs? We find that covarion-like patterns are more frequently detected than "constant but different," but that only the latter are correlated with signal for positive selection. Finally, there is no obvious difference in patterns between orthologs and paralogs.

Adverse selection, moral hazard, and outlier payment policy

In this article, we analyze the rationale for introducing outlier payments into a prospective payment system for hospitals under adverse selection and moral hazard. The payer has only two instruments: a fixed price for patients whose treatment cost is below a threshold and a cost-sharing rule for outlier patients. We show that a fixed-price policy is optimal when the hospital is sufficiently benevolent. When the hospital is weakly benevolent, a mixed policy solving a trade-off between rent extraction, efficiency, and dumping deterrence must be preferred. We show how the optimal combination of fixed price and partially cost-based payment depends on the degree of benevolence of the hospital, the social cost of public funds, and the distribution of patients severity. [Authors]