Moral panic : the old and the new

The theory of moral panics has been prominent in the sociology of deviance since the 1970s. This article uses this theory to trace the rise of the moral panic around the high number of heroin overdose deaths in Australian in the mid to late 1990s. It argues, however, that much of the panic was generated by groups not traditionally associated with moral panics, but by political progressives in the field of illicit drugs as well as victims, parent groups, and those who work with illicit drug users. In this way it was not a conventional right-wing moral crusade, but it was no less a moral panic.

NFC, moral position, socialisation and ethical decision-making

Absolutism (deontology and teleology), moral relativism (individual moral position), and individual and environmental factors are at the crossroads of descriptive ethics research. For several decades, researchers have espoused teleological aspects, such as the punitive influence of codes of ethics, as managerial tools that enhance ethical conduct in organisations. The current study modelled the individual factors of need-for-cognition (NFC), individual moral position, and occupational socialisation as influences on the work-norms of marketers. The findings from a survey of marketers suggest that NFC influences the ethical idealism, professional socialisation, and work-norms of marketers positively. The research identifies that encouraging cognitive activities among marketers may be a useful alternative when developing appropriate deontological work-norms and decision-making under ethical conditions in marketing.

Skeptical theism and moral skepticism : a reply to Almeida and Oppy

Skeptical theists purport to undermine evidential arguments from evil by appealing to the fact that our knowledge of goods, evils, and their interconnections is significantly limited. Michael J. Almeida and Graham Oppy have recently argued that skeptical theism is unacceptable because it results in a form of moral skepticism which rejects inferences that play an important role in our ordinary moral reasoning. In this reply to Almeida and Oppy's argument we offer some reasons for thinking that skeptical theism need not lead to any such objectionable form of moral skepticism.