Do higher moments really matter in portfolio choice?

We present explicit formulas for evaluating the difference between Markowitz weights and those from optimal portfolios, with the same given return, considering either asymmetry or kurtosis. We prove that, whenever the higher moment constraint is not binding, the weights are never the same. If, due to special features of the first and second moments, the difference might be negligible, in quite many cases it will be very significant. An appealing illustration, when the designer wants to incorporate an asset with quite heavy tails, but wants to moderate this effect, further supports the argument.

Does location matter to explain loan interest rates? evidence from Brazilian highly concentrad local markets

O setor bancário brasileiro é altamente concentrado. Embora concentração não signifique necessariamente que o mercado se comporta de forma não competitiva, o grau de competição é freqüentemente questionado no país. Utilizando uma base de dados extensiva e única do mercado de crédito brasileiro, este trabalho procura avaliar muitos dos fatores que contribuem para a variação nas taxas de juros cobradas pelos bancos nos diferentes mercados locais em duas categorias de empréstimos. A concentração não é significante ou mesmo associada a taxas de juros mais baixas, em parte devido ao papel dos bancos públicos. O prêmio de default é positivo e significante, e há alguma evidência de imperfeição de mercado. Neste trabalho, analisamos também o comportamento de precificação dos bancos em diferentes regiões do país, e encontramos que a localização é importante para explicar as taxas de juros dos empréstimos.

Does Regulation matter? Institutional dimension of the 2008 financial crisis

Why did house prices fall in 2007‐2009? This is the fundamental question to most Americans, and to those who lent them money. Most homeowners did not care why residential real estate prices rose. They assumed prices always rose, and they should simply enjoy their good fortune. It was not until prices began to fall that people were left searching for answers. How much did regulation or lack thereof play in the role of the devastation? To what degree did greed and unrealistic consumer expectation have on the real estate bubble? Using existing literature as well as face to face interviews of experienced leaders within the real estate industry in California who experienced both the up and down of the real estate cycle, the overarching purpose of this study is to investigate the opinions and beliefs of the leaders and drivers within the real estate industry about the cause of the real estate bubble that occurred sharply in 2008 . Specifically, this project will focus on the opinions of real estate industry leaders who worked in the center of the subprime universe located in Irvine, California, during 2004‐2008. Comparing the mainstream beliefs with the interviewees it is fair to say that the main finding in the mainstream beliefs are reflected very well with the finding of the subject’s opinion. The thesis is divided into 6 chapters starting with “introduction”, followed by chapter 2 “Literature Review”. Chapter 3 is “Research Methodology” followed by chapter 4 “Data Presentation”. Finally, the results are discussed in chapter 5 “Analysis and Discussion” and conclusions in Chapter 6.

Construction of facilities under asymmetric information: do constitutional constraints matter?

This paper studies construction of facilities in a federal state under asymmetric information. A country consists of two regions, each ruled by a local authority. The federal government plans to construct a facility in one of the regions. The facility generates a local value in the host region and has spillover effects in the other region. The federal government does not observe the local value because it is the local authority's private information. 80 the federal governrnent designs an incentive-compatible mechanism, specifying if the facility should be constructed and a balanced scheme of interregional transfers to finance its cost. The federal governrnent is constitutionally constrained to respect a given leveI of each region's welfare. We show that depending upon the facility's local value and the spillover effect, the governrnent faces different incentive problems. Moreover, their existence depends crucially on how stringent constitutional constraints are. Therefore, the optimal mechanism will also depend upon these three features of the model.

Does liquidity constraints matter for Ricardian equivalence?

The paper analysis a general equilibrium model with two periods, several households and a government that has to finance some expenditures in the first period. Households may have some private information either about their type (adverse selection) or about some action levei chosen in the first period that affects the probability of certain states of nature in the second period (moral hazard). Trade of financiai assets are intermediated by a finite collection of banks. Banks objective functions are determined in equilibrium by shareholders. Due to private information it may be optimal for the banks to introduce constraints in the set of available portfolios for each household as wellas household specific asset prices. In particular, households may face distinct interest rates for holding the risk-free asset. The government finances its expenditures either by taxing households in the first period or by issuing bonds in the first period and taxing households in the second period. Taxes may be state-dependent. Suppose government policies are neutml: i) government policies do not affect the distribution of wealth across households; and ii) if the government decides to tax a household in the second period there is a portfolio available for the banks that generates the Mme payoff in each state of nature as the household taxes. Tben, Ricardian equivalence holds if and only if an appropriate boundary condition is satisfied. Moreover, at every free-entry equilibrium the boundary condition is satisfied and thus Ricardian equivalence holds. These results do not require any particular assumption on the banks' objective function. In particular, we do not assume banks to be risk neutral.