Does the ring species concept predict vocal variation in the crimson rosella, Platycercus elegans, complex?

Vocal variation may be important in population divergence. We studied geographical variation in contact calls of parrots of the crimson rosella, Platycercus elegans, complex, which is characterized by striking geographical plumage coloration variation. This complex has long been considered a rare example of a ring species (where two divergent forms coexist in sympatry but are connected by a chain of intermediate populations forming a geographical ring). We tested whether contact call variation is consistent with the ring species hypothesis. We recorded calls throughout the ring, including several sites from the three main population groups forming the ring and interfaces between them. We analysed duration, peak frequency, fundamental frequency and frequency modulation. We found significant differences, particularly in fundamental frequency and frequency modulation, at multiple biogeographical scales ranging from local populations to subspecies level. Discriminant function analyses showed some populations could be reliably discriminated from call structure. However, our results provided little support for three key predictions of the ring species hypothesis: (1) calls of the terminal, most divergent forms were not significantly different in three of the four acoustic variables, and differences did not appear to be maintained in sympatry, (2) phenotypically/geographically intermediate populations were not characterized by intermediate calls, and (3) call variation was not concordant with geographical sequence around the ring from one terminal form to the other. Our results underscore the emerging view that the evolutionary histories and phenotypic variability of many long-held ring species may be inadequately described by the ring species hypothesis and require alternative explanations. (C) 2008 The Association for the Study of Animal Behaviour. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Lived experience of gay men caring for others with HIV/AIDS : living, loving and dying in the era of HIV/AIDS

This thesis explored gay male carers’ experience of caring for their partner, brother or friend who had HIV/AIDS. Through using phenomenological methodology (van Manen, 1990), the day-to-day caring experiences were uncovered. The data gathered were then analysed through a nursing ‘lens’, with the concept of stigma as an anchoring point. The dual stigmas of homophobia and AIDS phobia impacted on the daily lives of these men as they cared for their loved one. The research identified six themes. These were: 1) the relationship; 2) coping with HIV and AIDS; 3) the corporal impact of HIV/AIDS; 4) experiences of carers including the absence of others; 5) living daily with the virus: Demands of people living with HIV/AIDS (PLWHA); and 6) saying goodbye, but wanting to keep the memory alive. The caring these men undertook, for which they were frequently unprepared, was intensive and complex, but because of their commitment and love they battled on. Because of a sense of shame associated with AIDS phobia on the part of the PLWHA, the carer often had to undertake this care in isolation, without support from family, friends or home health care agencies. The carers struggled with not only the demands of day-to-day care, but also with non-acceptance from family, both of the nature of the relationship with their partner and of their homosexuality. Family members were forced, often with great difficulty, to acknowledge the close commitment the men had to each other. Recognition that one had a terminal disease, HIV/AIDS was also required. The fear of potential transmission was high among carers, friends and family members. Notably, there was an absence of blame on the part of the carer towards his partner for contracting HIV/AIDS. The physical decline and marking of the body further stigmatised the PLWHA, which added to carers’ burdens. They endeavoured to minimise the physical decline in their partner, so he could continue to pass as healthy, and attempted to make the day-to-day living as normal as possible. The methods of combating weight loss and opportunistic infections meant frequent medical appointments, complex intensive medical procedures and help with personal care, which was undertaken at home largely without support from health care staff. Carers frequently struggled also with their partner’s denial of being ill. One strategy all carers used was to escape with their partners from their everyday life in Melbourne and attempt metaphorically to leave the HIV/AIDS behind; this was a time when they could rekindle their life together as it was before HIV/AIDS came into their lives. Some carers chose to holiday without their partner, to give themselves a break from the day-to-day caring, while others planned and took holidays with their partner. The decline of the health in the PLWHA meant that family members had to recognise and accept both the nature of the relationship and the presence of the disease. This recognition and acceptance often came only when the partner was very ill, even at the point of dying. Carers and their partners discussed the potential use of euthanasia, as a means of ending the final phase of life with some dignity. One carer and his partner used euthanasia, despite its illegal status. The main concern for all carers was providing comfort and a reduction in the pain associated with HIV/AIDS for the partner. The widespread grief associated with HIV/AIDS was evident amongst these carers. All had known other gay men who had died, some carers own partner had died, or was about to die. There was an overwhelming sense of grief, which at times was repressed as a means of coping day-to-day. All carers felt it was important and necessary to remember those lost to HIV/AIDS through the various public memorials, as they did not want their partner to be just another faceless person lost to this disease. This phenomenological study of carers’ experience highlights the need for health care workers to be aware of the differing strategies that gay men use to cope with HIV/AIDS. While it may seem that the carers are coping with care of their partner, the outer façade is not always an accurate portrayal of the true situation. Health care workers should enquire as to the assistance these carers need from health care services in order to continue to care for their loved one. Such assistance can be the simple recognition of the partner and acceptance of them as part of the PLWHA’s network; this inclusion and acceptance is half the battle.

