Developing “Best Practices” for bankers’ pay in line with Basel III

This paper proposes hybrid capital securities as a significant part of senior bank executive incentive compensation in light of Basel III, a new global regulatory standard on bank capital adequacy and liquidity agreed by the members of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. The committee developed Basel III in a response to the deficiencies in financial regulation brought about by the global financial crisis. Basel III strengthens bank capital requirements and introduces new regulatory requirements on bank liquidity and bank leverage. The hybrid bank capital securities we propose for bank executives’ compensation are preferred shares and subordinated debt that the June 2004 Basel II regulatory framework recognised as other admissible forms of capital. The past two decades have witnessed dramatic increase in performance-related pay in the banking industry. Stakeholders such as shareholders, debtholders and regulators criticise traditional cash and equity-based compensation for encouraging bank executives’ excessive risk taking and short-termism, which has resulted in the failure of risk management in high profile banks during the global financial crisis. Paying compensation in the form of hybrid bank capital securities may align the interests of executives with those of stakeholders and help banks regain their reputation for prudence after years of aggressive risk-taking. Additionally, banks are desperately seeking to raise capital in order to bolster balance sheets damaged by the ongoing credit crisis. Tapping their own senior employees with large incentive compensation packages may be a viable additional source of capital that is politically acceptable in times of large-scale bailouts of the financial sector and economically wise as it aligns the interests of the executives with the need for a stable financial system.

Do national cultural differences affect the nature and characteristics of HRM practices? Evidence from Australian and Hong Kong construction firms on remuneration and job autonomy

Human resource management (HRM) plays a pivotal role in attracting and retaining talents. However, there is growing recognition in international HRM literature that the adoption of the widely accepted US/Harvard-inspired HRM model ignores the influences of cultural contexts on HRM practices in different countries. This notion has not been empirically investigated in the construction industry. Based on survey responses from 604 construction professionals from Australia and Hong Kong, this study examines whether: (i) national cultural differences influence individuals’ preference for types of remuneration and job autonomy, (ii) actual organizational HRM practices reflect such preferences and (iii) gaps between individuals’ preferences and actual organizational HRM practices affect job satisfaction. Results showed significant difference in HRM preferences between Australian and Hong Kong respondents and these are reflected in the distinct types of HRM practices adopted by construction firms in the two countries. Findings further indicated that the gap between individuals’ preferences and actual organizational HRM practices is associated with job satisfaction. The results support existing mainstream research and highlight the deficiency of the acultural treatment of HRM that is still apparent in construction management literature. An uncritical literature in the area not only hinders theory development but also potentially undermines the ability of construction firms to attract, recruit, and retain scarce talents.