Multinacionális vállalatok globalizált erp-modelljei, fejlődési tendenciák

A cikk nemzetközi cégeknél, illetve multinacionális vállalkozások hazai leányvállalatainál folytatott kutatás és szakértői megbeszélések alapján az ERP- (Enterprise Resource Planning) rendszerek globális telepítésének IT-struktúráit mutatja be, mely struktúrák a konszernszintű (centralizált) és országspecifikus (lokális) feldolgozások kapcsolatában alakulnak ki. A szerzők célja, hogy az ERP-rendszerek egyre növekvő alkalmazásainak telepítési formáit modellekbe foglalják. A gyakorlati tapasztalatok és szakirodalmi elemzés alapján az ERP globalizálódási folyamat fejlődési irányait is bemutatják.

Strategic trade policy and non-linear subsidy : in the case of price competition

In a strategic trade policy, it is assumed, in this paper, that a government changes disbursement or levy method so that the reaction function of home firm approaches infinitely close to that of foreign firm. In the framework of Bertrand-Nash equilibrium, Eaton and Grossman[1986] showed that export tax is preferable to export subsidy. In this paper, it is shown that export subsidy is preferable to export tax in some cases in the framework of Bertrand-Nash equilibrium, considering the uncertainty in demand. Historically, many economists mentioned non-linear subsidy or tax. However, optimum solution of it has not yet been shown. The optimum solution is shown in this paper.

Heterogeneous information and trade policy

Protectionism enjoys surprising popular support, in spite of deadweight losses. At thesame time, trade barriers appear to decline with public information about protection.This paper develops an electoral model with heterogeneously informed voters whichexplains both facts and predicts the pattern of trade policy across industries. In themodel, each agent endogenously acquires more information about his sector of employment. As a result, voters support protectionism, because they learn more about thetrade barriers that help them as producers than those that hurt them as consumers.In equilibrium, asymmetric information induces a universal protectionist bias. Thestructure of protection is Pareto inefficient, in contrast to existing models. The modelpredicts a Dracula effect: trade policy for a sector is less protectionist when there ismore public information about it. Using a measure of newspaper coverage across industries, I find that cross-sector evidence from the United States bears out my theoreticalpredictions.

Economic booms, trade deficits and economic policy

Many economic booms have been accompanied by realexchange rate appreciations, large trade defcits -whichhave sometimes persisted after the return to the initialexchange rate parity- and a deteriorating traded sector.Those circumstances have typically raised the questionof the de-sirability of some stabilization policy. We show that the dynamics induced by an expectedproductivity shock in an economy where the capital stockis non-mobile across sectors, match those circumstances.Furthermore, we obtain that credit market imperfectionstend to exacerbate trade deficits, and to cause aninefficient capacity reduction in the traded sector.Some stabilization policies are explored.

The EU strategy of policy convergence with its neighbours in the area of trade

The objective of this paper is to ascertain whether the EU is seeking policy convergence with its neighbours in the area of trade by means of EU regulations. For each trade- related topic, we carried out a content analysis of the available official documents to identify the model of relations that has been established between the EU and four neighbouring countries (Morocco, Algeria, Ukraine and Georgia). The findings indicate that Europeanization is the EU strategy in most cases. However, adaptation to European regulations is only a long-term aim. When international regulations exist in a specific area, the EU usually demands the internationalization of a country¿s regulations as a first step. When there are no international regulations, the convergence process is established on the basis of bilaterally developed norms. EU strategy also varies depending on the country. Its relations with Algeria are the most particular. We conclude that the EU is promoting policy convergence with its neighbours in the area of trade mainly on the basis of international and bilaterally-developed regulations.

The EU strategy of policy convergence with its neighbours in the area of trade

The objective of this paper is to ascertain whether the EU is seeking policy convergence with its neighbours in the area of trade by means of EU regulations. For each trade- related topic, we carried out a content analysis of the available official documents to identify the model of relations that has been established between the EU and four neighbouring countries (Morocco, Algeria, Ukraine and Georgia). The findings indicate that Europeanization is the EU strategy in most cases. However, adaptation to European regulations is only a long-term aim. When international regulations exist in a specific area, the EU usually demands the internationalization of a country¿s regulations as a first step. When there are no international regulations, the convergence process is established on the basis of bilaterally developed norms. EU strategy also varies depending on the country. Its relations with Algeria are the most particular. We conclude that the EU is promoting policy convergence with its neighbours in the area of trade mainly on the basis of international and bilaterally-developed regulations.

International economic policies; a survey of the economics of diplomacy,

Mode of access: Internet.

Trade barriers; report to the Committee on Finance of the United States Senate and its Subcommittee on International Trade, on investigations 332-66 and 332-67 under section 332 of the Tariff act of 1930.