Dialogue with Hans-Georg Gadamer : the contribution of hermeneutics to understanding what a person is saying

This thesis reviews the development of philosophy of interpretation since the nineteenth century exemplified in the work of Hans-Georg Gadamer, It recognizes Gadamer as the foremost philosopher of hermeneutics in the twentieth century, who draws together the contributions of his predecessors into a major new development. The theme upon which this thesis engages in dialogue with Gadamer is concentrated on the problem of making experience the sole object of hermeneutics to the exclusion of persons and what they say, considered objectively. The problem with this is to express the role of interpretative practices philosophically if non-objectifying thinking is normative for hermeneutics. A solution is found by following up Gadamer’s insight into the influence of tradition on understanding, I show that tradition and its truth, as well as not being separable from the understanding subject's thinking, are also not detached from an author's intentions and are shared by human beings understanding one another. The transmissive nature of tradition discloses its own method for understanding what a person is saying and the ethical requirements of truth are forwarded by following that method.

Death and late-stage dementia in institutions : a cultural analysis

The first purpose of this study was to describe the deaths of fifteen nursing home residents with late-stage dementia. The devastating effect of dementia on a person has been called a ‘living death’ (Woods, 1989). The caring which occurs when someone is going through this process in a nursing home was recorded and analysed. In analysing this act of caring, the second purpose was to look for the origins of the structures and the sources of pressure that shaped the context and therefore helped determine the behaviour of the various groups under observation. These groups were residents and their relatives, the staff of the nursing home and the treating doctors. Before commencing observations and carrying out this study, an understanding needed to be developed of: the condition of dementia as it is perceived by health professionals and presented in the media; the institutions in which the majority of people with dementia end their days; the background and conditions of the staff who nurse in them; the models of care that guide and determine policies; and the conceptions of life and death which underpin relevant laws and moral standpoints. Accordingly, in part 1. chapter 1 the history, causes, pathology and effects of dementing conditions are examined. Relevant medical and lay literature including media influences are examined which pertain to the subject of death and dementia and nursing home care. The history of this institutional care is briefly examined together with the growth of the discipline of gerontological nursing. Chapter 2 discusses some of the effects of this history on present day care and the concept of emotional work being carried out within the present day aged care public policy regulations. The moral arguments surrounding illness and dying in Australian society today are briefly discussed. Chapter 3 describes the conceptual framework for the study, the ethnographic method that has been employed and an outline of critical theory as the basis for analysis. The chapter concludes by recounting the practical steps taken to arrange the field work, secure the consent of participants, record data and gather documents, and outlines the ethical considerations given to the undertaking of the study. Chapter 4 describes the context in which the study took place and the first tentative exploration of the culture from an etic perspective. Part 2 describes the death trajectories observed and raises some questions about alternative strategies that may have been considered within a different paradigm of caring. In chapter 5 the death trajectories of each of the fifteen residents in the study are described, each written with a particular emphasis to illustrate aspects of the culture of care that emerged through thematic analysis. Observations, comments and feelings from staff and family are wound in and around these case studies. Chapter 6 looks more closely at the impact of policy and institutional pressure on the milieu in which these deaths took place. Part 3 draws conclusions from the observations and makes suggestions for emancipatory change as viewed from the author's standpoint of critical ethnographic analysis. In the final chapter an argument is presented for policy change that leads a movement towards palliative care practices for people with late-stage dementia. Approaches to implementation of palliative care will need to take account of any expression by the resident such as an advanced directive, indicating a preferred approach to treatment in the period prior to death; a need for a better understanding of such issues as the significance of body breakdown, the manifestations of pain and electrolyte imbalances; the surrounding ethical complexities and shift in public opinion, and perhaps, most of ail, the culture of the institutions in which this dying will take place. A definition of late-stage dementia which might be used in determining patterns of care is set out. A discussion about changes in practice which relate lo communication with treating doctors, the administering of antibiotics, the relief of pain, the mobilisation of residents and the provision of food and water takes place in light of the evidence found. The discussion of these issues is raised in the form of debate. Each aspect needs more rigorous analysis and information so that evidence-based practice, rather than care which is value-laden and emotional, can be used when treatment decisions are made for people with late-stage dementia.

