After the war, a southern tour : May 1, 1865, to May 1, 1866, /

Mode of access: Internet.

When and where we met each other on shore and afloat : battles, engagements, actions, skirmishes, and expeditions during the Civil War, 1861-1866, to which is added concise data concerning the army corps and legends of the army corps badges /

Mode of access: Internet.

Cullings from the confederacy. A collection of southern poems, original and others, popular during the war between the states, and incidents and facts worth recalling. 1862-1866. Including the doggerel of the camp, as well as tender tribute to the dead.

Mode of access: Internet.

After the war: a southern tour. May 1, 1865, to May 1, 1866,

Mode of access: Internet.

Five years in Texas; or, What you did not hear during the war from January 1861 to January 1866. A narrative of his travels, experiences, and observations, in Texas and Mexico.

Mode of access: Internet.

Otto Gersuny on horseback in uniform as a physician for the Austro-Hungarian army.

Otto Gersuny graduated with a degree in medicine from the University of Vienna in June 1914. He attributed his being a doctor to his survival of World War I.

Max Jacobsen Collection 1803-1894

Photocopies of documents: on the Schutzjude Moses Jacob during the Napoleonic Wars (1803-1813); other documents relating to Jewish life in Hamburg; graduating diploma from "Hoehere Buergerschule" (1866); excerpt from letter of Louis Jacobsen to his son living in Leedsat the occasion of the outbreak of the Prussian French War (1870); letter of G. Roemer to Louis Jacobsen (1866) after he was refused the marriage with Emilie Jacobsen; partial translation of will of Nathan Joseph living in Wittingen (1844); excerpt from letter of Emilie Heine to her son Ludwig who is a first-year medical student in Munich (1894).

Es war einmal 1882-1902

Childhood in Berlin; cultural life in fin-de-siecle Berlin; voyages and travels; marriage with physician Ernst Gustav Levin; contains newspaper clippings on author's mother, the social worker Hermine Lesser, copies of letter by the author from 1942, poems by Ernst Ludwig Levin

Broadside reporting the Fenian Invasion of Canada, June 2, 1866

The Fenians were a group intent on securing Irish independence from England. The movement had its origins in Ireland in1857, under the leadership of James Stephens, with the assistance of John O'Mahony, an American who had raised funds for the cause. The American branch of this movement was especially successful, having raised $500 000 and enlisting about 10 000 American Civil War veterans. The group split into two separate factions, one desiring an invasion of Canada and the other preferring an uprising in Ireland. It soon became apparent that an uprising in Ireland was not imminent, and a decision was made to invade Canada. In April, 1866, a raid was launched against New Brunswick. It proved unsuccessful, and another raid was attempted on June 1, 1866, this time in Ridgeway, near Fort Erie, Ontario. The Canadian militiamen were defeated, but the Fenians subsequently withdrew. A third incident occurred on June 7, this time at Missisquoi Bay in Quebec, when the Fenians crossed the border, remained there for 2 days, and withdrew. A failed uprising in Ireland in 1867 signaled the demise of the movement. The Fenian threat helped to promote a sense of union among Canadians and provided an incentive for Confederation.

Broadside reporting the Fenian Invasion of Canada, June 2, 1866

The Fenians were a group intent on securing Irish independence from England. The movement had its origins in Ireland in1857, under the leadership of James Stephens, with the assistance of John O'Mahony, an American who had raised funds for the cause. The American branch of this movement was especially successful, having raised $500 000 and enlisting about 10 000 American Civil War veterans. The group split into two separate factions, one desiring an invasion of Canada and the other preferring an uprising in Ireland. It soon became apparent that an uprising in Ireland was not imminent, and a decision was made to invade Canada. In April, 1866, a raid was launched against New Brunswick. It proved unsuccessful, and another raid was attempted on June 1, 1866, this time in Ridgeway, near Fort Erie, Ontario. The Canadian militiamen were defeated, but the Fenians subsequently withdrew. A third incident occurred on June 7, this time at Missisquoi Bay in Quebec, when the Fenians crossed the border, remained there for 2 days, and withdrew. A failed uprising in Ireland in 1867 signaled the demise of the movement. The Fenian threat helped to promote a sense of union among Canadians and provided an incentive for Confederation.

Fenian Raid Broadside collection, [1866]

The Fenians were a group intent on securing Irish independence from England. The movement had its origins in Ireland in1857, under the leadership of James Stephens, with the assistance of John O'Mahony, an American who had raised funds for the cause. The American branch of this movement was especially successful, having raised $500 000 and enlisting about 10 000 American Civil War veterans. The group split into two separate factions, one desiring an invasion of Canada and the other preferring an uprising in Ireland. It soon became apparent that an uprising in Ireland was not imminent, and a decision was made to invade Canada. In April, 1866, a raid was launched against New Brunswick. It proved unsuccessful, and another raid was attempted on June 1, 1866, this time in Ridgeway, near Fort Erie, Ontario. The Canadian militiamen were defeated, but the Fenians subsequently withdrew. A third incident occurred on June 7, this time at Missisquoi Bay in Quebec, when the Fenians crossed the border, remained there for 2 days, and withdrew. A failed uprising in Ireland in 1867 signaled the demise of the movement. The Fenian threat helped to promote a sense of union among Canadians and provided an incentive for Confederation.