Mode of access: Internet.

The World Trade Organization, competition policy, and developing countries: A cross -country examination of domestic policy actions

This dissertation addresses the following research question: in a particular policy area, why do countries that display unanimity in their international policy behavior diverge from each other in their domestic policy actions? I address this question in the context of the divergent domestic competition policy actions undertaken by developing countries during the period 1996-2007, after these countries had quite conspicuously displayed near-unanimity in opposing this policy measure at the World Trade Organization (WTO). This divergence is puzzling because (a) it does not align with their near-unanimous behavior at the WTO over competition policy and (b) it is at variance with the objectives of their international opposition to this policy at the WTO. Using an interdisciplinary approach, this dissertation examines the factors responsible for this divergence in the domestic competition policy actions of developing countries. ^ The theoretical structure employed in this study is the classic second-image-reversed framework in international relations theory that focuses on the domestic developments in various countries following an international development. Methodologically, I employ both quantitative and qualitative methods of analysis to ascertain the nature of the relationship between the dependent variable and the eight explanatory variables that were identified from existing literature. The data on some of the key variables used in this dissertation was uniquely created over a multi-year period through extensive online research and represents the most comprehensive and updated dataset currently available. ^ The quantitative results obtained from logistic regression using data on 131 countries point toward the significant role played by international organizations in engineering change in this policy area in developing countries. The qualitative analysis consisting of three country case studies illuminate the channels of influence of the explanatory variables and highlight the role of domestic-level factors in these three carefully selected countries. After integrating the findings from the quantitative and qualitative analyses, I conclude that a mix of international- and domestic-level variables explains the divergence in domestic competition policy actions among developing countries. My findings also confirm the argument of the second-image-reversed framework that, given an international development or situation, the policy choices that states make can differ from each other and are mediated by domestic-level factors. ^

Does international trade produce convergence?

In spite of increasing globalization around the world, the effects of international trade on economic growth are not very clear. I consider an endogenous economic growth model in an open economy with the Home Market Effect (HME) and non-homothetic preferences in order to identify some determinants of the different results in this relationship. The model shows how trade between similar countries leads to convergence in economic growth when knowledge spillovers are present, while trade between very asymmetric countries produces divergence and may become trade in a poverty or growth trap. The results for welfare move in the same direction as economic growth since convergence implies increases in welfare for both countries, while divergence leads to increases in welfare for the largest country and the opposite for its commercial partner in the absence of knowledge spillovers. International trade does not implicate greater welfare as is usual in a static context under CES preferences.

Fiscal policy, pricing frictions and monetary accommodation

We investigate the theoretical conditions for effectiveness of government consumptionexpenditure expansions using US, Euro area and UK data. Fiscal expansions taking placewhen monetary policy is accommodative lead to large output multipliers in normal times.The 2009-2010 packages need not produce significant output multipliers, may havemoderate debt effects, and only generate temporary inflation. Expenditure expansionsaccompanied by deficit/debt consolidations schemes may lead to short run output gains buttheir success depends on how monetary policy and expectations behave. Trade opennessand the cyclicality of the labor wedge explain cross-country differences in the magnitude ofthe multipliers.

Labor markets and monetary policy: A new-Keynesian model with unemployement

We construct a utility-based model of fluctuations, with nominal rigidities andunemployment, and draw its implications for the unemployment-inflation trade-off and for the conduct of monetary policy.We proceed in two steps. We first leave nominal rigidities aside. We show that,under a standard utility specification, productivity shocks have no effect onunemployment in the constrained efficient allocation. We then focus on theimplications of alternative real wage setting mechanisms for fluctuations in un-employment. We show the role of labor market frictions and real wage rigiditiesin determining the effects of productivity shocks on unemployment.We then introduce nominal rigidities in the form of staggered price setting byfirms. We derive the relation between inflation and unemployment and discusshow it is influenced by the presence of labor market frictions and real wagerigidities. We show the nature of the tradeoff between inflation and unemployment stabilization, and its dependence on labor market characteristics. We draw the implications for optimal monetary policy.

Optimal monetary and fiscal policy in a currency union

We lay out a tractable model for fiscal and monetary policy analysis in a currency union, and study its implications for the optimal design of such policies. Monetary policy is conducted by a common central bank, which sets the interest rate for the union as a whole. Fiscal policy is implemented at the countrylevel, through the choice of government spending. The model incorporates country-specific shocks and nominal rigidities. Under our assumptions, the optimal cooperative policy arrangement requires that inflation be stabilized at the union level by the common central bank, while fiscal policy is used by each country for stabilization purposes. By contrast, when the fiscal authorities act in a non-coordinated way, their joint actions lead to a suboptimal outcome, and make the common central bank face a trade-off between inflation and output gap stabilization at the union level.