Corporate governance, accountability and mechanisms of accountability: an overview

Purpose – This paper aims to review traditional corporate governance and accountability research, to suggest opportunities for future research in this field. Design/methodology/approach – The first part adopts an analytical frame of reference based on theory, accountability mechanisms, methodology, business sector/context, globalisation and time horizon. The second part of the paper locates the seven papers in the special issue in a framework of analysis showing how each one contributes to the field. The paper presents a frame of reference which may be used as a “roadmap” for researchers to navigate their way through the prior literature and to position their work on the frontiers of corporate governance research. The paper is primarily discursive and conceptual. Findings – The paper encourages broader approaches to corporate governance and accountability research beyond the traditional and primarily quantitative approaches of prior research. Broader theoretical perspectives, methodological approaches, accountability mechanism, sectors/contexts, globalisation, and time horizons are identified. Research limitations/implications – Greater use of qualitative research methods are suggested, which present challenges particularly of access to the “black box” of corporate boardrooms. Originality/value – Drawing on the analytical framework, and the papers in the special issue, the paper identifies opportunities for further research of accountability and corporate governance. Keywords Corporate governance, Management accountability, Research Paper type General review

Terrorism and electoral accountability: one strike, you're out!

We examine the relationship between terrorism and electoral accountability. We find that terror has a robust positive effect on the probability that the incumbent government is replaced. The magnitude of the effect increases with the severity of the terrorist attack.

Privatisation, empowerment and accountability: What are the policy implications for establishing effective farmer organisations?

Weak institutional development and information flows have constrained the extent to which the small-holder farming sector in developing countries can significantly drive growth and poverty reduction. Thisis despite widely implemented economic liberalisation policies focussing on market efficiency. Farmerorganisations are viewed as a potential means of addressing public and private institutional failure but thishas frequently been limited by inequalities in access to power and information. This article investigatestwo issues that have received little research attention to date: what role downward accountability plays inenabling farmer organisations to improve services and markets, and what influences the extent to whichdownward accountability is achieved. Kenya Tea Development Agency (KTDA), one of the largest farmerorganisations in the world (>400,000 farmers) is examined alongside wider literature. Mixed methodswere used including key informant interviews, and eight months of participant observation followedby a questionnaire survey. The article concludes that without effective downward accountability farmerorganisations can become characterised by institutions and mechanisms that favour elites, restrictedweak coordination and regulation, and manipulated information flows. This in turn reduces individuals’incentives to invest. If farmer organisations are to realise their potential as a means of enabling the small-holder sector to significantly contribute to economic growth and poverty reduction, policy and researchneeds to address key factors which influence accountability including: how to ensure initial processes information of farmer organisations establish appropriate structures and rules; strong state regulation toenhance corporate accountability; transparent information provision regarding actions of farmer organi-sation leaders; and the role independent non-government organisations can play. Consequently attentionneeds to focus on developing means of legitimising rights, building poor people’s capacity to challengeexclusion, and moving from rights to obligations regarding information provision.

Circles of support and accountability: criminal justice volunteers as the 'Deliberative public'

This paper provides a review of the role played by volunteers within one particular offender management and reintegration scheme in the United Kingdom. Circles of Support and Accountability (COSA) draw on the expertise of volunteer members of the public to create supportive monitoring frameworks around sex offenders following their release from prison. The paper presents evidence as to the motivations of these volunteers, and argues that they play a crucial role in the success of the scheme, as they provide an instrumentally-useful form of reintegrative social contact to a socially-excluded offender population, and perform a symbolically important role as representatives of the wider community in taking ownership of offender management practices on behalf of the wider society. This is particularly significant in grounding those processes in the communicative practices of the social sphere, providing powerful reasons for intervention that reinforce the work that COSA do.

