Construction of facilities under asymmetric information: do constitutional constraints matter?

This paper studies construction of facilities in a federal state under asymmetric information. A country consists of two regions, each ruled by a local authority. The federal government plans to construct a facility in one of the regions. The facility generates a local value in the host region and has spillover effects in the other region. The federal government does not observe the local value because it is the local authority's private information. 80 the federal governrnent designs an incentive-compatible mechanism, specifying if the facility should be constructed and a balanced scheme of interregional transfers to finance its cost. The federal governrnent is constitutionally constrained to respect a given leveI of each region's welfare. We show that depending upon the facility's local value and the spillover effect, the governrnent faces different incentive problems. Moreover, their existence depends crucially on how stringent constitutional constraints are. Therefore, the optimal mechanism will also depend upon these three features of the model.

Iniciativa popular na concretização do direito fundamental à democracia

The Participatory Democracy is disseminated throughout the Principle of Popular Sovereignty. Since it spurs the participation of the people in the exercise of political power, it emerges as a conciliatory alternative to the Representative Regime - one of questionable legitimacy in account of the distortion it causes on the will of the public. It does so specially vis-à-vis the legislative, where the law is created. It s known that our Constitution (arts. 1º e 14, CF/88) provides for the means through which the members of the public may take part in the political process of the country, for it consecrates the plebiscite, the referendum and the popular initiative, all of them incipiently regulated by the Lei nº 9.709/98. It s our task, thus, to inquire, through deductive reasoning as well as the legal exegeses, the enforceability of the Popular Initiative as a means of popular emancipation, given that it enables the citizens to conscientiously participate in the public sphere. It has also an educational ethos which builds the capacity of individual to act, and, therefore, through thoughtful choices, enhance the legal system. Furthermore, the Lei da Ficha Limpa (LC nº 135/2010) surely represents a milestone in the Brazilian political history, since it accrued from a new way of social interaction allowed by the usage of communication technology on the pursuit of political morality. As a matter of fact, this bill is a clear example of how a legal act was legitimately proposed through Public Initiative. Hence, it s beneficial to actually make use of the Public Initiative, under the influence of the New Constitutional Hermeneutics, with a view to supporting social claims and promoting a dialogical relationship with the State in order to help it in the decisionmaking process. Thereat, we can achieve important civic spaces through which the fundamental right to democracy shall be materialized, tearing apart the old paradigms of inequality and, thus, promoting social justice

Hemangioendothelioma of bone in a patient with a constitutional supernumerary marker

A 13-year old girl was diagnosed as having a bone hemangioendothelioma. Cytogenetic studies identified the presence of a small supernumerary marker chromosome in this patient. Classical cytogenetic methods using G-, C-, Ag-NOR-banding were supplemented by spectral karyotyping (SKY) and fluorescence in situ hybridization to reveal a karyotype 47,XX,+mar.ish der(22)(D22S543+) karyotype in cells derived from the tumor and lymphocytes. These findings suggest that the supernumerary marker chromosome originated from the proximal centromeric region of chromosome 22, and that trisomy of the region 22q11: was not associated with adverse phenotypic effects, but that the presence of trisomy 22q11 may be related to the development of this tumor. (C) Elsevier B.V., 1999. All rights reserved.

Brazil’s Northeast Financing Constitutional Fund: Differentiated effects on municipal economic growth

This article investigates the effects of the investments made by the Northeast Financing Constitutional Fund (FNE) on the economic growth of that region's municipalities in the decade of 2000. To that end, it uses an empirical framework based on growth models that make it possible to form convergence clubs according to the municipalities' initial development level. The results corroborate the empirical strategy and reveal the existence of four groups of municipalities, in which investment flows through the FNE have different effects on growth. In general, the FNE produces positive and significant effects in most municipalities of the Northeast, except for those whose gross domestic product (GDP) per capita was either very low or very high at the start of the decade, in which case its effects are not significant.

Sacredness of the constitutional text and interpretive heresy: the brazilian supreme court decision on same-sex unions

The paper provides a close lecture of the arguments and methods of legal construction, employed in the extensive individual opinions written by the Justices of the Brazilian Supreme Court in the case which authorized the same sex civil union. After tracing an outline of the legal problem and his possible solutions, we analyze the individual opinions, showing their methodological syncretism, the use of legal methods and arguments in a contradictory way as well the deficiencies in the reasoning. The Justices use legal arguments, but do not meet the requirements of rationality in the decision-making. We have a rhetorical attempt that aims to satisfy the public opinion than to offer a comprehensive and coherent solution according the normative elements of the Brazilian Federal Constitution of 1988.

