Medical science and the law

Advances in medical science have presented both law and bioethics with some of the most fascinating questions of our time. As science continues to forge ahead into new frontiers, in fields such as reproductive technology, human genetics, cloning technologies, and stem cell research, questions have arisen over the role for law in regulating this new terrain. The speed with which medical science has advanced, and continues to advance, can make it difficult to formulate appropriate regulatory responses. The rapid pace of scientific change and the increasing complexity of the science can present hurdles and barriers to the engagement of the public with science and the legal and ethical issues raised by it.

The value of respect in human research ethics: A conceptual analysis and a practical guide

In order to continue to maintain public trust and confidence in human research, participants must be treated with respect. Researchers and Human Research Ethics Committee members need to be aware that modern considerations of this value include: the need for a valid consenting process, the protection of participants who have their capacity for consent compromised; the promotion of dignity for participants; and the effects that human research may have on cultures and communities. This paper explains the prominence of respect as a value when considering the ethics of human research and provides practical advice for both researchers and Human Research Ethics Committee members in developing respectful research practices.

Liability in negligence and the failure to disclose multiple risks in surgery : I would have been willing to run the risk

It has been 21 years since the decision in Rogers v Whitaker and the legal principles concerning informed consent and liability for negligence are still strongly grounded in this landmark High Court decision. This paper considers more recent developments in the law concerning the failure to disclose inherent risks in medical procedures, focusing on the decision in Wallace v Kam [2013] HCA 19. In this case, the appellant underwent a surgical procedure that carried a number of risks. The surgery itself was not performed in a sub-standard way, but the surgeon failed to disclose two risks to the patient, a failure that constituted a breach of the surgeon’s duty of care in negligence. One of the undisclosed risks was considered to be less serious than the other, and this lesser risk eventuated causing injury to the appellant. The more serious risk did not eventuate, but the appellant argued that if the more serious risk had been disclosed, he would have avoided his injuries completely because he would have refused to undergo the procedure. Liability was disputed by the surgeon, with particular reference to causation principles. The High Court of Australia held that the appellant should not be compensated for harm that resulted from a risk he would have been willing to run. We examine the policy reasons underpinning the law of negligence in this specific context and consider some of the issues raised by this unusual case. We question whether some of the judicial reasoning adopted in this case, represents a significant shift in traditional causation principles.

Law and Global Health

Law and Global Health, the sixteenth volume in the Current Legal Issues series, offers an insight into the scholarship examining the relationship between global health and the law. Covering a wide range of areas from all over the world, articles in the volume look at areas of human rights, vulnerable populations, ethical issues, legal responses and governance.

Health Law in Australia [Second Edition]

Health Law in Australia is the country’s leading text in this area and was the first book to deal with health law on a comprehensive national basis. In this important field that continues to give rise to challenges for society Health Law in Australia takes a logical, structured approach to explain the breadth of this area of law across all Australian jurisdictions. By covering all the major areas in this diverse field, Health Law in Australia enhances the understanding of the discipline as a whole. Beginning with an exploration of the general principles of health law, including chapters on “Negligence”, “Children and Consent to Medical Treatment”, and “Medical Confidentiality and Patient Privacy”, the book goes on to consider beginning-of-life and end-of-life issues before concluding with chapters on emerging areas in health law, such as biotechnology, genetic technologies and medical research. The contributing authors are national leaders who are specialists in these areas of health law and who can share with readers the results of their research. Health Law in Australia has been written for both legal and health audiences and is essential reading for undergraduate and postgraduate students, researchers and scholars in the disciplines of law, health and medicine, as well as health and legal practitioners, government departments and bodies in the health area, and private health providers.

Health law : scope, sources and forces

• For the purposes of this chapter, “health law” encapsulates regulation of the medical and health professions, the administration of health services and the maintenance of public health to the extent that it is connected to the provision of health services. • There are diverging views as to whether health law can be regarded as a discrete “area of law”. • Health law draws on other areas of law such as tort law, criminal law and family law. It also draws upon other disciplines, most notably medical and health ethics. • Social and economic forces have influenced the development and direction of health law, and these forces may become even more influential in the future. • The increasingly globalised world has implications for Australia's health systems and raises questions and creates commitments in respect of the international community. • Technological developments, including in respect of treatment, diagnosis and information management, create ongoing challenges for health law. • Patient rights, human rights and consumerism are increasingly key drivers in the development of health law. • Health law is significant to contemporary Australian society because of the gravity of the topics that fall within its ambit, its social relevance to so many aspects of human existence and endeavour, the important role it plays in protecting the vulnerable, and the extent to which it engages with fundamental principles of justice.

