Affiliation, equilibrium existence and the revenue ranking of auctions

We consider private value auctions where bidders’ types are dependent, a case usually treated by assuming affiliation. We show that affiliation is a restrictive assumption in three senses: topological, measure-theoretic and statistical (affiliation is a very restrictive characterization of positive dependence). We also show that affiliation’s main implications do not generalize for alternative definitions of positive dependence. From this, we propose new approaches to the problems of pure strategy equilibrium existence in first-price auctions (PSEE) and the characterization of the revenue ranking of auctions. For equilibrium existence, we slightly restrict the set of distributions considered, without loss of economic generality, and offer a complete characterization of PSEE. For revenue ranking, we obtain a characterization of the expected revenue differences between second and first price auctions with general dependence of types.

Auctions with options for re-auction

We examine the role of seller bidding and reserve prices in an infinitely repeated independent-private-value (IPV) ascending-price auction. The seller has a single object that she values at zero. At the end of any auction round, she may either sell to the highest bidder or pass-in the object and hold a new auction next period. New bidders are drawn randomly in each round. The ability to re-auction motivates a notion of reserve price as the option value of retaining the object for re-auctioning. Even in the absence of a mechanism with which to commit to a reserve price, the optimal “secret” reserve is shown to exceed zero. However, despite the infinite repetition, there may be significant value to the seller from a binding reserve price commitment: the optimal binding reserve is higher than the optimal “secret” reserve, and may be substantially so, even with very patient players. Furthermore, reserve price commitments may even be socially preferable at high discount factors. We also show that the optimal “phantom” bidding strategy for the seller is revenue-equivalent to a commitment to an optimal public reserve price.

All-pay auctions with endogenous asymmetries

We study N-bidders, asymmetric all-pay auctions under incomplete information. First, we solve for the equilibrium of a parametric model. Each bidder’s valuation is independently drawn from an uniform [0, αi] where the parameter αi may vary across bidders. In this game, asymmetries are exogenously given. Next, a two-stage game where asymmetries are endogenously generated is studied. At the first stage, each bidder chooses the level of an observable, costly, value-enhancing action. The second stage is the bidding sub-game, whose equilibrium is simply the equilibrium of the, previously analyzed, game with exogenous asymmetries. Finally, natural applications of the all pay-auction in the context of political lobbying are considered: the effects of excluding bidders, as well as, the impact of caps on bids.

Buy-or-sell auctions

This paper develops a game theoretic model of a "Buy-or-Sell" auction. Participants have to submit both a bid and an offer price for up to one of the many units of the good being auctioned. The bid-ask spread is set in advance by the auctioneer. Such an auction was used by the Central Bank of Brazil to intervene in the foreign exchange market during the exchange rate crawling-peg regime (1995-1999). I investigate whether such mechanism is more effective than standard intervention auctions to prevent speculative attacks in the context of managed exchange rate regimes.

Auctions of identical objects with single-unit demands : a survey

The theory of auctions of a single object generalizes to a situation where identical objects are sold either sequentially or simultaneously but individuais can only buy one object. In this context, I will present a survey of the main results regarding the ranking of auctions based on revenue, bidding behaviour, effects of entry fees and reserve prices, and other strategic issues.

A simple analysis of the U.S. emission permits auctions

We examine a stylized version of EPA auctions when agents know the list of values of sellers and buyers. Sellers and buyers behave strategically. We show that there are two types of equilibria: inefficient equilibria where no goods are traded and efficient equilibria where alI exchange occurs at a uniform price. We also provide examples of the EPA auction game under incomplete information when the uniform price equilibrium holds and when it does not hold. When the uniform price equilibrium holds, sellers shade their bids up and buyers shade their bids down. In the example where the uniform price equilibrium does not hold, both buyers and sellers shade their bids down in an equilibrium.

Share bidding auctions, sliding scale royalty rates and the new brazilian regulatory framework for the pre-salt areas

O governo brasileiro recentemente aprovou uma legislação instituindo um novo marco regulatório para as reservas petrolíferas do pré-sal. Segundo as novas regras, estas áreas deverão ser licitadas mediante um leilão de partilha de lucro. Motivado por esta mudança, apresentamos um modelo de leilão de partilha sob afiliação, demonstrando a existência de um equilíbrio monótono em estratégias puras e caracterizando a solução. Alem disso, provamos que este mecanismo gera receita esperada maior ou igual a um leilão de primeiro preço usual. Em seguida, introduzimos no modelo uma função representando taxas de royalties que dependem do valor do objeto. Este instrumento permite uma elevação na receita esperada de ambos os modelos, fazendo com que a diferença entre eles encolha. Finalmente, analisando o novo marco regulatório sob o ponto de vista dos resultados obtidos, concluímos que o antigo modelo de concessão utilizado pelo governo brasileiro é mais adequado e lucrativo.