Ballot Initiatives, Constitutional Referendums and Effects on Various Groups

Direct legislation in the United States is a subject that has received a great deal of attention recently. A large proportion of this attention however has been focused on the potential for direct legislation to harm minority groups. An example of this negative potential can be seen in a group of ballot propositions that were presented to California voters in the 1990s. These initiatives can all be interpreted as targeting various minority groups in California. As California is the state which makes use of the ballot initiative more frequently than any other, this is a cause for concern. There are however several other factors that make it unclear whether direct legislation will more often lead to negative outcomes for minorities. There is also a noticeable effect of direct democracy generally on political participation. Several studies have found a positive correlation between the extent that a state uses ballot initiatives and referenda with political participation indexes such as voting rates. These findings complicate the negative attention that ballot initiatives have recently received.

Essays on the political economy of European integration

Recently, a rising interest in political and economic integration/disintegration issues has been developed in the political economy field. This growing strand of literature partly draws on traditional issues of fiscal federalism and optimum public good provision and focuses on a trade-off between the benefits of centralization, arising from economies of scale or externalities, and the costs of harmonizing policies as a consequence of the increased heterogeneity of individual preferences in an international union or in a country composed of at least two regions. This thesis stems from this strand of literature and aims to shed some light on two highly relevant aspects of the political economy of European integration. The first concerns the role of public opinion in the integration process; more precisely, how economic benefits and costs of integration shape citizens' support for European Union (EU) membership. The second is the allocation of policy competences among different levels of government: European, national and regional. Chapter 1 introduces the topics developed in this thesis by reviewing the main recent theoretical developments in the political economy analysis of integration processes. It is structured as follows. First, it briefly surveys a few relevant articles on economic theories of integration and disintegration processes (Alesina and Spolaore 1997, Bolton and Roland 1997, Alesina et al. 2000, Casella and Feinstein 2002) and discusses their relevance for the study of the impact of economic benefits and costs on public opinion attitude towards the EU. Subsequently, it explores the links existing between such political economy literature and theories of fiscal federalism, especially with regard to normative considerations concerning the optimal allocation of competences in a union. Chapter 2 firstly proposes a model of citizens’ support for membership of international unions, with explicit reference to the EU; subsequently it tests the model on a panel of EU countries. What are the factors that influence public opinion support for the European Union (EU)? In international relations theory, the idea that citizens' support for the EU depends on material benefits deriving from integration, i.e. whether European integration makes individuals economically better off (utilitarian support), has been common since the 1970s, but has never been the subject of a formal treatment (Hix 2005). A small number of studies in the 1990s have investigated econometrically the link between national economic performance and mass support for European integration (Eichenberg and Dalton 1993; Anderson and Kalthenthaler 1996), but only making informal assumptions. The main aim of Chapter 2 is thus to propose and test our model with a view to providing a more complete and theoretically grounded picture of public support for the EU. Following theories of utilitarian support, we assume that citizens are in favour of membership if they receive economic benefits from it. To develop this idea, we propose a simple political economic model drawing on the recent economic literature on integration and disintegration processes. The basic element is the existence of a trade-off between the benefits of centralisation and the costs of harmonising policies in presence of heterogeneous preferences among countries. The approach we follow is that of the recent literature on the political economy of international unions and the unification or break-up of nations (Bolton and Roland 1997, Alesina and Wacziarg 1999, Alesina et al. 2001, 2005a, to mention only the relevant). The general perspective is that unification provides returns to scale in the provision of public goods, but reduces each member state’s ability to determine its most favoured bundle of public goods. In the simple model presented in Chapter 2, support for membership of the union is increasing in the union’s average income and in the loss of efficiency stemming from being outside the union, and decreasing in a country’s average income, while increasing heterogeneity of preferences among countries points to a reduced scope of the union. Afterwards we empirically test the model with data on the EU; more precisely, we perform an econometric analysis employing a panel of member countries over time. The second part of Chapter 2 thus tries to answer the following question: does public opinion support for the EU really depend on economic factors? The findings are broadly consistent with our theoretical expectations: the conditions of the national economy, differences in income among member states and heterogeneity of preferences shape citizens’ attitude towards their country’s membership of the EU. Consequently, this analysis offers some interesting policy implications for the present debate about ratification of the European Constitution and, more generally, about how the EU could act in order to gain more support from the European public. Citizens in many member states are called to express their opinion in national referenda, which may well end up in rejection of the Constitution, as recently happened in France and the Netherlands, triggering a European-wide political crisis. These events show that nowadays understanding public attitude towards the EU is not only of academic interest, but has a strong relevance for policy-making too. Chapter 3 empirically investigates the link between European integration and regional autonomy in Italy. Over the last few decades, the double tendency towards supranationalism and regional autonomy, which has characterised some European States, has taken a very interesting form in this country, because Italy, besides being one of the founding members of the EU, also implemented a process of decentralisation during the 1970s, further strengthened by a constitutional reform in 2001. Moreover, the issue of the allocation of competences among the EU, the Member States and the regions is now especially topical. The process leading to the drafting of European Constitution (even if then it has not come into force) has attracted much attention from a constitutional political economy perspective both on a normative and positive point of view (Breuss and Eller 2004, Mueller 2005). The Italian parliament has recently passed a new thorough constitutional reform, still to be approved by citizens in a referendum, which includes, among other things, the so called “devolution”, i.e. granting the regions exclusive competence in public health care, education and local police. Following and extending the methodology proposed in a recent influential article by Alesina et al. (2005b), which only concentrated on the EU activity (treaties, legislation, and European Court of Justice’s rulings), we develop a set of quantitative indicators measuring the intensity of the legislative activity of the Italian State, the EU and the Italian regions from 1973 to 2005 in a large number of policy categories. By doing so, we seek to answer the following broad questions. Are European and regional legislations substitutes for state laws? To what extent are the competences attributed by the European treaties or the Italian Constitution actually exerted in the various policy areas? Is their exertion consistent with the normative recommendations from the economic literature about their optimum allocation among different levels of government? The main results show that, first, there seems to be a certain substitutability between EU and national legislations (even if not a very strong one), but not between regional and national ones. Second, the EU concentrates its legislative activity mainly in international trade and agriculture, whilst social policy is where the regions and the State (which is also the main actor in foreign policy) are more active. Third, at least two levels of government (in some cases all of them) are significantly involved in the legislative activity in many sectors, even where the rationale for that is, at best, very questionable, indicating that they actually share a larger number of policy tasks than that suggested by the economic theory. It appears therefore that an excessive number of competences are actually shared among different levels of government. From an economic perspective, it may well be recommended that some competences be shared, but only when the balance between scale or spillover effects and heterogeneity of preferences suggests so. When, on the contrary, too many levels of government are involved in a certain policy area, the distinction between their different responsibilities easily becomes unnecessarily blurred. This may not only leads to a slower and inefficient policy-making process, but also risks to make it too complicate to understand for citizens, who, on the contrary, should be able to know who is really responsible for a certain policy when they vote in national,local or European elections or in referenda on national or European constitutional issues.