Convex hulls in concept induction

Classification learning is dominated by systems which induce large numbers of small axis-orthogonal decision surfaces. This strongly biases such systems towards particular hypothesis types but there is reason believe that many domains have underlying concepts which do not involve axis orthogonal surfaces. Further, the multiplicity of small decision regions mitigates against any holistic appreciation of the theories produced by these systems, notwithstanding the fact that many of the small regions are individually comprehensible. This thesis investigates modeling concepts as large geometric structures in n-dimensional space. Convex hulls are a superset of the set of axis orthogonal hyperrectangles into which axis orthogonal systems partition the instance space. In consequence, there is reason to believe that convex hulls might provide a more flexible and general learning bias than axis orthogonal regions. The formation of convex hulls around a group of points of the same class is shown to be a usable generalisation and is more general than generalisations produced by axis-orthogonal based classifiers, without constructive induction, like decision trees, decision lists and rules. The use of a small number of large hulls as a concept representation is shown to provide classification performance which can be better than that of classifiers which use a large number of small fragmentary regions for each concept. A convex hull based classifier, CH1, has been implemented and tested. CH1 can handle categorical and continuous data. Algorithms for two basic generalisation operations on hulls, inflation and facet deletion, are presented. The two operations are shown to improve the accuracy of the classifier and provide moderate classification accuracy over a representative selection of typical, largely or wholly continuous valued machine learning tasks. The classifier exhibits superior performance to well-known axis-orthogonal-based classifiers when presented with domains where the underlying decision surfaces are not axis parallel. The strengths and weaknesses of the system are identified. One particular advantage is the ability of the system to model domains with approximately the same number of structures as there are underlying concepts. This leads to the possibility of extraction of higher level mathematical descriptions of the induced concepts, using the techniques of computational geometry, which is not possible from a multiplicity of small regions.

Second person : a point of view? The function of the second person pronoun in narrative prose fiction