Profit-share bidding auctions: a theoretical approach

Neste trabalho, estudamos o regime de partilha de produção brasileiro, instituí do pela Lei No 12.351, para exploração de petróleo através de uma abordagem te orica. Desenvolvemos um modelo de partilha de produção a fim de capturar algumas características do modelo de partilha brasileiro como, por exemplo, a participação obrigatória da Petrobras, assimetria de informação e a presença de participantes estratégicos. Através de solução numérica, fazemos uma análise das estratégias dos participantes e dos ganhos esperados. Além disso, desenvolvemos um modelo de custos heterogêneos para estudar as regras de conteúdo local.

Asymmetric auctions and risk aversion within independent private valoues

We study tournaments with many ex-ante asymmetric (heterogeneous) contestants as an independent-private-values all-pay auction. The asymmetry is either with respect to the distribution of valuations for the prize or the risk preferences. By characterizing equilibria in tnonotone strategies we show that tournaments \:vith man~y heterogenous contestants are qualitatively distinct. First, with two (or many ex-ante identical) participants, a contestant always exerts some effort with positive probability. In contrast, with many asymmetric participants, one 1night not exert any effort at all, even if there is a positive probability that he has the highest valuation among ali. Second, in tournan1ents with t'wo (o r n1any ex-ante h01nogenous) contestants, equilibrium effort densities are decreasing. This prediction is at odds with experimental evidence that shows the empírica! density might be increasing at high effort levels. V\.lith rnany heterogeneous contestants, however. the increasing bid density is consistent with an equilibrium behavior.

Os conflitos de competência normativa do estado regulador brasileiro no setor administrado pela ANP

The dissertation has by objective describe the administrative activity of regulation exercised by independent regulatory agencies, observing that this activity was already done before this structures creation, however, after a really deep administrative reform that had as objective built a Public Administration with more efficiency, it passed to be done with some own peculiarities of these new structures of regulation. The work gave especial attention to what concern the conflicts of normative competency that really often happen between ANP (Agência Nacional do Petróleo, Gás Natural e Biocombustíveis) and the legislatives organs of the Republic Federative of Brazil, because energetic area has unbelievable mater to any country, and the fact of some juridical norm be against the law and be accepted is very dangerous, it affronts the constitutional principle of the legality e may put in risk the democratic Estate of law, them, regulatory dogmatic must be scientifically knows, and developed, thought and especially there are so many doctrinaires divergences about regulation constitutionality. As a theorist point, the investigation got the Logical nocontradiction principle, according Hans Kelsen and Lourival Vilanova thought, doing a philosophical reflection about the system of positive law, in which there are many antinomies, or conflicts of norms, what include the conflicts of the administrative acts expedited by ANP and the legislation of the brazilian regulatory Estate. For a better understanding and exemplify some perplexities treated by the doctrinaire angle, this work did a lucubration about a possibility of a normative conflict between a ANP resolution and the municipal legislation in a specific case, also, brought several jurisprudences for the brazilians courts of justice, that confirm the empiric existence of normative conflicts among ANP s administrative norms and federal legislation. Finally, concludes observing that the regulation is not a legislative competency delegation to regulatory agencies, is just a new exercise of the administrative function, it is a technical specialization of the public administration, that using this know-how can acting with more efficiency, however the normative power of regulatory agencies must respect the empire of law, so in this terms, the dissertation suggests the ponderation of the constitutionals principles of efficiency and legality how form to harmonizing the democratic legitimate inherent to legal norm supremacy, with the perspective of an efficient economic and institutional development

Does plasma ANP participate in natriuresis induced by a-MSH?

-Melanocyte-stimulating hormone (-MSH; 0.6 and 3 nmol) microinjected into the anteroventral region of the third ventricle (AV3V) induced a significant increase in diuresis without modifying natriuresis or kaliuresis. Intraperitoneal (ip) injection of -MSH (3 and 9.6 nmol) induced a significant increase in urinary sodium, potassium and water excretion. Intraperitoneal (3 and 4.8 nmol) or iv (3 and 9.6 nmol) administration of -MSH did not induce any significant changes in plasma atrial natriuretic peptide (ANP), suggesting that the natriuresis, kaliuresis and diuresis induced by the systemic action of -MSH can be dissociated from the increase in plasma ANP. These preliminary results suggest that -MSH may be involved in a -MSHindependent mechanism of regulation of hydromineral metabolism.