When bookkeepers become beekeepers: why bee accountability

Accounting for biodiversity has received increasing attention from the academic accounting community in recent years. Despite a stream of research investigating the quality and quantity of biodiversity reporting in general, no academic research has focused on reporting related to one specific species. This paper explores the quality and quantity of corporate disclosures relating to bees. Society is becoming increasingly concerned about the accelerating fall in bee populations around the world. Colony Collapse Disorder has been spreading through global bee populations since 2006, decimating commercial hives. Concerns are fuelled by fears that pollinators may become extinct which would have dire consequences for the majority of world food production, leaving human pollination, at immense cost, the only alternative. On the basis of these fears, companies as well as other organisations, have started to establish programmes aimed at rejuvenating global bee populations. In this paper we explore the bee-related disclosures provided by a large selection of UK listed companies. We assess the extent to which companies believe they have a role to play in enhancing and protecting bee populations. Further we consider whether corporate accountability in this area derives solely from a business case or whether there is a deeper societal connection with bees as a species which is encouraging companies to protect their survival. The paper investigates the historical and philosophical connection between bees and human beings, for example the ways industrial production has been likened to honey production. We draw parallels between bees and human industrial organisation as well as between the role and responsibilities of the bookkeeper and the beekeeper.

Strengthening citizen agency and accountability through ICT

We investigated the role of Information and Communication Technologies (ICT, namely mobile phones) in support of citizen agency and its potential in calling authorities to account. We focused on Eastern Africa and we used a mixed methodology, which allowed us to explore the current uses of ICT to strengthen accountability and to forecast the growth of mobile phones' adaption in that region. Evidence from both analyses suggests that there are two main areas where citizen agency and ICT can reinforce each other in bottom–up and horizontal processes: participation and engagement of citizens, and the diffusion of information.

Risk-taking for others under accountability

We let subjects take risky decisions that affect themselves and a passive recipient. Adding a requirement to justify their choices significantly reduces loss aversion. This indicates that such an accountability mechanism may be effective at debiasing loss aversion in agency relations.

Accountability and ideology: when left looks right and right looks left

Abstract Managers face hard choices between process and outcome systems of accountability in evaluating employees, but little is known about how managers resolve them. Building on the premise that political ideologies serve as uncertainty-reducing heuristics, two studies of working managers show that: (1) conservatives prefer outcome accountability and liberals prefer process accountability in an unspecified policy domain; (2) this split becomes more pronounced in a controversial domain (public schools) in which the foreground value is educational efficiency but reverses direction in a controversial domain (affirmative action) in which the foreground value is demographic equality; (3) managers who discover employees have subverted their preferred system favor tinkering over switching to an alternative system; (4) but bipartisan consensus arises when managers have clear evidence about employee trustworthiness and the tightness of the causal links between employee effort and success. These findings shed light on ideological and contextual factors that shape preferences for accountability systems.

Separating real incentives and accountability

In experimental investigations of the effect of real incentives, accountability—the implicit or explicit expectation of a decision maker that she may have to justify her decisions in front of somebody else—is often confounded with the incentives themselves. This confounding of accountability with incentives makes causal attributions of any effects found problematic. We separate accountability and incentives, and find different effects. Accountability is found to reduce preference reversals between frames, for which incentives have no effect. Incentives on the other hand are found to reduce risk seeking for losses, where accountability has no effect. In a choice task between simple and compound events, accountability increases the preference for the simple event, while incentives have a weaker effect going in the opposite direction. It is thus shown that the confounding of accountability and incentives is relevant for studies on the effect of the latter, and that existing conclusions on the effect of incentives need to be reconsidered in light of this issue.

The effect of accountability on loss aversion.

This paper investigates the effect of accountability-the expectation on the side of the decision maker of having to justify his/her decisions to somebody else-on loss aversion. Loss aversion is commonly thought to be the strongest component of risk aversion. Accountability is found to reduce the bias of loss aversion. This effect is explained by the higher cognitive effort induced by accountability, which triggers a rational check on emotional reactions at the base of loss aversion, leading to a reduction of the latter. Connections to dual-processing models are discussed.

Reining in excessive risk-taking by executives: the effect of accountability

Performance-contingent compensation by means of stock options may induce risk-taking in agents that is excessive from the point of view of the company or the shareholders. We test whether increasing shareholder control may be an effective checking mechanism to rein in such excessive risk-taking. We thus tell one group of experimental CEOs that they may have to justify their decision-making processes in front of their shareholders. This indeed reduces risk-taking and increases the performance of the companies they manage. Implications are discussed.