This thesis looks at the functions and effects of the ‘second-person’ pronoun in narrative prose fiction, with particular focus on the fluidity and ambiguity of the mode that I will call Protean-'you.' It is a mode in which it is unclear whether the ‘you’ is a character, the narrator, a reader/narratee, or no-one in particular—or a combination of these—so that readers find ‘second-person’ utterances at once familiar and deeply strange. I regard the ‘second person’ as a special case of narrative ‘person’ that, at its most fluid, can produce an experience of reading quite unlike that of reading traditional ‘first-‘ and ‘third-person’ narrative. Essentially, this unique experience comes about because Protean-‘you’ neglects to constitute the stable modes of subjectivity that readers expect to find within narrative textuality. These stable modes of subjectivity, modelled on what I will refer to as Cartesianism’s hegemonic notion of the self, have been thoroughly formalised and naturalised within the practices of ‘first-‘ and ‘third-person’ narrative. The Protean-‘you’ form of ‘second-person’ narrative, conversely, is a mode of narrative discourse that puts readers in a place of doubt and uncertainty, its unsettling equivocations forcefully disrupting accustomed, mimetic explanations of narrative and denying us access to the foundational, authorising subject of classical Cartesian thought. Rather than founding a notion of ‘second-person’ narrative and narrative ‘person’ generally on Cartesianism's ‘self-ish’ logic of unified, privatised identity, I turn to C.S, Peirce's notion of the semiotic self and to developments in post-structuralist thought. Essentially, the conception of subjectivity underpinning my arguments is Peirce's proposition that the self is to be conceived of not as a cogito, but as a sign by which the conscious entity knows itself. It is a sign, moreover, that is constantly being re-read, reinterpreted, so that identity is never self-complete. This reconception of subjectivity is necessary because 1 will argue that the effects of Protean-‘you’ arise in some part from a tension between Cartesianism's hegemony and what philosophical pragmatism and post-structuralism glimpse as the actual condition of the human subject—the subject as dispersed and contingent rather than unified and authoritative. Most discussions of ‘second-person’ narrative conceive of the mode in terms of implicit communicative relations, in some measure instituting Cartesianism's notion of the intentionalist self at the centre of literary meaning. I contrast the paradigmatic address model that arises from this conception against a model that approaches the analysis of ‘second-person’ narrative modality in terms of a referential function, that is, in terms of the object or objects referred to deictically by the ‘second-person’ pronoun. Two principal functions of ‘second-person’ textuality are identified and discussed at length. The first is generalisation, which is rarely dissipated altogether, a situation that contributes to the ambiguities of the pronoun's reference in much ‘second-person’ fiction. The second principal function is that of address, that is, the allocutionary function. Clearly, although stories that continually refer to a ‘you’ can seem quite baffling and unnatural, not all ‘second-person’ narratives unsettle the reader. In order to make the ‘second person's’ outlandish narratives knowable and stable, we bring to bear on them in our habits of reading whatever hermeneutic frames, whatever interpretive keys, come to hand, including a large number of unexceptional forms of literary and ‘natural’ discourse that employ the ‘second-person’ pronoun. These forms include letter writing and internal dialogue (i.e., talking to one's self), the language of the courtroom, the travelogue, the maxim, and so on. In looking at the ways in which the radicalising potentials of ‘second-person’ discourse are contained or recuperated, I focus on issues of vraisemblance and mimesis. Vraisemblance can be described as the ‘system of conventions and expectations which rests on/reinforces that more general system of ‘mutual knowledge’ produced within a community for the realisation and maintenance of a whole social world’. All of the forms of the vraisemblable are already instituted within social, cultural relations, so that what vraisemblance describes is the way we fit the inscriptions we read-that is, the way in which we naturalise what we read-into those given cultural and social forms. I also look at the conventionalising and naturalising work done by notions of mimesis in explaining relations between the world, our being in it, and texts, proposing that mimesis provides a principle buttress by which the good standing of the metaphor of ‘person’ is preserved in traditional and pre-critical modes of analysis. Indeed, the critic’s recourse to ‘person’ is in some measure always an engagement with mimesis. Any discussion that maintains that mimesis is in some way productive of meaning-which this thesis in fact does-must identify mimesis as a merely conventional category within practices of reading and semiosis more generally, and at the very least remove that term from its traditional position of transparent primacy and authority. Some of the most interesting and insightful arguments about ‘second-person’ narrative propose that the ‘second person’s’ most striking effects derive from the constitution of an ‘intersubjective’ experience of reading in which the subject positions of the ‘you’-protagonist, reader-narratee and narrator are combined into a fluid and indeterminate multiple subjectivity. Notions of intersubjectivity frequently position themselves as liberating the reader from Cartesianism's fixed, authoritative modes of subjectivity, Frequently, however, they tend implicitly to reinstate Cartesianism's notion of the self at the centre of textual practice and subjectivity. I look at Daniel Gunn's novel ‘Almost You’, at length in this context, illustrating the constant overdetermination of the ‘you’ and the novel's narrating voice, and demonstrating that this overdetermination leaves the origin of the narrative discourse, the identity of the narrator, and the ontological nature of both principal protagonists utterly ambiguous. The fluidity and ambiguity of Protean-‘you’ in ‘Almost You’ is discussed in terms of ‘second-person’ intersubjectivity, but with a view to demonstrating the indebtedness by the notion of intersubjectivity to Cartesianism's hegemony of ‘person’. I then turn to a discussion of what might be a more ‘old fashioned’ if perhaps ultimately more far-reaching approach to the ‘second person’s’ often startling ambiguities. This is Keats's notion of negative capability, a capacity or quality in which a person ‘is capable of being in uncertainties, Mysteries, doubts, without any irritable reaching after fact and reason.’ I suggest that Protean-‘you’ texts will license all of the readings of ambiguity and fluidity proposed in my discussion of ‘Almost You’, but conclude that the instances of indeterminacy illustrate no more than that: the fluidity and deep ambiguity, and thus, finally, the lack of coherence, of Protean-‘you’ discourse. This has particular implications for how we are to consider readers’ experiences of narrative texts. More fundamentally, it has implications for how we are to consider readers as subjects. I suggest that unstable, ambiguous instances of ‘second-person’ narrative can tear the complex and systematic embroidery of ideological suture that unifies Cretinism’s experience or sense of subjectivity, leaving the reader in a condition of epistemological and ontological havoc. I go on to argue that much of the deeply unsettling effect of Protean-‘you’ discourse anises because its utterances explicitly gesture towards Cretinism’s notion of self. Protean-‘you’ involves a sense of address that is much more pronounced than we are accustomed to facing when reading literary narrative, alerting us to the presence of inscribed anthropomorphic subjects. At the very same time, protean-‘you’ leaves its inscribed subjects indeterminate, ambiguous. This conflict generates a tension between the anticipation of the emergence of speaking and listening selves and our inability to find them. I go on to propose that Protean-‘you’ narrative's lack of coherence is also to be understood as the condition of narrative actuality generally, but a condition that is vigorously mediated against by dominant practices of reading and writing, hocusing my discussion in this respect on the issue of narrative ‘person,’ I argue that narrative ‘person’ is constituted within texts as an apparent unity, but that it is in fact, produced as unitary solely within the practice of making sense, that is, Within our habits of reading, and so is never finally unified. I propose that this is the case for ‘first-‘ and ‘third-person’ modes no less than for the ‘second.’ Where ‘second-person’ narrative at its most radical and Protean differs from conventional ‘first-‘ and ‘third-person’ narratives is the degree to which each has been circumscribed by practices of tantalization, containment and limit, and, in particular, Cretinism’s hegemony of ‘person.’ It may be that the most significant insights ‘second-person’ narrative has to offer are to be found within its capacity to reveal to the engaged reader the underlying condition of narrative discourse, and more generally, its capacity to reveal the actual condition of the human subject-a condition in which, exactly like its textual corollary of narrative ‘person,’ the self is glimpsed as thoroughly dispersed and contingent.

