Theology and politics in Richard Hooker's thought

Although Richard Hooker’s private attitudes were clericalist and authoritarian, his constitutional theory subordinated clergymen to laymen and monarchy to parliamentary statute. This article explains why his political ideas were nonetheless appropriate to his presumed religious purposes. It notes a very intimate connection between his teleological conception of a law and his hostility towards conventional high Calvinist ideas about predestination. The most significant anomaly within his broadly Aristotelian world-view was his belief that politics is nothing but a means to cope with sin. This too can be linked to his religious ends, but it creates an ambiguity that made his doctrines usable by Locke.

Rhetoric in international standard setting process: constructing accounting reality

The paper seeks to explore in depth the ways in which rhetorical strategies are employed in the international accounting standard setting process. The study proposes that rather than simply detailing new accounting requirements, the texts and drafts of accounting standards are artefacts, i.e. deliberately and carefully crafted products, that construct, persuade and encourage certain beliefs and behaviours. The persuasive and constructive strategies are also employed by the constituents submitting comment letters on the regulatory proposals. Consequently, the international accounting standard setting process is an ‘interactive process of meaning making’ (Fairclough, 1989). The study regards accounting as a social construct based on intersubjectivity (Searle, 1995; Davidson, 1990, 1994) and posits language as a constitutive factor in the process (Saussure, 1916; Peirce, 1931-58). This approach to the use of language and the role of rhetoric as a persuasive tool to convince others to our perception of ‘accounting reality’ is supported by the sociological work of Bourdieu (1990, 1991). Bourdieu has drawn our attention to how language becomes used, controlled, reformed and reconstituted by the social agents for the purposes of establishing their dominance. In our study we explore in particular the joint IASB and FASB proposals and subsequent regulations on the scope of consolidation and relevant disclosures that address issues of off-balance sheet financing, a subject that is very timely and of great topical importance. The analysis has revealed sophisticated rhetorical devices used by both the Boards and by the lobbyists. These reflect Aristotelian ethos, pathos and logos. The research demonstrates that those using accounting standards as well as those reading comment letters on the proposals for new standards should be aware of the normative nature of these documents and the subjectivity inherent in the nature of the text.

Persuading the Public : A Linguistic Analysis of Barack Obama’s Speech on “Super Tuesday” 2008

This essay examines the persuasive side of language in a speech given by Senator Barack Obama on Super Tuesday in February 2008. It studies how Senator Obama utilizes language to convince and persuade his audience. This is done from an Aristotelian point of view, meaning that the study focuses foremost on how the senator’s word choices relate to Aristotle’s three means of persuasion, ethos, pathos and logos. Those basic guiding principles are relevant to use since Aristotle’s work on the subject of rhetoric is still today one of the most relevant works in that field. The analysis is basically performed through personal observations guided by previous studies, within the frame of Aristotelian rhetoric. The results show how Senator Obama enforces the three means of persuasion through language and how it can be considered persuasive. The study might add to rhetoric studies from a linguistic perspective since it reaches a better understanding of language used in the field of politics, where rhetoric is a prominent component.

Emotioner och värdegrundsarbete : Om lärare, fostran och elever i en mångkulturell skola

This thesis explores aspects of teachers’ obligation to implement and discuss what are referred to in the Swedish national school curricula as “fundamental values” (“värdegrunden” in Swedish). The aim is to describe and analyze dilemmas in interpretations of and teachers’ work with these fundamental values. Four questions are related to this aim. The first addresses difficulties discussed in conversations between seven upper secondary teachers, during nine meetings over the course of one year. In these conversations the teachers reflected upon how to interpret the fundamental values in relation to their daily practice. The second question focuses on the considerable diversity of Swedish schools and examines the work of the teachers through a perspective of intersectionality. The third question concerns how Martha Nussbaum’s theory of emotions as judgments of value could be used for an understanding of the identified dilemmas. The fourth question focuses on ways in which the participating teachers’ discussions may contribute to a wider discussion about possible aims and circumstances of teachers’ work with the fundamental values. Chapter 2 introduces the theoretical framework of the study, Martha Nussbaum’s (2001) ethical thinking on emotions as judgments of value. She argues that emotions have four common cognitive components. They have (1) external objects, and are directed towards these objects. They are (2) intentional, reflecting a person’s particular point of view, his or her special way of beholding the object, and (3) consist of judgments, i.e. views of how things in the world are. According to Nussbaum’s Aristotelian ethics, emotions also (4) mirror the individual’s vision of what a good human life is like, and the vulnerability of it. The concept of eudaimonia, a fulfilled or flourishing life, is central. Chapter 3 focuses on ideas of ethnicity, and on the specific obligation mentioned in the curriculum of counteracting xenophobia and intolerance in a multicultural society. Chapter 4 discusses various aspects of the teachers’ thoughts on religiosity within Swedish society (often depicted as one of most secular in the world) and within the educational system that is non-denominational. Chapter 5 draws attention to different ways in which the teachers view and teach pupils about sexual orientation. Chapter 6 presents conclusions on potential advantages of and challenges involved in Nussbaum’s Aristotelian theory of emotions, when applied to teachers’ views of and practical work with the fundamental values described in the curriculum. One advantage is that emotions may be intellectually scrutinized and morally assessed, on grounds that are known beforehand and discussed in a democratic process. The non-productive division between emotions, on the one hand, and intellectual and moral capabilities, on the other, is transcended by Nussbaum’s theory. An important challenge is to reflect upon when to discuss the cognitive content of pupils’ emotions, and when it is appropriate to state what is right or wrong, and try to influence pupils accordingly. Keywords: Emotions, vulnerability, values education, religious education, teaching, Martha Nussbaum, ethnicity, religion, sexual orientation.