La partecipazione popolare nell'esperienza dei referendum comunali

I Comuni incarnano idealmente delle piazze in cui il dibattito politico può svilupparsi in assenza di particolari filtri ed intermediazioni, con un rapporto diretto tra cittadini ed istituzioni. Essi costituiscono uno snodo di centrale importanza nell'esercizio della sovranità popolare e, al contempo, sono terreno fertile per la sperimentazione di modelli di partecipazione democratica. Prendendo come punto di vista l'esperienza dei Comuni italiani, si è scelto di focalizzare l'attenzione su uno degli strumenti “istituzionali” – nonché uno tra i più tradizionali – di partecipazione popolare, ovvero il referendum, nelle diverse forme ed accezioni che rientrano nel campo semantico di tale espressione. Questa è generalmente impiegata per indicare tutte quelle votazioni popolari non elettive su questioni politicamente rilevanti, formulate attraverso un quesito con due o più risposte alternative tra loro. L'analisi della disciplina legislativa degli istituti di partecipazione negli enti locali e lo studio delle disposizioni statutarie e regolamentari previste dai singoli Comuni, nonché le informazioni raccolte da alcuni casi di studio, rappresentano, in questo contesto, l'occasione per indagare le caratteristiche peculiari dell'istituto referendario, la sua effettività ed il suo impatto sulla forma di governo. In particolare, si è verificata positivamente la compatibilità del referendum, classificato dalla prevalente dottrina come istituto di democrazia diretta, con le forme attuali di democrazia rappresentativa. Si è tentato, altresì, un accostamento ai concetti di democrazia partecipativa e deliberativa, evidenziando come manchi del tutto, nel procedimento referendario (che pure è dotato di massima inclusività) un momento di confronto “deliberativo”. Il raffronto tra le esperienze riscontrate nei diversi Comuni ha consentito, inoltre, di ricercare le cause di alcuni aspetti critici (scarsa affluenza, mancata trasformazione del voto in decisioni politiche, aumento del conflitto) e, al contempo, di individuarne possibili soluzioni, tracciate sulla scorta delle migliori pratiche rilevate.