Adults who lack capacity : substitute decision-making

• Mechanisms to facilitate consent to healthcare for adults who lack capacity are necessary to ensure that these adults can lawfully receive appropriate medical treatment when needed. • In Australia, the common law plays only a limited role in this context, through its recognition of advance directives and through the parens patriae jurisdiction of superior courts. • Substitute decision-making for adults who lack capacity is facilitated primarily by guardianship and other related legislation. This legislation, which has been enacted in all Australian States and Territories, permits a range of decision-makers to make different types of healthcare decisions. • Substitute decision-makers can be appointed by the adult or by a guardianship or other tribunal. Where there is no appointed decision-maker, legislation generally empowers those close to the adult to make the relevant decision. Most Australian jurisdictions have also provided for statutory advance directives. • For the most serious of decisions, such as non-therapeutic sterilisations, consent can only be provided by a tribunal. Other decisions can generally be made by a range of substitute decision-makers. Some treatment, such as very minor treatment or that which is needed in an emergency, can be provided without consent. • Guardianship legislation generally establishes a set of principles and/or other criteria to guide healthcare decisions. Mechanisms have also been established to resolve disputes as to who is the appropriate decision-maker and how a decision should be made.

Withholding and withdrawing life-sustaining medical treatment

• At common law, a competent adult can refuse life-sustaining medical treatment, either contemporaneously or through an advance directive which will operate at a later time when the adult’s capacity is lost. • Legislation in most Australian jurisdictions also provides for a competent adult to complete an advance directive that refuses life-sustaining medical treatment. • At common law, a court exercising its parens patriae jurisdiction can consent to, or authorise, the withdrawal or withholding of life-sustaining medical treatment from an adult or child who lacks capacity if that is in the best interests of the person. A court may also declare that the withholding or withdrawal of treatment is lawful. • Guardianship legislation in all jurisdictions allows a substitute decision-maker, in an appropriate case, to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment for an adult who lacks capacity. • In terms of children, a parent may refuse life-sustaining medical treatment for his or her child if it is in the child’s best interests. • While a refusal of life-sustaining medical treatment by a competent child may be valid, this decision can be overturned by a court. • At common law and generally under guardianship statutes, demand for futile treatment need not be complied with by doctors.

Double effect and palliative care excuses

• The doctrine of double effect is an exception to the general rule that taking active steps that end life is unlawful. • The essence of the doctrine at common law is intention. • Hastening a patient’s death through palliative care will be lawful provided the primary intention is to relieve pain, and not cause death, even if that death is foreseen. • Some States have enacted legislative excuses that deal with the provision of palliative care. • These statutory excuses tend to be stricter than the common law as they impose other requirements in addition to having an appropriate intent, such as adherence to some level of recognised medical practice.

Crafting and retelling everyday lives : disabled people's contribution to bioethical concerns

This commentary draws out themes from the narrative symposium on “living with the label “disability”” from the perspective of auto/biography and critical disability studies in the humanities. It notes the disconnect between the experiences discussed in the stories and the preoccupations of bioethicists. Referencing Rosemarie Garland-Thompson’s recent work, it suggests that life stories by people usually described as “disabled” offer narrative, epistemic and ethical resources for bioethics. The commentary suggests that the symposium offers valuable conceptual tools and critiques of taken-for-granted terms like “dependency”. It notes that these narrators do not un–problematically embrace the term “disability”, but emphasize the need to redefine, strategically deploy or reject this term. Some accounts are explicitly critical of medical practitioners while others redefine health and wellbeing, emphasizing the need for reciprocity and respect for the knowledge of people with disability, including knowledge from their experience of “the variant body” (Leach Scully, 2008).

Children and consent to medical treatment

This chapter provides a comprehensive and up-to-date treatment of legislative provisions and common law principles regarding children and the law of consent to medical treatment. When can children provide their own consent? Can parents consent on behalf of their children, and if so, under what circumstances and why? Is court authority ever required, and if so, when, and why? What new contexts are providing fresh challenges to legal principles, parents, medical practitioners, and most importantly, children?

The potentiality of the embryo and the somatic cell

Recent arguments on the ethics of stem cell research have taken a novel approach to the question of the moral status of the embryo. One influential argument focuses on a property that the embryo is said to posses—namely, the property of being an entity with a rational nature or, less controversially, an entity that has the potential to acquire a rational nature—and claims that this property is also possessed by a somatic cell. Since nobody seriously thinks that we have a duty to preserve the countless such cells we wash off our body every day in the shower, the argument is intended as a reductio ad absurdum of the claim that the embryo should be afforded the same moral status as a fully developed human being. This article argues that this argument is not successful and that it consequently plays into the hands of those who oppose embryonic stem cell research. It is therefore better to abandon this argument and focus instead on the different argument that potentiality, as such, is not a sufficient ground for the creation of moral obligations towards the embryo.

Voluntary palliated starvation : A lawful and ethical way to die?

Increasingly, individuals want control over their own destiny. This includes the way in which they die and the timing of their death. The desire for self-determination at the end of life is one of the drivers for the ever-increasing number of jurisdictions overseas that are legalising voluntary euthanasia and/or assisted suicide, and for the continuous attempts to reform state and territory law in Australia. Despite public support for law reform in this field, legislative change in Australia is unlikely in the near future given the current political landscape. We argue that there may be another solution which provides competent adults with control over their death and to have any pain and symptoms managed by doctors, but which is currently lawful and consistent with prevailing ethical principles. ‘Voluntary palliated starvation’ refers to the process which occurs when a competent individual chooses to stop eating and drinking, and receives palliative care to address pain, suffering and symptoms that may be experienced by the individual as he or she approaches death. In this article, we argue that, at least in some circumstances, such a death would be lawful for the individual and doctors involved, and consistent with principles of medical ethics.