A new approach for the solution of the optimal set-point tracking problem for nonlinear systems

In this paper, a discrete time dynamic integrated system optimisation and parameter estimation algorithm is applied to the solution of the nonlinear tracking optimal control problem. A version of the algorithm with a linear-quadratic model-based problem is developed and implemented in software. The algorithm implemented is tested with simulation examples.

Optimal control of nonlinear differential algebraic equation systems

A novel iterative procedure is described for solving nonlinear optimal control problems subject to differential algebraic equations. The procedure iterates on an integrated modified linear quadratic model based problem with parameter updating in such a manner that the correct solution of the original non-linear problem is achieved. The resulting algorithm has a particular advantage in that the solution is achieved without the need to solve the differential algebraic equations . Convergence aspects are discussed and a simulation example is described which illustrates the performance of the technique. 1. Introduction When modelling industrial processes often the resulting equations consist of coupled differential and algebraic equations (DAEs). In many situations these equations are nonlinear and cannot readily be directly reduced to ordinary differential equations.

On the determinants of optimal border enforcement

We extend the current immigration-enforcement literature by incorporating both the practice of people smuggling and a role for non-wage income into a two-country, dynamic general equilibrium model. We use the model economy to examine three questions. First, how does technological progress in the smuggling industry affect the level of migration and capital accumulation for a given level of enforcement? Second, do changes in border enforcement affect the level of migration, capital accumulation, and smuggling activity? Third, is the optimal level of enforcement sensitive to technological progress in the smuggling industry? We show that the government chooses to devote resources to border enforcement only if the deterrent effect on smugglers is large enough. Otherwise, it is not worth taxing host-country natives as the taxes paid will more than offset any income gain resulting from fewer migrants.