Judgement, decision, and integrity

Although Aristotle did not mention it, integrity can be understood in an Aristotelian framework. Seeing it in these terms will show that it is an executive virtue which concerns the existential well being of an agent. This analysis is not offered as an exegesis of Aristotle's text, but as an attempt to use an Aristotelian framework to understand a virtue deemed important today. This account will have the benefit of solving some problems relating to motivational internalism and, as such, will contribute to that recent current of thought which has been highlighting the importance of virtue thinking in moral theory. I will distinguish moral judgement from decision and show that moral judgement is dependent upon virtue more strongly than it is upon impartial rationality. I will suggest that integrity is the virtue to which moral judgement gives expression and is the virtue which links judgement to decision so as to overcome akrasia.

As fire burns : functional work and praxis in ontology

The context: the historical and philosophical demise of the Marxist model of praxis as a unity of theory and practice organized by a Party in service of a Cause. The task: to remodel praxis by distinguishing it from functional work. The proving ground: the discourse of ontology. The thesis works through four types of ontology in its attempt to construct different ontological schemas for praxis and functional work. In the first three ontologies, Platonic, Aristotelian and relativist, ontological impasses occur in the accounts of the relation between one and the multiple, and of the existence of order. They prevent the successful construction of a schema for functional work. It is in the set-theory ontology of Alain Badiou that the means arise for the passage through these impasses and the definitive construction of distinct ontological schemas for functional work and praxis. This results in a new concept of praxis and a multiplication of its domains beyond politics to science, art and love

The purpose of the PhD : theorising the skills acquired by students

In the past decade there has been a marked push for the development of employability skills to be part of the PhD process. This push is generally by stakeholders from above and outside the PhD process, i.e. government and industry, who view skills as a summative product of the PhD. In contrast, our study interviewed stakeholders inside the PhD process – twenty final‐year, full‐time Australian PhD students – to provide a bottom‐up perspective into the skills question. Using grounded theory procedures we theorise the skills students develop during the PhD as a formative developmental process of acquiring intellectual virtues. Drawing on Aristotelian theory, we propose that theorising the PhD as a process of acquiring intellectual virtues offers a more robust and conceptually richer framework for understanding students’ development during the PhD than the instrumental focus on skills evident in contemporary debates.

Inventing (a) life: deconstruction and the praxis and poiesis of narrative

Deconstruction often sits awkwardly between the realm of literary studies and criticism, and philosophy proper. This paper explores the contribution that a deconstructive literacy might have for those engaged in writing narrative, as a practice and a product. Taking up Kristeva's reading of Arendt, and the Aristotelian categories of praxis and poiesis, it will be argued that the act of narrating life amounts to both the actual generation of the life it purports to describe, while also being a praxis in itself, one that need not produce anything, since the very act of engaging in/with it, leaves atraceless trace that itself is 'full of meaning'. Narrative, however, will not rest in either pole of Aristotle's binary structure. For Arendt, Kristeva will remind us, narrative is an activity that is very 'human', where we engender not just zoe, mere physiological life, but bios, a living that is not colonised by ends alone, and instead finding in itself a value, a fulfilment in its own process. Applied to the activity of story-making (autobiographical or otherwise), and also to pedagogical practice in the academy, this dual potential of narrative (at once to produce and to be an end unto itself) reframes the Beruf (calling) of creative writing. Deconstruction, in other words, assists us in appreciating the very ethical consequences of the labour of deciding where and when the story begins and ends, and who the protagonist is. Recalling us to the ontological implications of the thought of différance, this paper will attempt to demonstrate how the action of articulating the edges of story can be read as akin to that which turns the
featureless flux of time into bios, or human life that, according to Arendt, is what goes missing under totalitarianism.

Inaccurate autobiography – the ‘true-invention’ of a life

This paper takes the Aristotelian binary of praxis and poiesis and approaches the process of autobiography via its double lens. Drawing on a reading of Hannah Arendt done by Julia Kristeva, it considers the question of whether the activity (that is: praxis) of making-narrative might constitute an activity that is particularly ‘human’. It is framed by the playful and serious challenge offered by Derridean deconstruction to think two things at once, and to practice an inhabiting of binary ultimatums. Given this, it goes on to suggest that making in an autobiographical fashion, rather than involvinganythingprimarily representative or documentary, is more paradoxically akin to the invention of what is most true about that which we are in the habit of calling ‘our life’. Indeed, it can be argued that this praxisinvents that very ‘life’ – the latter being an entity or categorythat logically does not precede thesame writing that purports to describe it, but rather arises with its activity. This self-reflexivity (a manoeuvre that at once describes and invokes the very thing described) coincides with Derrida’s explication of invention’s mechanism.

