985 resultados para Board of trade
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State University Audit Report
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Annual Report of the Iowa Board of Nursing. Includes changes to rules,legislation and procedure during fiscal year 2004, as well as statistics pertaining to all aspects of board business: basic education, continuing education, enforcement, administration, financial report, and nursing demographics.
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Annual report of the Iowa Board of Nursing. Includes information on legislation, rule changes, and statistics related to all aspects of board business: education, continuing education, enforcement, administrative changes, financial report and general nursing demographics.
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Agency Performance Report
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In the last 20 years, wage inequality has increased in many developing countries. Most research on this topic focuses on two alternative causes: trade or skill-biased technical change. Several empirical studies in both developed and developing countries document increases in skill intensity within all sectors, favoring the technological change explanation over trade. Instead, I present and test a model where bilateral trade liberalization increases exporting revenues inducing more firms to enter the export market and to adopt skilled-biased new technologies. I find that the increase in the relative demand of skilled labor does not come from labor reallocation across sectors or firms but from skill upgrading within firms. Firms that upgrade technology faster also upgrade skill faster. Finally, firms entering the export market after liberalization become more skill and technology-intensive than non exporters.
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State Audit Reports
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Audit report on the Iowa Board of Parole for the year ended June 30, 2006
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In this paper I study the effects of a regional free trade agreement on the demand for skill.I start by documenting a series of facts to shed light on the determinants of a steep increasein the relative demand of skilled labor in a panel of Argentinean industrial firms covering thetrade liberalization period. First, this is not explained by labor reallocation across industriesor firms but by skill upgrading within firms. Second, exporters upgrade skill faster than nonexporters. Third, firms upgrading skill also upgrade technology. These findings are consistentwith a model where a reduction in trading partner s tariffs induces the most productive firms(exporters) to adopt skill-intensive production technologies. Indeed, I find that the reduction inBrazil s tariffs induces the most productive Argentinean firms to upgrade skill, while the leastproductive ones downgrade. One third of the increase in the relative demand for skill can beattributed to the reduction in Brazil s tariffs.
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Report of Recommendations to the Board of Regents for the year ended June 30, 2006
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In a world with two countries which differ in size, we study theimpact of (the speed of) trade liberalization on firms' profitsand total welfare of the countries involved. Firms correctlyanticipate the pace of trade liberalization and take it intoaccount when deciding on their product choices, which areendogenously determined at the beginning of the game. Competitionin the marketplace then occurs either on quantities or on prices.As long as the autarkic phase continues, local firms are nationalmonopolists. When trade liberalization occurs, firms compete in aninternational duopoly. We analyze trade effects by using twodifferent models of product differentiation. Across all thespecifications adopted (and independently of the price v. quantitycompetition hypothesis), total welfare always unambiguously riseswith the speed of trade liberalization: Possible losses by firmsare always outweighed by consumers' gains, which come under theform of lower prices, enlarged variety of higher average qualitiesavailable. The effect on profits depends on the type of industryanalyzed. Two results in particular seem to be worth of mention.With vertical product differentiation and fixed costs of qualityimprovements, the expected size of the market faced by the firmsdetermines the incentive to invest in quality. The longer the periodof autarky, the lower the possibility that the firm from the smallcountry would be producing the high quality and be the leader in theinternational market when it opens. On the contrary, when trade opensimmediately, national markets do not play any role and firms fromdifferent countries have the same opportunity to become the leader.Hence, immediate trade liberalization might be in the interest ofproducers in the small country. In general, the lower the size of thesmall country, the more likely its firm will gain from tradeliberalization. Losses from the small country firm can arise when itis relegated to low quality good production and the domestic marketsize is not very small. With horizontal product differentiation (thehomogeneous good case being a limit case of it when costs ofdifferentiation tend to infinity), investments in differentiationbenefit both firms in equal manner. Firms from the small country do notrun the risk of being relegated to a lower competitive position undertrade. As a result, they would never lose from it. Instead, firms fromthe large country may still incur losses from the opening of trade whenthe market expansion effect is low (i.e. when the country is very largerelative to the other).
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This paper investigates the relationship between trade openness and the size of government, both theoretically and empirically. We show that openness can increase the size of governments through two channels: (1) a terms of trade externality, whereby trade lowers the domestic cost of taxation and (2) the demand for insurance, whereby trade raises risk and public transfers. We provide a unified framework for studying and testing these two mechanisms. First, we show how their relative strength depends on a key parameter, the elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods. Second, while the terms of trade externality leads to inefficiently large governments, the increase in public spending due to the demand for insurance is optimal. We show that large volumes of trade may result in welfare losses if the terms of trade externality is strong enough while small volumes of trade are always beneficial. Third, we provide new evidence on the positive association between openness and the size of government and test whether it is consistent with the terms of trade externality or the demand for insurance. Our findings suggest that the positive relationship is remarkably robust and that the terms of trade externality may be the driving force behind it, thus raising warnings that globalization may have led to inefficiently large governments.
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Report of the Board of Regents for the year ended June 30, 2007
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Agency Performance Plan, Iowa Board of Parole
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This report outlines the strategic plan for Strategic Plan of the Board of Regents, goals and mission.