Theory and practice in value management: a reply to Ellis et al (2005)

The constructivist model of 'soft' value management (VM) is contrasted with the VM discourse appropriated by cost consultants who operate from within UK quantity surveying (QS) practices. The enactment of VM by cost consultants is shaped by the institutional context within which they operate and is not necessarily representative of VM practice per se. Opportunities to perform VM during the formative stages of design are further constrained by the positivistic rhetoric that such practitioners use to conceptualize and promote their services. The complex interplay between VM theory and practice is highlighted and analysed from a non-deterministic perspective. Codified models of 'best practice' are seen to be socially constructed and legitimized through human interaction in the context of interorganizational networks. Published methodologies are seen to inform practice in only a loose and indirect manner, with extensive scope for localized improvization. New insights into the relationship between VM theory and practice are derived from the dramaturgical metaphor. The social reality of VM is seen to be constituted through scripts and performances, both of which are continuously contested across organizational arenas. It is concluded that VM defies universal definition and is conceptualized and enacted differently across different localized contexts.

Understanding construction consortia: Theory, practice and opinions

Firms form consortia in order to win contracts. Once a project has been awarded to a consortium each member then concentrates on his or her own contract with the client. Therefore, consortia are marketing devices, which present the impression of teamworking, but the production process is just as fragmented as under conventional procurement methods. In this way, the consortium forms a barrier between the client and the actual construction production process. Firms form consortia, not as a simple development of normal ways of working, but because the circumstances for specific projects make it a necessary vehicle. These circumstances include projects that are too large or too complex to undertake alone or projects that require on-going services which cannot be provided by the individual firms inhouse. It is not a preferred way of working, because participants carry extra risk in the form of liability for the actions of their partners in the consortium. The behaviour of members of consortia is determined by their relative power, based on several factors, including financial commitment and ease of replacement. The level of supply chain visibility to the public sector client and to the industry is reduced by the existence of a consortium because the consortium forms an additional obstacle between the client and the firms undertaking the actual construction work. Supply chain visibility matters to the client who otherwise loses control over the process of construction or service provision, while remaining accountable for cost overruns. To overcome this separation there is a convincing argument in favour of adopting the approach put forward in the Project Partnering Contract 2000 (PPC2000) Agreement. Members of consortia do not necessarily go on to work in the same consortia again because members need to respond flexibly to opportunities as and when they arise. Decision-making processes within consortia tend to be on an ad hoc basis. Construction risk is taken by the contractor and the construction supply chain but the reputational risk is carried by all the firms associated with a consortium. There is a wide variation in the manner that consortia are formed, determined by the individual circumstances of each project; its requirements, size and complexity, and the attitude of individual project leaders. However, there are a number of close working relationships based on generic models of consortia-like arrangements for the purpose of building production, such as the Housing Corporation Guidance Notes and the PPC2000.

Implementing innovation in construction: Contexts, relative boundedness and actor-network theory

Theoretical understanding of the implementation and use of innovations within construction contexts is discussed and developed. It is argued that both the rhetoric of the 'improvement agenda' within construction and theories of innovation fail to account for the complex contexts and disparate perspectives which characterize construction work. To address this, the concept of relative boundedness is offered. Relatively unbounded innovation is characterized by a lack of a coherent central driving force or mediator with the ability to reconcile potential conflicts and overcome resistance to implementation. This is a situation not exclusive to, but certainly indicative of, much construction project work. Drawing on empirical material from the implementation of new design and coordination technologies on a large construction project, the concept is developed, concentrating on the negotiations and translations implementation mobilized. An actor-network theory (ANT) approach is adopted, which emphasizes the roles that both human actors and non-human agents play in the performance and outcomes of these interactions. Three aspects of how relative boundedness is constituted and affected are described; through the robustness of existing practices and expectations, through the delegation of interests on to technological artefacts and through the mobilization of actors and artefacts to constrain and limit the scope of negotiations over new technology implementation.

Torque in mooring chain. Part 1: Background and theory

Chain in both its forms - common (or stud-less) and stud-link - has many engineering applications. It is widely used as a component in the moorings of offshore floating systems, where its ruggedness and corrosion resistance make it an attractive choice. Chain exhibits some interesting behaviour in that when straight and subject to an axial load it does not twist or generate any torque, but if twisted or loaded when in a twisted condition it behaves in a highly non-linear manner, with the torque dependent upon the level of twist and axial load. Clearly an understanding of the way in which chains may behave and interact with other mooring components (such as wire rope, which also exhibits coupling between axial load and generated torque) when they are in service is essential. However, the sizes of chain that are in use in offshore moorings (typical bar diameters are 75 mm and greater) are too large to allow easy testing. This paper, which is in two parts, aims to address the issues and considerations relevant to torque in mooring chain. The first part introduces a frictionless theory that predicts the resultant torques and 'lift' in the links as non-dimensionalized functions of the angle of twist. Fortran code is presented in an Appendix, which allows the reader to make use of the analysis. The second part of the paper presents results from experimental work on both stud-less (41 mm) and stud-link (20.5 and 56 mm) chains. Torsional data are presented in both 'constant twist' and 'constant load' forms, as well as considering the lift between the links.

Innovative approach to building systems integration problems: Using systems theory, technological forecasting and scenario planning

Building services are worth about 2% GDP and are essential for the effective and efficient operations of the building. It is increasingly recognised that the value of a building is related to the way it supports the client organisation’s ongoing business operations. Building services are central to the functional performance of buildings and provide the necessary conditions for health, well-being, safety and security of the occupants. They frequently comprise several technologically distinct sub-systems and their design and construction requires the involvement of numerous disciplines and trades. Designers and contractors working on the same project are frequently employed by different companies. Materials and equipment is supplied by a diverse range of manufacturers. Facilities managers are responsible for operation of the building service in use. The coordination between these participants is crucially important to achieve optimum performance, but too often is neglected. This leaves room for serious faults. The need for effective integration is important. Modern technology offers increasing opportunities for integrated personal-control systems for lighting, ventilation and security as well as interoperability between systems. Opportunities for a new mode of systems integration are provided by the emergence of PFI/PPP procurements frameworks. This paper attempts to establish how systems integration can be achieved in the process of designing, constructing and operating building services. The essence of the paper therefore is to envisage the emergent organisational responses to the realisation of building services as an interactive systems network.

How contractors price risk in bids: theory and practice

Formal and analytical models that contractors can use to assess and price project risk at the tender stage have proliferated in recent years. However, they are rarely used in practice. Introducing more models would, therefore, not necessarily help. A better understanding is needed of how contractors arrive at a bid price in practice, and how, and in what circumstances, risk apportionment actually influences pricing levels. More than 60 proposed risk models for contractors that are published in journals were examined and classified. Then exploratory interviews with five UK contractors and documentary analyses on how contractors price work generally and risk specifically were carried out to help in comparing the propositions from the literature to what contractors actually do. No comprehensive literature on the real bidding processes used in practice was found, and there is no evidence that pricing is systematic. Hence, systematic risk and pricing models for contractors may have no justifiable basis. Contractors process their bids through certain tendering gateways. They acknowledge the risk that they should price. However, the final settlement depends on a set of complex, micro-economic factors. Hence, risk accountability may be smaller than its true cost to the contractor. Risk apportionment occurs at three stages of the whole bid-pricing process. However, analytical approaches tend not to incorporate this, although they could.