Il diritto alla mobilita' fra dimensione europea, costituzioni statali e autonomie territoriali

La tesi si prefigge l'obbiettivo di offrire una ricostruzione logico sistematica della disciplina giuridica che regola i trasporti pubblici locali in ambito regionale, statale e comunitario, affrontando le principali questioni interpretative e di coordinamento che esse pongono. Nella primo capitolo, viene analizzato l'evoluzione storica della normativa nazionale che regola il trasporto pubblico locale, soffermandosi soprattutto sulla riforma del trasporto pubblico locale introdotte dal d.lgs. 422/1997. Particolare attenzione è stata posta agli aspetti di programmazione e finanziamento nonché alle modalità di gestione del trasporto pubblico locale, in quanto il quadro normativo applicabile è caratterizzato da un’estrema complessità dovuta ai numerosi interventi legislativi. Nel secondo capitolo viene esaminato l'evoluzione dell'intervento comunitario in materi di trasporto pubblico locale, partendo dal (CE) n. 1191/69 che si limitava a disciplinare gli aiuti di Stato, fino alla normativa quadro per il settore (Regolamento (CE) n. 1370/2007). L'obbiettivo è quello di verificare se le scelte del legislatore italiano, per quanto concerne le modalità di gestione del trasporto pubblico locale possano dirsi coerenti con le scelte a livello comunitario previste dal Regolamento (CE) n. 1370/2007. Viene inoltre affronta la questione dell'articolazione della potestà normativa e amministrativa del settore dei trasporti pubblici locali nelle disposizioni del Titolo V della Costituzione. Lo studio si sofferma soprattutto sulla giurisprudenza della Corte costituzionale per tracciare una chiara individuazione del riparto delle competenze tra Stato e Regioni in materia. Infine nell'ultima parte, esamina le diverse problematiche interpretative e applicative della normativa che disciplina il settore del TPL, dovute all'azzeramento della normativa generale dei servizi pubblici locali di rilevanza economica in seguito al referendum abrogativo del 12 e 13 giugno 2011, nonché della illegittimità costituzionale della normativa contenuta nell'art 4 del d.l. n. 138/2011, ad opera della sentenza della Corte costituzionale n. 199/2012.

The Constitutional-Judicial Control of the Legislative and Executive Powers in Central and Eastern European Countries