Meaning of home : a comparison of the meaning of home as identified by samples of Victorians with, and without, an intellectual disability

This phenomenological study of the meaning of home from the perspectives of people with and without an intellectual disability sought to identify, (a) any common ‘essence’ of meaning held by and, (b) the nature of any differences of perception between, the groups. Purposive samples of 18 people with an intellectual disability and 21 non-disabled people were surveyed using a semi-structured interview to ascertain their experiences of home and 'non-homes'. Inductive analysis of the data revealed a shared understanding of the meaning of home at a fundamental level. This shared meaning of home was found to comprise: the ability to exert control over an area; having a personalised space; feeling content with the living situation; a sense of familiarity with the setting; a set of behaviours and routines usually only enacted when at home; common names and uses for rooms; socialising at home with others; the importance of a positive social atmosphere in the home; and, recognition of places as non-homes because they lacked one or more of these attributes. Further analysis revealed the essence of home is its experience as the place where stress is most reduced or minimised for the individual. The study demonstrates that the concept of stress is superordinate to previously identified concepts considered fundamental to home such as privacy, control and non-homes. Major differences between the two samples were largely differences of degree with people who have an intellectual disability reporting the same fundamental attributes of home as people who do not have an intellectual disability, but in a less elaborated form. Principal among these differences of degree was the notion of control over the home and its derivative elements which encompassed the whole dwelling including its setting for people without an intellectual disability but was very restricted for people with an intellectual disability being largely confined to the person's bedroom. Socialising in or from the home was also very limited for people with an intellectual disability in comparison with that experienced by non-disabled informants with the former group conveying an impression of leading significantly socially isolated lives at home. The major implications of this study are related to the meaning of home per se, to residential service provision to people with an intellectual disability, and to future research.