Action of ANP on the nongenomic dose-dependent biphasic effect of aldosterone on NHE1 in proximal S3 segment

The rapid (2 min) nongenomic effects of aldosterone (ALDO) and/or spironolactone (MR antagonist), RU 486 (GR antagonist), atrial natriuretic peptide (ANP) and dimethyl-BAPTA (BAPTA) on the intracellular pH recovery rate (pHirr) via NHE1 (basolateral Na+/H+ exchanger isoform), after the acid load induced by NH4Cl, and on the cytosolic free calcium concentration ([Ca2+](i)) were investigated in the proximal S3 segment isolated from rats, by the probes BCECF-AM and FLUO-4-AM, respectively. The basal pHi was 7.15+/-0.008 and the basal pHirr was 0.195+/-0.012 pH units/min (number of tubules/number of tubular areas = 16/96). Our results confirmed the rapid biphasic effect of ALDO on NHE1: ALDO (10(-12) M) increases the pHirr to approximately 59% of control value, and ALDO (10(-6)M) decreases it to approximately 49%. Spironolactone did not change these effects, but RU 486 inhibited the stimulatory effect and maintained the inhibitory effect. ANP (10(-6) M) or BAPTA (5 x 10(-5) M) alone had no significant effect on NHE1 but prevented both effects of ALDO on this exchanger. The basal [Ca2+](i) was 104+/-3 nM (15), and ALDO (10(-12) or 10(-6) M) increased the basal [Ca2+](i) to approximately 50% or 124%, respectively. RU 486, ANP and BAPTA decreased the [Ca2+](i) and inhibited the stimulatory effect of both doses of ALDO. The results suggest the involvement of GR on the nongenomic effects of ALDO and indicate a pHirr-regulating role for [Ca2+](i) that is mediated by NHE1, stimulated/impaired by ALDO, and affected by ANP or BAPTA with ALDO. The observed nongenomic hormonal interaction in the S3 segment may represent a rapid and physiologically relevant regulatory mechanism in the intact animal under conditions of volume alterations. (C) 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

ANP impairs the dose-dependent stimulatory effect of ANG II or AVP on H+-ATPase subcellular vesicle trafficking

The effect of angiotensin II (ANG II) or arginine vasopressin (AVP) alone or plus atrial natriuretic peptide (ANP) on H+-ATPase subcellular vesicle trafficking was investigated in MDCK cells following intracellular pH (pHi) acidification by exposure to20 mMNH4Cl for 2 min in a Na+-free solution containing Schering 28080, conditions under which H+-AT-Pase is the only cell mechanism for pHi recovery. Using the acridine orange fluorescent probe (5mM) and confocal microscopy, the vesicle movement was quantified by determining, for each experimental group, the mean slope of the line indicating the changes in apical/basolateral fluorescence density ratio over time during the first 5.30 min of the pHi recovery period. Under the control conditions, the mean slope was 0.079 ± 0.0033 min-1 (14) and it increased significantly with ANG II [10-12 and 10-7 M, respectively to 0.322 ± 0.038 min-1 (13) and 0.578 ± 0.061 min-1 (12)] or AVP [10-12 and 10-6 M, respectively to 0.301 ± 0.018 min-1 (12) and 0.687 ± 0.049 min-1 (11)]. However, in presence of ANP (10-6 M, decreases cytosolic free calcium), dimethyl-BAPTA/AM (5 × 10-5 M, chelates intracellular calcium) or colchicine (10-5 M, 2-h preincubation; inhibits microtubule-dependent vesicular trafficking) alone or plus ANG II or AVP the mean slopes were similar to the control values, indicating that such agents blocked the stimulatory effect of ANG II or AVP on vesicle trafficking. The results suggest that the pathway responsible for the increase in cytosolic free calcium and the microtu-bule-dependent vesicular trafficking are involved in this hormonal stimulating effect. Whether cytosolic free calcium reduction represents an important direct mechanism for ANP impairs the dose-dependent stimulatory effect of ANG II or AVP on H+-ATPase subcellular vesicle trafficking, or is a side effect of other signaling pathways which will require additional studies.

Designing Electricity Auctions in the Presence of Transmission Constraints

This paper analyzes the effect that different designs in the access to fnancial transmission rights has on spot electricity auctions. In particular, I characterize the equilibrium in the spot electricity market when financial transmission rights are assigned to the grid operator and when financial transmission rights are assigned to the firm that submits the lowest bid in the spot electricity auction. When financial transmission rights are assigned to the grid operator, my model, in contrast with the models available in the literature, works out the equilibrium for any transmission capacity. Moreover, I have found that an increase in transmission capacity not only increases competition between markets but also within a single market. When financial transmission rights are assigned to the firm that submits the lowest bid in the spot electricity auction, firms compete not only for electricity demand, but also for transmission rights and the arbitrage profits derived from its hold. I have found that introduce competition for transmission rights reduces competition in spot electricity auctions.