Conflicts of interest, information provision and competition in banking

In some markets, such as the market for drugs or for financial services, sellers have better information than buyersregarding the matching between the buyer's needs and the good's actual characteristics. Depending on the market structure,this may lead to conflicts of interest and/or the underprovision of information by the seller. This paper studies this issuein the market for financial services. The analysis presents a new model of competition between banks, as banks' pricecompetition influences the ensuing incentives for truthful information revelation. We compare two different firm structures,specialized banking, where financial institutions provide a unique financial product, and one-stop banking, where a financialinstitution is able to provide several financial products which are horizontally differentiated. We show first that, althoughconflicts of interest may prevent information disclosure under monopoly, competition forces full information provision forsufficiently high reputation costs. Second, in the presence of market power, one-stop banks will use information strategicallyto increase product differentiation and therefore will always provide reliable information and charge higher rices thanspecialized banks, thus providing a new justification for the creation of one-stop banks. Finally, we show that, ifindependent financial advisers are able to provide reliable information, this increases product differentiation and thereforemarket power, so that it is in the interest of financial intermediaries to promote external independent financial advice.

The Value of Private Information within Evolving Groups

This note offers an analytical framework aimed at explaining how individual agents purposefully act with the goal of managing the value of their information sets. Agents undertake a process of private accumulation of information, which takes into account the non-rival nature of this peculiar entity. Non rivalry introduces an externality that might trigger long-term endogenous fluctuations. The dynamics of interaction, namely the possibility of entering or exiting the group to which the individuals belong, wil l determine time trajectories for the information flows that are unique for the specific conditions of interaction that are being considered at a given momentEste artigo apresenta uma estrutura analítica que tem por objetivo explicar como é que os agentes individuais atuam, de modo intencional, com o propósito de gerir o valor da informação que detêm. Os agentes prosseguem um processo de acumulação privada de informação, o qual toma em consideração a natureza não rival desta entidade que detém características específicas. A não rivalidade introduz uma externalidade que pode despoletar flutuações endógenas de longo prazo. A dinâmica de interação, nomeadamente a possibilidade de entrar ou sair do grupo a que os indivíduos pertencem, vai determinar a formação de trajetórias no tempo para os fluxos de informação, as quais são únicas para as condições particulares de interação que estão a ser consideradas num determinado momento.

Endogenous information structures

Many models in the economics literature deal with strategic situations withprivately informed agents. In those models the information structure isassumed to be exogenous and common knowledge. We consider whether suchmodels, and the results they produce, are robust with respect theendogenization of the information structure. The results depend on whetherinformation acquisition is secret or private, and on whether the strategicsituation involves simultaneous or sequential moves. In particular we findthat only when information is secretly acquired and moves are simultaneous,the results are fully robust. When information is acquired secretly butmoves are sequential additional equilibria may appear. Instead, privateinformation acquisition may make the equilibrium set smaller.

Reputation and honesty in a market for information

Previous works on asymmetric information in asset markets tendto focus on the potential gains in the asset market itself. We focus on the market for information and conduct an experimental study to explore, in a game of finite but uncertain duration, whether reputation can be an effective constraint on deliberate misinformation. At the beginning of each period, an uninformed potential asset buyer can purchase information, at a fixed price and from a fully-informed source, about the value of the asset in that period. The informational insiders cannot purchase the asset and are given short-term incentives to provide false information when the asset value is low. Our model predicts that, in accordance with the Folk Theorem, Pareto-superior outcomes featuring truthful revelation should be sustainable. However, this depends critically on beliefs about rationality and behavior. We find that, overall, sellers are truthful 89% of the time. More significantly, the observed frequency of truthfulness is 81% when the asset value is low. Our result is consistent with both mixed-strategy and trigger strategy interpretations and provides evidence that most subjects correctly anticipate rational behavior. We discuss applications to financial markets, media regulation, and the stability of cartels.

Audit report on the Black Hawk County Criminal Justice Information System for the year ended June 30, 2008

Audit report on the Black Hawk County Criminal Justice Information System for the year ended June 30, 2008

Parental altruism under imperfect information: Theory and evidence

Can we reconcile the predictions of the altruism model of the family withthe evidence on parental monetary transfers in the US? This paper providesa new assessment of this question. I expand the altruism model by introducingeffort of the child and by relaxing the assumption of perfect informationof the parent about the labor market opportunities of the child. First,I solve and simulate a model of altruism and labor supply under imperfectinformation. Second, I use cross-sectional data to test the following prediction of the model: Are parental transfers especially responsive tothe income variations of children who are very attached to the labor market? The results of the analysis suggest that imperfect informationaccounts for many of the patterns of intergenerational transfers in theUS.

Setting standards: Information accumulation in development

We propose a model in which economic relations and institutions in advancedand less developed economies differ as these societies have access to different amounts of information. This lack of information makes it hard to give the right incentives to managers and entrepreneurs. We argue that differences in the amount of information arise because of the differences in the scale of activities in rich and poor economies; namely, there is too little repetition of similar activities in pooreconomies, thus insufficient information to set the appropriate standards for firm performance. Our model predicts a number of institutional and structural transformations as the economy accumulates capital and information.

Jackson County Sanitary Disposal Agency independent auditor's reports, basic financial statements and required supplementary information, schedule of findings, June 30, 2008

Audit report on the Jackson County Sanitary Disposal Agency for the year ended June 30, 2008

Duality in mean-variance frontiers with conditioning information

Portfolio and stochastic discount factor (SDF) frontiers are usually regarded as dual objects, and researchers sometimes use one to answer questions about the other. However, the introduction of conditioning information and active portfolio strategies alters this relationship. For instance, the unconditional portfolio frontier in Hansen and Richard (1987) is not dual to the unconditional SDF frontier in Gallant, Hansen and Tauchen (1990). We characterise the dual objects to those frontiers, and relate them to the frontiers generated with managed portfolios, which are commonly used in empirical work. We also study the implications of a safe asset and other special cases.

Adaptive dynamics and the implementation problem with complete information

This paper studies the equilibrating process of several implementationmechanisms using naive adaptive dynamics. We show that the dynamics convergeand are stable, for the canonical mechanism of implementation in Nash equilibrium.In this way we cast some doubt on the criticism of ``complexity'' commonlyused against this mechanism. For mechanisms that use more refined equilibrium concepts,the dynamics converge but are not stable. Some papers in the literatureon implementation with refined equilibrium concepts have claimed that themechanisms they propose are ``simple'' and implement ``everything'' (incontrast with the canonical mechanism). The fact that some of these ``simple''mechanisms have unstable equilibria suggests that these statements shouldbe interpreted with some caution.