Does just war theory need to get with the times?

La théorie de la guerre juste a fournit les principes qui forment la base de nos intuitions concernant l’éthique de la guerre pendant plus de milles ans. Cependant, la nature de la guerre a changé drastiquement dans les derniers 50 ans. Avec les avancés technologiques, tous les aspects de la guerre, du champ de bataille aux armes utilisées, sont aujourd’hui très différents. Ce qui est proposé dans ce texte est que les principes de jus in bello sont malgré tout encore adéquats pour les guerres contemporaines. Spécifiquement, en utilisant une analyse historique, ce texte argumentera contre la condition de l’urgence suprême de Michael Walzer pour proposer une approche qui laisse les principes de bases du jus in bello intactes. Ce texte suggère que les théoriciens de la guerre juste se penchent sur la question des armes prohibées pour avoir un impacte positif dans le domaine de l’éthique de la guerre.

The great asymmetry : America's closest allies in times of war

This dissertation focuses on military cooperation between the United States and its special allies. It argues that alliance expectations determine the level of military cooperation, while two intervening variables - the level of government cohesion and military capabilities - determine its implementation. This study also shows how secondary states deploy strategies to overcome power asymmetries through bilateral concessions, international organizations and by appealing to principle. The focus of the research is on special allies, as they have the most to gain or lose by going along with American plans. My contention is that secondary allies can rarely influence the dominant ally decisively, but they can act autonomously and resist to pressures exerted by the stronger alliance partner. The argument builds on three central claims. First, power asymmetries between allies translate into different assessments of international threats. Second, when disagreements over threats arise, the outcome of intra-alliance bargaining is not necessarily dictated by the preferences of the stronger power. Third, secondary states, as opposed to the dominant partner, face unique constraints when facing major foreign policy decisions, i.e. they face a trade-off between establishing a credible reputation as an alliance partner in a politically feasible way while minimizing domestic audience costs. To examine the theoretical puzzle presented by asymmetric military cooperation, I introduce a causal explanation that builds on neoclassical realism, to zone in on the interaction between systemic and domestic variables. My research makes a contribution to alliance theory and foreign policy decision-making by studying how special allies respond to American decisions in times of threat and how systemic constraints are channeled through state-level variables. To investigate the causal link between threat perception, alliance expectations and domestic constraints, this study relies on the method of structured focused comparison with three detailed case studies. The focus is on the initial decision made by special allies regarding whether or not to participle in joint mobilization with the United States. The decision-making process is presented from the perspective of secondary allied states and measures the explanatory factors that motivated the decision on military cooperation. The case studies are the UK, Canada and Australia’s response to the war in Afghanistan and the war in Iraq during the period of 2001 to 2003.

The DPRK in China's post-cold war foreign policy - a neoclassical realist analysis

Avec l’échec des négociations entre les États-Unis et la Corée du Nord, menées depuis le début des années 1990, sur la question du nucléaire, le problème est devenu graduellement l’affaire des pays voisins, tous soucieux de l’avenir de la région du sud-est asiatique. Présentée comme le seul allié de la Corée du Nord, la China a été invitée à participer à des négociations à trois, à quatre (1997-1998), et à six (2003-2007), dans l’espoir de faire entendre raison au régime isolé, mais jusqu’à maintenant, aucune des tentatives n’est parvenue à satisfaire chacun des membres à la table. Alors que la tension monte et que la politique américaine se fait de moins en moins flexible, la Chine quant à elle, continue d’encourager le retour des négociations à six (Six-Party Talks) dans l’optique de dénucléariser la péninsule coréenne, tout en travaillant à maintenir ses liens avec la Corée du Nord. Le fil conducteur de cette présente recherche est d’abord d’essayer de comprendre pourquoi la Chine continue de soutenir la Corée du Nord, fournissant dons alimentaires et financiers. L’idée est donc d’analyser, selon les principes du réalisme néoclassique, la politique étrangère de la Chine. L’hypothèse principale de cette théorie renvoie à l’idée que la distribution du pouvoir dans le système international influence la politique étrangère des États, mais que des variables au niveau de l’état et/ou de l’individu interviennent dans la formulation et l’application de celle-ci. Il est proposé ici que le lien entre l’unipolarité du système international et la politique nord-coréenne de la Chine, est façonné par des variables intermédiaires telles que : a) la perception des leaders de la distribution du pouvoir et de leur place dans le système international; b) l’idéologie du régime politique, et; c) le type d’unité responsable de la prise de décision en politique étrangère. L’analyse de chacune des variables permettra de faire la lumière sur les intérêts politiques et économiques de la Chine dans l’entretien de cette relation avec la Corée du Nord.