Inbreeding uncovers fundamental differences in the genetic load affecting male and female fertility in a butterfly

Inbreeding depression is most pronounced for traits closely associated with fitness. The traditional explanation is that natural selection eliminates deleterious mutations with additive or dominant effects more effectively than recessive mutations, leading to directional dominance for traits subject to strong directional selection. Here we report the unexpected finding that, in the butterfly Bicyclus anynana, male sterility contributes disproportionately to inbreeding depression for fitness (complete sterility in about half the sons from brother-sister matings), while female fertility is insensitive to inbreeding. The contrast between the sexes for functionally equivalent traits is inconsistent with standard selection arguments, and suggests that trait-specific developmental properties and cryptic selection play crucial roles in shaping genetic architecture. There is evidence that spermatogenesis is less developmentally stable than oogenesis, though the unusually high male fertility load in B. anynana additionally suggests the operation of complex selection maintaining male sterility recessives. Analysis of the precise causes of inbreeding depression will be needed to generate a model that reliably explains variation in directional dominance and reconciles the gap between observed and expected genetic loads carried by populations. This challenging evolutionary puzzle should stimulate work on the occurrence and causes of sex differences in fertility load.

The Dark Side of Nudging: The Ethics, Political Economy, and Law of Libertarian Paternalism

Libertarian paternalism, as advanced by Cass Sunstein, is seriously flawed, but not primarily for the reasons that most commentators suggest. Libertarian paternalism and its attendant regulatory implications are too libertarian, not too paternalistic, and as a result are in considerable tension with ‘thick’ conceptions of human dignity. We make four arguments. The first is that there is no justification for a presumption in favor of nudging as a default regulatory strategy, as Sunstein asserts. It is ordinarily less effective than mandates; such mandates rarely offend personal autonomy; and the central reliance on cognitive failures in the nudging program is more likely to offend human dignity than the mandates it seeks to replace. Secondly, we argue that nudging as a regulatory strategy fits both overtly and covertly, often insidiously, into a more general libertarian program of political economy. Thirdly, while we are on the whole more concerned to reject the libertarian than the paternalistic elements of this philosophy, Sunstein’s work, both in Why Nudge?, and earlier, fails to appreciate how nudging may be manipulative if not designed with more care than he acknowledges. Lastly, because of these characteristics, nudging might even be subject to legal challenges that would give us the worst of all possible regulatory worlds: a weak regulatory intervention that is liable to be challenged in the courts by well-resourced interest groups. In such a scenario, and contrary to the ‘common sense’ ethos contended for in Why Nudge?, nudges might not even clear the excessively low bar of doing something rather than nothing. Those seeking to pursue progressive politics, under law, should reject nudging in favor of regulation that is more congruent with principles of legality, more transparent, more effective, more democratic, and allows us more fully to act as moral agents. Such a system may have a place for (some) nudging, but not one that departs significantly from how labeling, warnings and the like already function, and nothing that compares with Sunstein’s apparent ambitions for his new movement.