Sticks, Stones and Words: Emotional Harm and the English Criminal Law

This article discusses the rule that criminal liability does not normally attach for the causing of emotional harm or mental distress in the absence of proof of a 'recognised psychiatric injury'. It considers what is involved in the diagnosis of psychiatric injury, and to what extent the difference between such injury and 'ordinary' mental distress is one of degree rather than one of kind. It reviews the situations in which the law already criminalises the infliction of emotional harm without proof of psychiatric injury, and assesses the policy arguments for drawing the distinction in the normal case. The article concludes that the law can and should adopt a more flexible approach to cases of this sort.

On Testing the 'Moral Law'

In a previous article in this journal, Daniel Kelly, Steven Stich, Kevin Haley, Serena Eng and Dan Fessler report data that, according to them, foster scepticism about an association between harm and morality existent in the Turiel tradition (Kelly et al., 2007). This article challenges their interpretation of the data. It does so by explicating some methodological problems in the Turiel tradition that Kelly et al. themselves in a way inherit and by drawing on new evidence coming from a partial replication of their research.