930 resultados para 140202 Economic Development and Growth
Resumo:
Includes bibliography
Resumo:
We construct a simple growth model where agents with uncertain survival choose schooling time, life-cycle consumption and the number of children. We show that rising longevity reduces fertility but raises saving, schooling time and the growth rate at a diminishing rate. Cross-section analyses using data from 76 countries support these propositions: life expectancy has a significant positive effect on the saving rate, secondary school enrollment and growth but a significant negative effect on fertility. Through sensitivity analyses, the effect on the saving rate is inconclusive, while the effects on the other variables are robust and consistent. These estimated effects are decreasing in life expectancy. Copyright The editors of the Scandinavian Journal of Economics 2005.
Resumo:
In the past 20 years, Chile and Venezuela have followed divergent paths of democratic and economic development. When the Cold War ended, Venezuela was one of the few Latin American countries where democracy had survived the authoritarian wave of the 1960 and 1970s. Heralded in the late 1980s as the most stable democracy and one of the most developed and globalized economies in the region, Venezuela has since experienced deterioration of democratic institutions, political polarization, economic stagnation, and instability. In contrast, Chile has experienced a democratic renaissance since 1990. Rapid economic growth, an increasingly efficient public sector, significant reductions in poverty, and improvements in social programs have all made Chile a regional leader in democratic consolidation and sustainable development. Chile emerges as a success story and Venezuela as a country lagging behind in terms of making progress in economic development and poverty reduction. While Chile has developed a democratic system based on institutions, Venezuela has seen its democracy evolve towards increasing concentration of power on the hands of President Hugo Chávez.
Resumo:
This dissertation analyzes the effects of political and economic institutions on economic development and growth.^ The first essay develops an overlapping-generations political economy model to analyze the incentives of various social groups to finance human capital accumulation through public education expenditures. The contribution of this study to the literature is that it helps explain the observed differences in the economic growth performance of natural resource-abundant countries. The results suggest that the preferred tax rates of the manufacturers on one hand and the political coalition of manufacturers and landowners, on the other hand, are equal to the socially optimal tax rate. However, we show that owners of natural resources prefer an excessively high tax rate, which suppresses aggregate output to a suboptimal level.^ The second essay examines the relationship between the political influence of different social classes and public education spending in panel data estimation. The novel contribution of this paper to the literature is that I proxy the political power and influence of the natural resource owners, manufacturers, and landowners with macroeconomic indicators. The motivation behind this modeling choice is to substantiate the definition of the political power of social classes with economic fundamentals. I use different governance indicators in the estimations to find out how different institutions mediate the overall impact of the political influence of various social classes on public education spending. The results suggest that political stability and absence of violence and rule of law are the important governance indicators.^ The third essay develops a counter argument to Acemoglu et al. (2010) where the thesis is that French institutions and economic reforms fostered economic progress in those German regions invaded by the Napoleonic armies. By providing historical data on urbanization rates used as proxies for economic growth, I demonstrate that similar different rates of economic growth were observed in the regions of France in the post-Napoleonic period as well. The existence of different economic growth rates makes it hard to argue that the differences in economic performance in the German regions that were invaded by the French and those that were spared a similar fate follow from regional differences in economic institutions.^