This project looked at the nature, contents, methods, means and legal and political effects of the influence that constitutional courts exercise upon the legislative and executive powers in the newly established democracies of Central and Eastern Europe. The basic hypothesis was that these courts work to provide a limitation of political power within the framework of the principal constitutional values and that they force the legislature and executive to exercise their powers and duties in strict accordance with the constitution. Following a study of the documentary sources, including primarily the relevant constitutional and statutory provisions and decisions of constitutional courts, Mr. Cvetkovski prepared a questionnaire on various aspects of the topics researched and sent it to the respective constitutional courts. A series of direct interviews with court officials in six of the ten countries then served to clarify a large number of questions relating to differences in procedures etc. that arose from the questionnaires. As a final stage, the findings were compared with those described in recent publications on constitutional control in general and in Central and Eastern Europe in particular. The study began by considering the constitutional and political environment of the constitutional courts' activities in controlling legislative and executive powers, which in all countries studied are based on the principles of the rule of law and the separation of powers. All courts are separate bodies with special status in terms of constitutional law and are independent of other political and judicial institutions. The range of matters within their jurisdiction is set by the constitution of the country in question but in all cases can be exercised only with the framework of procedural rules. This gives considerable significance to the question of who sets these rules and different countries have dealt with it in different ways. In some there is a special constitutional law with the same legal force as the constitution itself (Croatia), the majority of countries allow for regulation by an ordinary law, Macedonia gives the court the autonomy to create and change its own rules of procedure, while in Hungary the parliament fixes the rules on procedure at the suggestion of the constitutional court. The question of the appointment of constitutional judges was also considered and of the mechanisms for ensuring their impartiality and immunity. In the area of the courts' scope for providing normative control, considerable differences were found between the different countries. In some cases the courts' jurisdiction is limited to the normative acts of the respective parliaments, and there is generally no provision for challenging unconstitutional omissions by legislation and the executive. There are, however, some situations in which they may indirectly evaluate the constitutionality of legislative omissions, as when the constitution contains provision for a time limit on enacting legislation, when the parliament has made an omission in drafting a law which violates the constitutional provisions, or when a law grants favours to certain groups while excluding others, thereby violating the equal protection clause of the constitution. The control of constitutionality of normative acts can be either preventive or repressive, depending on whether it is implemented before or after the promulgation of the law or other enactment being challenged. In most countries in the region the constitutional courts provide only repressive control, although in Hungary and Poland the courts are competent to perform both preventive and repressive norm control, while in Romania the court's jurisdiction is limited to preventive norm control. Most countries are wary of vesting constitutional courts with preventive norm control because of the danger of their becoming too involved in the day-to-day political debate, but Mr. Cvetkovski points out certain advantages of such control. If combined with a short time limit it can provide early clarification of a constitutional issue, secondly it avoids the problems arising if a law that has been in force for some years is declared to be unconstitutional, and thirdly it may help preserve the prestige of the legislation. Its disadvantages include the difficulty of ascertaining the actual and potential consequences of a norm without the empirical experience of the administration and enforcement of the law, the desirability of a certain distance from the day-to-day arguments surrounding the political process of legislation, the possible effects of changing social and economic conditions, and the danger of placing obstacles in the way of rapid reactions to acute situations. In the case of repressive norm control, this can be either abstract or concrete. The former is initiated by the supreme state organs in order to protect abstract constitutional order and the latter is initiated by ordinary courts, administrative authorities or by individuals. Constitutional courts cannot directly oblige the legislature and executive to pass a new law and this remains a matter of legislative and executive political responsibility. In the case of Poland, the parliament even has the power to dismiss a constitutional court decision by a special majority of votes, which means that the last word lies with the legislature. As the current constitutions of Central and Eastern European countries are newly adopted and differ significantly from the previous ones, the courts' interpretative functions should ensure a degree of unification in the application of the constitution. Some countries (Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Russia) provide for the constitutional courts' decisions to have a binding role on the constitutions. While their decisions inevitably have an influence on the actions of public bodies, they do not set criteria for political behaviour, which depends rather on the overall political culture and traditions of the society. All constitutions except that of Belarus, provide for the courts to have jurisdiction over conflicts arising from the distribution of responsibilities between different organs and levels in the country, as well for impeachment procedures against the head of state, and for determining the constitutionality of political parties (except in Belarus, Hungary, Russia and Slovakia). All the constitutions studied guarantee individual rights and freedoms and most courts have jurisdiction over complaints of violation of these rights by the constitution. All courts also have some jurisdiction over international agreements and treaties, either directly (Belarus, Bulgaria and Hungary) before the treaty is ratified, or indirectly (Croatia, Czech Republic, Macedonia, Romania, Russia and Yugoslavia). In each country the question of who may initiate proceedings of norm control is of central importance and is usually regulated by the constitution itself. There are three main possibilities: statutory organs, normal courts and private individuals and the limitations on each of these is discussed in the report. Most courts are limited in their rights to institute ex officio a full-scale review of a point of law, and such rights as they do have rarely been used. In most countries courts' decisions do not have any binding force but must be approved by parliament or impose on parliament the obligation to bring the relevant law into conformity within a certain period. As a result, the courts' position is generally weaker than in other countries in Europe, with parliament remaining the supreme body. In the case of preventive norm control a finding of unconstitutionality may act to suspend the law and or to refer it back to the legislature, where in countries such as Romania it may even be overturned by a two-thirds majority. In repressive norm control a finding of unconstitutionality generally serves to take the relevant law out of legal force from the day of publication of the decision or from another date fixed by the court. If the law is annulled retrospectively this may or may not bring decisions of criminal courts under review, depending on the provisions laid down in the relevant constitution. In cases relating to conflicts of competencies the courts' decisions tend to be declaratory and so have a binding effect inter partes. In the case of a review of an individual act, decisions generally become effective primarily inter partes but is the individual act has been based on an unconstitutional generally binding normative act of the legislature or executive, the findings has quasi-legal effect as it automatically initiates special proceedings in which the law or other regulation is to be annulled or abrogated with effect erga omnes. This wards off further application of the law and thus further violations of individual constitutional rights, but also discourages further constitutional complaints against the same law. Thus the success of one individual's complaint extends to everyone else whose rights have equally been or might have been violated by the respective law. As the body whose act is repealed is obliged to adopt another act and in doing so is bound by the legal position of the constitutional court on the violation of constitutionally guaranteed freedoms and rights of the complainant, in this situation the decision of the constitutional court has the force of a precedent.