Cross-country effects of regulatory capital arbitrage

One reason for the recent asset price bubbles in many developed countries could be regulatory capital arbitrage. Regulatory and legal changes can help traditional banks to move their assets off their balance sheets into the lightly regulated shadows and thus enable regulatory arbitrage through the securitized sector. This paper adopts a global vector autoregression (GVAR) methodology to assess the effects of regulatory capital arbitrage on equity prices, house prices and economic activity across 11 OECD countries/ regions. A counterfactual experiment disentangles the effects of regulatory arbitrage following a change in the net capital rule for investment banks in April 2004 and the adoption of the Basel II Accord in June 2004. The results provide evidence for the existence of an international finance multiplier, with about half of the countries overshooting U.S. impulse responses. The counterfactual shows that regulatory arbitrage via the U.S. securitized sector may enhance the cross-country reallocation of capital from housing markets towards equity markets.

A word of caution on calculating market-based minimum capital risk requirements

This paper demonstrates that the use of GARCH-type models for the calculation of minimum capital risk requirements (MCRRs) may lead to the production of inaccurate and therefore inefficient capital requirements. We show that this inaccuracy stems from the fact that GARCH models typically overstate the degree of persistence in return volatility. A simple modification to the model is found to improve the accuracy of MCRR estimates in both back- and out-of-sample tests. Given that internal risk management models are currently in widespread usage in some parts of the world (most notably the USA), and will soon be permitted for EC banks and investment firms, we believe that our paper should serve as a valuable caution to risk management practitioners who are using, or intend to use this popular class of models.