The western humanist tradition

In this essay, I describe the development of at least three traditions of humanism: the Platonic, the Aristotelian, and the Promethean. These traditions have developed and intermingled so as to produce the complex and multifaceted face of humanism today. The first, Platonic tradition involves a turning away from the world in order to find wisdom and spirituality in a metaphysical realm. The Aristotelian tradition stresses the need to be at home in the world and happy in life even as we contemplate their unchangeable realities. It speaks of the perfectibility of human beings in muted tones and shows a reverence for the changeable world, as well as for the fragile, vulnerable, fallible, and mortal condition of being human. However, it is the Promethean tradition, with its celebration of science, progress, and technology, that has had the greatest effect upon modern civilization and spirituality. The culmination of these various streams of thought was the Enlightenment: a movement that its greatest philosopher, Immanuel Kant, interpreted as giving humanity permission, for the first time, to think for itself. But the Enlightenment leads to a disenchanted world in which spirituality seems to have no place. I argue that my subjectivity is a transcendent reality and that our very subjectivity becomes a real self and a social being insofar as it is drawn towards the Other. Accordingly, a humanist spirituality is possible in the form of reverence, love, and humility in the presence of transcendence. While religions give the names of their gods to this transcendence, humanism gives it other names: Subjectivity, the Other, Beauty, Goodness, and Truth.

Changing Aristotle's mind and world : critical notes on McDowell's Aristotle

Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics is central to John McDowell’s classic Mind and World. In Lectures IV and V of that work, McDowell makes three claims concerning Aristotle’s ethics: first, that Aristotle did not base his ethics on an externalist, naturalistic basis (including a theory of human nature); second, that attempts to read him as an ethical naturalist are a modern anachronism, generated by the supposed need to ground all viable philosophical claims on claims analogous to the natural sciences; and third, that a suitably construed Aristotelian conception of “second nature” can form the basis of a viable contemporary philosophy of mind, world, and normativity. This paper challenges each of these three claims. Aristotle’s ethics, we will claim alongside Terence Irwin, Bernard Williams, Philippa Foot, and many premodern commentators, is based in the kind of physics, metaphysics, and metaphysical biology that McDowell says it cannot be. Historically, we will argue that McDowell’s argument that Aristotle’s ethical reasoning is “autonomous” or “self-standing” is distinctly modern, citing evidence from the leading medieval commentators on the Nicomachean Ethics. The felt need to which McDowell responds, of reading Aristotle’s ethical or political thought as wholly non-metaphysical, arises from out of the successes of the natural sciences in the modern world, which he agrees discredit the Aristotelian, teleological account of nature. In the final part of the paper, we propose that McDowell’s account of normativity, rooted in the non-metaphysical “second nature” he reads into Aristotle, we will contend, is as it stands inescapably relativistic. On a different note, we need also to recognize, as McDowell does not, that this is a new Aristotle, one shaped by our requirements and space of reasons, not the mind and world of the Greek Philosopher himself.

Um estudo sobre as origens da Lógica Matemáitca

The present study has as objective to explaining about the origins of the mathematical logic. This has its beginning attributed to the autodidactic English mathematician George Boole (1815-1864), especially because his books The Mathematical Analysis of Logic (1847) and An Investigation of the Laws of Thought (1854) are recognized as the inaugural works of the referred branch. However, surprisingly, in the same time another mathematician called Augutus of Morgan (1806-1871) it also published a book, entitled Formal Logic (1847), in defense of the mathematic logic. Even so, times later on this same century, another work named Elements of Logic (1875) it appeared evidencing the Aristotelian logic with Richard Whately (1787-1863), considered the better Aristotelian logical of that time. This way, our research, permeated by the history of the mathematics, it intends to study the logic produced by these submerged personages in the golden age of the mathematics (19th century) to we compare the valid systems in referred period and we clarify the origins of the mathematical logic. For that we looked for to delineate the panorama historical wrapper of this study. We described, shortly, biographical considerations about these three representatives of the logic of the 19th century formed an alliance with the exhibition of their point of view as for the logic to the light of the works mentioned above. In this sense, we aspirated to present considerations about what effective Aristotelian´s logic existed in the period of Boole and De Morgan comparing it with the new emerging logic (the mathematical logic). Besides of this, before the textual analysis of the works mentioned above, we still looked for to confront the systems of Boole and De Morgan for we arrive to the reason because the Boole´s system was considered better and more efficient. Separate of this preponderance we longed to study the flaws verified in the logical system of Boole front to their contemporaries' production, verifying, for example, if they repeated or not. We concluded that the origins of the mathematical logic is in the works of logic of George Boole, because, in them, has the presentation of a new logic, matematizada for the laws of the thought similar to the one of the arithmetic, while De Morgan, in your work, expand the Aristotelian logic, but it was still arrested to her